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ABSTRACT
Constructive body theology provides an ethical commitment to and a set of
analytical principles for understanding bodily experience. If we insist upon the
theological value of embodied experience, how can we give an adequate account of it?
Are feminist appeals to the senses useful in developing theological truth claims based in
embodied experiences? Feminist theologies which explicitly seek to overcome
body/mind dualisms often reinscribe them when they neglect to attend to perception as a
critical element of bodily experience. Phenomenological analyses of perception (such as
suggested by Merleau-Ponty) strengthen and refine our conception of embodiment.
Grounding constructive theology in experience requires understanding experience as
bodily perceptual orientation, as perceptual bodily and cultural acts involved in socially
and historically situated contextual meaning-making processes. This shift expands
phenomenological concepts such as intentionality and habit, and allows for a comparative
investigation of historical and cultural differences in embodied experiences through
examples found in sensory anthropology. Body theology, framed as principles,
strengthens theological projects (such as those by Carter Heyward and Marcella AlthausReid, as well as new constructive possibilities) through opening dialogical avenues of
exploration into embodied being in the world. Body theology principles help us conceive
of and address how our bodily experiencing—our feeling, tasting, hearing, imaging,
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remembering and other sensory knowledge —comes to matter in our lives, especially
where oppressive forces viscerally affect embodied life.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION OF BODY THEOLOGY
I was preparing a presentation on the importance of embodiment to theory and
theology at a national academic conference in 2010 when I received a phone call from
my father: “Oma passed away last night.” Oma, my paternal grandmother, had been part
of the household I grew up in and had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease 13 years
prior. “Don’t come to the funeral,” my parents insisted. “We’re too busy taking care of
things here. Besides, she’d been dying for a long time. You’ve got other things to do. Go
to your conference.”
But as family matters often do, bereavement and processing the death of a person
infused those “other things” (like presenting about embodiment) with emotions and
questions. I asked myself, “How could it be that my thoughts and activities are still
centered on a body now dead, the final passing of a person whom I began mourning
almost a decade ago?” Alzheimer’s disease had brought on physical, mental, and
emotional changes in the loving and doting grandmother who had a significant part in
raising me. Changes in personality and physical and mental capabilities required
adjustments in our relationship. I had to let go of the person I had come to know.
Grandmom spent the last years of her life in a nursing home, requiring more intensive
care than my father, who had been her primary caretaker, could provide.
Reflecting on those last years of her at home and in nursing care, I thought about
the peculiarity of our household she has been part of–my parents, my sister and I musing
1

out loud about her mental state, her being “like a vegetable”–and yet so much of our
lives, especially the daily lives and routines of my parents, revolved around this body.
What agency did this body hold? What power did it assert in the physical space of our
home and our experiences together in it, even as we stopped searching for emotional and
mental cues to help us relate? Why were the daily activities of my parents managed by
this body with declining cognitive capacities, even when (to us) her eyes lost signs of
comprehending her environment, and my father, the last person she was able to
recognize, became a stranger to her?
***
This dissertation is about bodies, bodily experiences, sense-perception, difference,
and theology. It is a reflection grounded in feminist commitments, a reflection on how
theologians interested in understanding and analyzing bodily experiences need to begin
by framing them as integral to the process of our meaning-making, to our socio-cultural
expressions, as integral to how we relate to the world and how we find and invest value.
This project joins a long line of feminist theological ventures, asserting the importance of
experience in theorizing, the importance of difference to experience, and the varieties of
embodiments demanding attention when thinking about difference. However, this is not a
project seeking to elaborate on the merits of specific experiences as resource by narrating
the particularity of the experience and accounting for the ways in which it is useful to
theology. Instead, I seek to highlight the significance of complexly conceiving of bodily
experience intertwined with processes of perception, so that experience is not simply one
among many possible starting points, but the realm of meaning making. Ultimately,
theologies which seek to begin with a critical analysis of the human condition need to be
2

able to account for the ways in which bodily experience is the ground for the various
dimensions of our lives.
Cartesian/Kantian epistemologies locate the primacy of validation of knowledge
in objective rationality. Feminist theories and theologies, too, have suffered
compartmentalization as a result of rationalist epistemologies by failing to complexly
conceive of the body-mind-world connection they seek to frame in order to overcome
body/mind dualisms. The contribution of this dissertation is framed by taking another
look at the utilizing of experience itself. I will demonstrate that theologies which
understand themselves as accessing, retrieving, and mining bodily experience as resource
too often end up failing themselves. They do this by perpetuating certain Cartesian
presuppositions they aim to overcome, specifically in regards to bodily experience and
perception.
In this project, I explore bodily experience as a theological resource. I will take a
closer look at the embodied dimensions of our existence in the world, rather than
approaching bodily experience through the discursive, through analyses of social
constructions (though not neglecting this dimension). I will utilize “body theology,”
which I will frame as analytical principles grounded in and emerging out of
understanding our bodily perceptual orientations in the world. Rather than acting as
theologizing subjects, exploring material reality and turning to access our bodily
experience of it, we need to begin with conceiving of bodily experience as the
fundamental condition of our subjectivity. Thus body theology needs to approach bodily
experience as the realm through which to understand socio-cultural ideologies traversing
and impeding on our bodies, whilst also being the realm which constructs and conveys
3

socio-cultural ideologies through perceptual values and practices evident in our bodily
experience.
As I engage in this work, I appreciate the discursive analysis of experience but
wonder about the underlying presuppositions embedded in methods which access and
utilize embodied aspects of experience. My goal is to present an approach, “body
theology,” as a critical framework for our understanding of human experiences and
embodied differences. I will make a case that we need to take bodily sensory perception
seriously in order to understand bodily experiences for the sake of critical theological
analysis, not just in feminist theologies and discourse, but generally in the “Cartesianbased” field of theology as well.
Bodily Experience
“Experience is a reality that needs explaining,” Mary McClintock Fulkerson
charges as she demands that feminist theologians do the work of connecting systems of
discourse and social relations to their claims of experienced reality. 1 Though this claim
was made twenty years ago, I will make the case that indeed experience is still a reality
that demands explaining, even after these critical and complex connections to discourse
are made.
The complicated enmeshment of experience and discourse, of embodiment and
language, has gained attention with the application of poststructuralist methods and
theories of social constructivism. Especially after Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, neither
feminist theory nor feminist theology has been the same: The implications of language

1

Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Changing the Subject: Women's Discourses and Feminist Theology
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), viii.
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and discourse on embodied experiences are now available to critical investigation. 2
“Experience” has become a resource to be defined and handled carefully. 3 It now needs
to be thought of in relation to power structures and linguistic systems, lest we run the risk
of oversimplifying and excluding differences to the point of inducing harm for the sake of
harnessing experiences of chosen identity groups, for example, “women.”
In light of Judith Butler’s claim that language and materiality are fully embedded
in each other, but nevertheless not reducible to each other,4 I question methodologies that
seek to access and utilize embodied experience. When appealing to experience as a
resource, feminist theologians often rely upon narratives of experience, which makes the
above-mentioned need for discourse analysis necessary. But if our bodily experience, the
material reality of bodily life, is irreducible to a thing we have, what are we missing by
focusing on discourse, and, what are we presupposing when resourcing bodily
experience?5

2

Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge,

1990).
3

The elaboration and description of “experience” is one of the aims of this project, I will forego a
specific definition here and refer the reader to the following chapters, particularly chapter three.
4

Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits Of "Sex" (New York: Routledge,

1993), 69.
5

In terms of political analysis of experience, the prevailing mode of accounting for and
responding to social events has been what Davide Panagia termed “narratocracy,” or “the rule of the
narrative.” Panagia argues that offering narrative lines is coupling of the visual with the textual, rendering
events readable by incising a story line into the field of vision. This commits vision to readerly sight (while
at the same time partitioning the body into areas of sensory competency. Panagia investigates the regimes
of perception and their political power. He questions political strategies such as those of Judith Butler, who
seek to offer aggressive counterreadings (i.e., changing the story lines), and offers parallel (not
replacement) strategies, namely, enacting reconfigurations of the sensible. Davide Panagia, The Political
Life of Sensation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009). This project seeks to inquire into the
sensible, as to more complexly grasp how it might configure our social life (and inspire imaginations into
possible reconfigurations).
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If we as theologians appeal to embodied experience, we must do the work of
attending to the sensory perceptual aspects of embodiment, the bodily capacities and
orientation to the world, in order to investigate the complex ways in which our
experience is facilitated and shaped in and through our bodily existence in the world. For
example, the questions nagging in the back of my mind as I developed this project
centered on Oma’s experience: Without much short-term memory and failing long-term
memory, how does she experience her life? Does it matter if I am there with her? Does
she experience the love and care, the frustration and bitterness extended towards her?
Does she still know ____? And how would we know about what she experiences,
considering the symptoms of Alzheimer’s (affecting brain receptors and neural
connections, loss of neurons)? I had watched my grandmother unresponsive to the smell
of burning milk and other sensory stimuli which should have evoked a response. Does
she experience ____? How do we begin to understand bodily experience or the criteria
for it? If my grandmother does not “have” experiences such as memory, desire, pain, fear,
etc., anymore, or at the least, does not have the capacity to express them or respond to
perceptual stimuli through verbal or physical responses, what does that imply about her
bodily existence? Theologically, speaking from a feminist perspective, has she lost her
subjectivity, her capacities for meaning-making, for orienting herself in the world? What
makes this body an experiencing person? Whose experience is now (more or less)
valuable in the sourcing of theology?
My academic interest in theology had put me on a path ready to explore some of
these questions. Because of its insistence on experience (particularly women’s
experience) as a resource, feminist theology became an important methodological
6

touchstone. Theologians who affirm “women’s experience” as a theological resource
hold different conceptualizations of “experience” and employ them in a variety of ways. 6
Yet more often than not, that humans “experience” is presupposed, but the how of
experiencing is left unexamined, which posits it in an a-contextual way. In other words,
feminist theologians may insist on differences in experience, yet the analytical structures
to reflect on “experience” are considered to be foundational and generalizing-able, and
stable enough to be universally applicable.
Bodily experience is not a dimension of experience separate from, say, socialized
or historical experience, but rather the one grounding all “other” experiences.7 Yet bodily
experience is also a contested space, a space deeply paradoxical, sociopolitical, and
intensely personal, as disability scholar Christopher Newell alerts us, because it
acknowledges the person experiencing, rather than remaining grounded in the objects

6

“Experience,” as we have already discovered thus far (and will discuss throughout this
dissertation), continues to be a term accompanied by various presuppositions as well as common sense
assertions. This dissertation will explore experience as bodily perceptual orientation. Other scholars,
depending on discipline, have defined (or utilized without definition) “experience” in various other ways.
Pamela Young provides a distinction of five categories of experience conceived of in feminist theological
reflections: bodily experience, socialized experience (experience of being made into a ‘woman’ by society
with its construction of femininity), feminist experience (response to and radical questioning of socialized
experience), historical experience (recovery of women’s history), and individual experience. Serene Jones,
"Women's Experience between a Rock and a Hard Place: Feminist, Womanist, and Mujerista Theologies in
North America," Horizons in Feminist Theology: Identity, Tradition, and Norms (1997): 34. “Experience”
as a term and category has undergone a plethora of philosophical conceptualizations. In general, when I
refer to “experience,” I aim to refer to the modes of sensing, knowing, understanding, moving in, engaging
with, being familiar with, learning, thinking, imagining, etc., the world. This incorporates “experience” as
practice or skill (as in having experience in typing), but is also much more general in terms of what makes
up my grasp and engagement in a situation, “experience” as that which I will explore in chapters three and
four as “bodily perceptual orientation in the world.”
7

As cited in Elizabeth Stuart, "Experience and Tradition: Just Good Friends," in Sources and
Resources of Feminist Theologies, ed. Elisabeth Hartlieb and Charlotte Methuen (Mainz, Germany:
Matthias-Gruenewald Verlag, 1997), 51. While I do not believe that these categories are necessarily
exclusive, they are useful in highlighting what kind of experience an author engages (even if she does not
point this out explicitly herself), and this naming of differences is useful to demonstrate the openness and
fluidity of the term.

7

experienced and the validated ways of gaining knowledge. 8 Bodily experience is a space
that is socially shaped: to analyze the space of bodily experience we can focus on sociocultural accounts of oppression of people with certain kinds of bodies and specifically the
prejudice and injustices bestowed upon them. Yet this personal space is also deeply
physical: the realities of flux and deterioration are embodied and undeniable in each of
our own existences. This paradoxical nature of bodily experience can create a space for
reflections that come from experiences that are deeply personal, unique, and embodied;
reflections on the projects of culture and theology that are subject-centered (not
“subjective” in an individualized sense).
The important question regarding bodily experience is not whether but how it will
be valued. Is it just one kind of experience, one that brings out particularities of an
individual context? If so, then the challenge identified for theology remains that of
making room for narratives about bodily experiences, especially those marginalized, and
to create space for narratives that speak about undervalued, suppressed experiences, to
allow for a voice commonly denied to speak against that which has come to be seen as
acceptable. Yet this trajectory still maintains bodily experience as a marginal, subjective,
and particular object of inquiry. It maintains that its relevance is always in question and
in need of justification in the presence of universalized and generalized critical theorizing
and philosophical analyzing. With and throughout this project, I will show how all
experience is essentially bodily experience, and how theology as a critical inquiry into

8

Christopher Newell, "On the Importance of Suffering: The Paradoxes of Disability," in The
Paradox of Disability: Responses to Jean Vanier and L'arche Communities from Theology and the
Sciences. , ed. Hans S. Reinders (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2010), 174-175.
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our being in the world needs to consider experience as a resource by attending to bodily
experience and the way it situates us in the world.
Representation of Difference in Experience
To answer the question of how we might value bodily experiences, we must be
able to account for differences in bodily experiences and their representation. Rather than
simply acknowledging that difference in experience exists, we also need to account for
how they come to be, and how these differences might “travel” in representations. 9
My mother, a native of Thailand, still struggles to express herself in German even
though she has lived in Germany for over 35 years. Returning home after a post-high
school year abroad, I found my mother cooking in an outdoor kitchen, a repurposed
garage. Even after some probing, all Mom would tell me then was, “That’s just how I like
it. It’s easier that way.” To an observer, the actual food preparation, cooking, and
cleaning procedures did not seem “easier.” And there was much worry, especially on her
daughters’ sides, about how we should “explain this” to others who perceive us–about the
story or image we would try to convey to those friends and neighbors visiting and seeing
and partaking in (or refusing) our newly formed cooking and eating habits. But what was
the untold story behind this moving of daily home activities to the outside of the house?
Over the 14 years of outdoor cooking that followed, Mom would sometimes begin
to share with me about my grandmother banning her to prepare certain foods at home,
particularly foods that would offend my grandmother’s sense of smell. I began
understanding my mother’s actions as resistance and preservation of self and identity.
9

Wonhee Anne Joh discusses the issue of representation in theology after poststructural,
postmodern, and postcolonial turns, specifically the questions regarding adequate representation of
difference. Wonhee Anne Joh, "Heart of the Cross: A Postcolonial Christology," (2006): 5-70.

9

Part of my mother’s story, which I have come to learn in bits and pieces over the years, is
her suffering under the control and abuse of her mother-in-law (the loving and doting
grandmother of my childhood), experiences of which I would not learn until I reached
adulthood. Even today, I think I only have heard few and select experiences, and I often
hear my mother struggle for words and then say “If you’d understand Thai, I could tell
you.” If I shared my mother’s language, I would have a different (though not necessarily
complete) understanding of her practices and rituals at home, which do not always make
sense to me, and which do not always have an easily-constructed narrative to explain
them. Yet there are some things I begin to get a glimpse of, ways in which differences in
experience I tend to overlook make themselves known, differences struggling to find
their expression through language. A similar trace is found in Mom’s insistence on not
re-inhabiting certain rooms in the home until renovation and remodeling erased not only
visual markers of my late grandmother, but until certain smells associated with
Grandmom had vanished.
In my work, I want to follow these glimpses and traces of difference and find a
way for them to take up space in critical scholarship. Without (creating) a space for the
lack of voice, for the inability to communicate to fill common space, we will always fall
into speaking about, rather than with, those persons without the ability to access language
proper. Newell writes in regards to suffering, “Part of the cultural context of suffering is
the ubiquitous tendency to worry about its adequate representation rather than actually
allowing it to be present.”10 This is a sentiment shared by postcolonial scholars thinking
about representation, misrepresentation, voice and agency. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s
10

Newell, 174-175.
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often-cited essay Can the Subaltern Speak? discusses the dynamics of power and race as
epistemic violence inflicted on subaltern consciousness and voice. 11 Postcolonial
scholarship then reminds me of the academic and cultural tendencies to worry about
adequate representation of cultural difference and the inclinations to represent for the
other rather than creating conditions that support the (embodied) presence and
recognition of difference.
Returning to my mother, I am left wondering what my mother’s communication
about her experiences is about. In a sense, we both seem left without access to language
when it comes to communicating about our experiences to each other. The narratives she
gives me in a language not native and comfortable to her, and the narratives I tend to
create for her, are they really adequate? Or are they possibly grossly inadequate to even
begin thinking about her experience? Thinking about my mother guides my reflections in
two related directions: the already-mentioned presence of cultural difference and
epistemic violence inflicted on different consciousness and voice; and the sought-after
manifestation of difference outside of narratives, the difference present in sensory
perceptual acts and experiences. What are the glimpses into my mother’s experiences that
I can gain by paying attention to her perceptual acts, rather than solely relying on
narratives? How can I begin to understand my relation to her world of experience, despite
11

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in Colonial Discourse and
Postcolonial Theory, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press,
1994). Spivak argues that the subaltern can speak, but cannot be heard unless the voice is changed. Any
attempt to make audible the voice of subalterns is the subjection of the latter to epistemic violence:
Granting the subaltern a collective voice by the intellectual expressing solidarity homogenizes the
irretrievable heterogeneity of subaltern subjects, and in the same vein establishes a dependence on Western
intellectuals or postcolonial subjects situated in the West to speak for the subaltern rather than creating
conditions of audibility. Furthermore, in the conceptualization of subaltern historiography, the male
remains dominant as subject and thus the female subaltern is doubly effaced. Postcolonial studies, in their
attempts to recover subaltern voices and consciousness, are complicit in the re-inscription of colonial and
neo-colonial political domination and exploitation.
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the gap between our social and cultural structuring of selves and identity? How do I begin
to think about the realms of perception in which difference manifests, and how does it
relate to experience?
Reflecting on both my mother and my grandmother, I begin to think that bodily
experiences are grounds of practices, values, meaning making, and theologies. And in
both cases, different as they may be, bodily experience demands attention not as one
realm, but as the realm from which to understand how our existence in the world makes
sense. Bodily experience is the site from which to begin critical theological analyses, and
we need to come to this site by inquiring into sensory perception.
Constructive Body Theology
As a theologian working to be attentive to difference via feminist and postcolonial
theories, I notice that much has been and is being said in regards to the particularities of
bodies, bodily experience, and how bodily differences (race, class, gender, ability, sex,
pain, etc.) affect particularities in meaning making. Feminist and postcolonial theologians
attentive to particularities in embodiment begin with this acknowledgment: Bodies make
a difference as they situate us in the world; our embodiment makes a difference in how
we perceive and are perceived by our environment, and thus how we actively make
meaning, how we do theology in this world. Beginning with this shared theoretical
conviction, I bring several concerns and questions (initiated by my personal interests
partially sketched out above) to this project:


If difference in bodily experience and embodied difference provide the
starting point for body theology, what then, is bodily experience, and how
does difference come into play? Maintaining that bodily experience is just
12

“something we have” not only maintains the power of (re)definition and
(re)narration in the eye of the beholder, but also often leads to
universalizing articulations of a generalized “normal” and to pathologizing
taxonomies of differences and deviance.


What might be at stake when references to sense perception and
perceptual experiences are made without providing a more thorough
investigation of perceptual processes (and thereby implicitly or explicitly
referring to commonsense notions of “sensing the world”)?



How do we move from body metaphor theology to body theology? It
seems that most theologies gathered under the label of “body theologies”
are better named “body metaphor theologies”.12 What would it look like if
we would move from exploring metaphors provided in bodily images
toward a theology which begins from bodily experience and bodies as the
locus and medium of our thinking? What is the difference in these
approaches and what difference does it make in the constructing of
theologies?

I pursue this exploration of bodily experience as an interdisciplinary project, but
want to situate this project as constructive body theology. A few opening comments are in
order to clarify this label.
To locate an investigation into bodily experience explicitly in/as theology might
seem like a self-defeating project to some feminist sensibilities. Those committed to the
human sciences may wonder whether a discipline like theology, seemingly committed to
12

See chapter two for evidence of this claim.

13

metaphysical matters, has any regards for the rules and methodologies guiding science
(for example building theory on scientifically gained evidence). Theologians reading this
project may wonder about the use of drawing in scholars who seem to ignore questions
regarding underpinnings values in their theories. Whichever academic discipline we are
trained in, we often come to believe that it is our field which explains the world best. Yet
it is only because of the limited scope of scientific methods that we come to produce any
knowledge at all. Learning about the limitations of the kind of knowledge that our own
field produces can help us to appreciate difference and thus be open to dialogue and
interdisciplinary (yet still limited) knowledge production. An academic community needs
to learn to forego claims of unity and wholeness in its disciplinary taxonomies which tend
to impose particular perspectives on the realm of human experience and distort the
varieties and differences present around us.13
I am convinced that important contributions can be made in anchoring analysis of
bodily experience explicitly within the theological, though in an interdisciplinary
conversation with other disciplines constructively taking up embodiment: sociology,
anthropology, and phenomenology particularly are the disciplines selected here to speak
in a dialogical fashion of the constructive potential offered by theology in the
deconstructive age of cultural analysis. 14
13

Hans S. Reinders, "Human Vulnerability: A Conversation at L'arche," in The Paradox of
Disability: Responses to Jean Vanier and L'arche Communities from Theology and the Sciences, ed. Hans
S. Reinders (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2010), 5.
14

Most feminist theologians I have read and learned from thus far, owe what is distinctly
“feminist” in their works to the questions and methodologies of feminist theorists, and my own theological
thinking displays similar directionality of influence. The relationship between feminist theory and feminist
theology is often that of the former influencing the latter, rather than the reverse, and even rather than a
mutual dialogue between the two. However, or especially now, I seek to employ a dialogical method, rather
than a one-directional conversation.
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I present this project as a theological one with two premises in mind. First, as a
scholar located in Western culture wherein Christianity has forged so many wider cultural
perspectives and habits, I cannot properly understand and work out of my own context
without at least referencing Christian theology. I agree with Mieke Bal that one of
Western culture’s interlocking structures is (Christian) theological in nature, and as such
it informs the cultural imaginary, and that relevant theology today must be a cultural
discipline.15 Thus, I understand the study of religion and my theological project as
necessarily engaging in cultural analysis while understanding at the same time that
cultural analysis needs to take into account theological imaginations and frameworks at
play in socio-cultural expressions. Further, any investigation into concepts with bodily
implications/dimensions today that is located in the Western academy (as this project is)
is done within an imaginary that is born and still steeped in religious and Western
Christian theological legacies, not the least of these being Cartesian and Kantian infused
philosophical frameworks.16
The second premise of my understanding and defending my project as theological
is also based in the conviction that any investigation into the body today must be
interdisciplinary. Religion and theology are but one in a cluster of permeable arenas of
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Mieke Bal, "Postmodern Theology as Cultural Analysis," in The Blackwell Companion to
Postmodern Theology, ed. Graham Ward (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 4-5.
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I will name some of these Cartesian and Kantian legacies more specifically in the next two
chapters. At this point, I want to assert that while some might disagree with my naming the works of
Descartes and Kant as either Christian or theological—even both—since their philosophical work is a
project of exercising rational reasoning over against religious/metaphysical speculation, it is precisely their
situatedness in Western Christian culture that structures their philosophies. To invoke a deconstructive
analysis, it is the engagement of reason and rationality over against Christian religion and theology that
positions their philosophical voice within a Western Christian theo-cultural discourse (e.g., their engaging
in philosophical debates regarding the method of inquiry into metaphysical issues, such as the existence of
God).
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social life. Knowledge in life is not experienced as compartmentalized, and any discipline
today must acknowledge interdisciplinarity if it wants to be relevant in a dynamic
present. Much of the feminist theory that has influenced feminist theology has drawn
explicitly on what are considered non-religious disciplines (medical sciences,
anthropology, philosophy, physics), specifically in order to overcome religious concepts
of the body considered oppressive to women. Theology then can neither be a separate
discipline, nor be treated as the ignored presence in a cultural theory dialogue, in which
other disciplines develop the theory and theology receives/criticizes the pieces it can use
to stay relevant as a specialized field.
“Constructive” Theology
As a Christian theologian, I add the descriptor “constructive” to the kind of work I
see myself engaging in. My brief explanation is first a differentiation. I understand
constructive theology to engage in the task of taking up questions and concepts of
meaning, world, and humanity for the contemporary context, while attending to the
shaping influences of histories of ideas and theological traditions, as well as the
particularities of the present location. While sharing certain intersections and overlapping
in theories and methods, constructive theology thus is different from, for example,
historical, systematic, or biblical theology. Second, I offer a proposition: I understand
constructive theology today to be most apt to the task sketched above if it acknowledges
and makes use of certain poststructural ideas and methods. This includes attending to the
structures of language and the productions of culture, presenting a complex context of
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influences, investments, contesting/conforming discourses, and power dynamics which
precede modes of experience, interpretations and thus theological constructions.17
Third, and perhaps for some readers most controversially, I propose that
constructive theology today must not be, by literal definition, “god-talk.”18 Theology
must not be equaled with dogma but rather understood as a “method by which to analyze
human experience… [T]heology in particular allow[s] for interrogation of the cultural
underpinning found within all human endeavors.”19 Theology is an analytical scheme
then, and a constructive theology which investigates bodily experience must be
interdisciplinary (because it seeks to engage the vast resource of “human experience”
explored in vast volumes of inquire in various disciplines) if it wants to attend to the
ways in which questions and concepts of meaning, world, and humanity emerge from,
come together in and traverse our human existence and experience as bodies.
“Body Theology”–a Brief Detour on Definitions So Far
“Body Theology” is most popularly known as the title of James B. Nelson’s 1992
publication.20 Nelson places incarnation at the center of the theological imagination.
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I follow here what different theologians have described and exemplified in Serene Jones and
Paul Lakeland, eds., Constructive Theology: A Contemporary Approach to Classical Themes (Minneapolis,
MN: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2005).
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I take my cues from Anthony B. Pinn, who argues that a non-theistic theology does not need to
be an atheistic theology. Rather, it is taking seriously theology as a method to analyze human experience,
but rather than arguing for the existence of God and its ramifications, non-theistic theology understands
God as a symbol, albeit a symbol that has outlived its usefulness. Anthony B. Pinn, The End of God-Talk:
An African American Humanist Theology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3-5.
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Ibid., 3-4. Pinn grounds his theological inquiries in the experiences of African-American
communities in the United States to develop his African-American nontheistic humanist theology,
rethinking various dimensions of embodied life. He, too, turns to the resource of embodiment, though
choosing photography and architecture.
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James B. Nelson, Body Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster / John Knox Press, 1992).
Nelson first used the term “body theology” in an earlier work in reference to embodiment and sexual
theology. “Sexual theology is body theology. We experience our concreteness as body-selves occupying
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Claiming sexuality as the grounding reality—the basic dimension of personhood—he
seeks to develop a positive account of all aspects of embodiment as source of revelation.
Rather than developing norms for the use of the body by means of theological reflection,
or describing the body in theological terms, he proposes to do theology as “critical
reflection on bodily experience as a fundamental realm of the experience of God.” 21 This
turn to bodily experience was significant, yet his resourcing of bodily experience for
theology largely framed bodily experiences as metaphors for theological exploration.
“Body Theology” surfaced again in 1998 as the distinct name of a field of study
with the publication of Introducing Body Theology by Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth
Stuart, in which body theology is categorized as theology which allows “the body and its
experiences to be a site of revelation.”22 One might argue that any Christian theology,
with its doctrinal claims of divine incarnation in a human body, inherently must be body
theology, thus making a separate naming redundant and delineation as a field
superfluous. Yet, as Isherwood and Stuart point out, while divine incarnation and
redemption wrought through the body of Christ could have laid the foundation of body-

space in a concrete world.” James B. Nelson, Embodiment: An Approach to Sexuality and Christian
Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1978), 20. One more book bears this title,
published earlier by Arthur Vogel, though it is Nelson’s work which gained most attention and is most
referenced in a query on “body theology.” Arthur A. Vogel, Body Theology: God's Presence in Man's
World (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1973). Interestingly to me is that both Vogel and Nelson ground
their understanding of the body in concepts by Merleau-Ponty, a philosopher of the phenomenological
movement to whom I will return later in this project.
21

Nelson, Body Theology, 43. Emphasis mine.
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Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth Stuart, Introducing Body Theology (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1998), 40.
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positive theologies and practices, the history of theology as it is embedded in various
religious, political and philosophical discourses proves otherwise.23
Isherwood and Stuart introduce body theology as a field of study which is normdefying in its being positively body-centered, albeit still an emerging way of doing
theology.24 With their volume situated in a series called “Introductions in Feminist
Theology,” it is not surprising that the framework within which the authors present,
evaluate and critique body theologies is that of taking the female body (in its
particularity) as normative,25 and emphasizing bodily experience as central in order to
“create theology through the body and not about the body.” 26
As introduction, this volume presents a range of theologies which “do” body
theology, for example, feminist, womanist, and disability theologies, lesbian, gay, and
queer theologies, and ecofeminist theologies each receive mention in this volume, and the
future direction of body theology is projected to develop the concerns of gender,
sexuality and ecojustice further. The authors point to the phenomenological and suggest
future attention to the sensual dimension of bodily experience, as well as the need for
new constructions in theological anthropology as aim and constructive contribution of
body theology.
Importantly, the methodological approach put forward in this introductory volume
suggests to place “what we feel and experience in our everyday lives at the heart of how
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Ibid., 22.
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we begin to understand God;” it suggests that experience is contextual and situated, and
fundamental assumptions underpinning experiences must be named; that “interpretation
is as embodied as the experience itself;” and that “we are related to the things we
experience.”27 I resonate with these suggestions, yet much of the introductory exploration
points towards theologies which nevertheless frame “the body” as a site of investigation
(asking how a specific body comes to be in a specific context), a site of revelation (what
does a specific body “mean” in a specific context), as locus of speech (what is said
through a specific body), questions which may maintain “the body” as an object of and
through which we learn. This kind of approach upholds a dualism of body/mind in
implicit ways by treating “the body” as something to do with theologically. And though
“body theology” is framed as “theology through the body and not about the body,” 28 the
theological examples and theologians featured more often than not present bodily
experience (or narratives thereof, as for example in biblical stories) as symbol or
metaphor to construct liberative theological visions. 29
When “Body Theology” again appears in a title ten years later, it is in the series
“Controversies in Contextual Theology,” in which editors Marcella Althaus-Reid and
Lisa Isherwood seek the continuation of dealing with the “harsher realities of the body
and the way in which it manifests and reacts in the world and most importantly to the
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Ibid., 39-40.
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Ibid., 22.
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James Nelson’s aforementioned book is referred to in Introduction to Body Theology, but he is
not listed again as a significant key contributor. Most often he is referred to, as I have, as the author coining
the name.
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world.”30 Here, too, it is women’s and/or sexual bodies that provide the ground for
critical inquiries, from matricide and the Marquis de Sade, to mutilation of bodies, transand intersex bodies, to women’s bodies and dieting/fitness crazes in Western
contemporary culture. The editors call this a highlighting of “some of the important
current themes in the discussion of a body theology pertinent for the twenty-first
century,” hoping for new development of dialogue on “some of the hard issues of
women’s bodies, the theological, political and social implications of which we are just
starting to unravel.”31
That both books, given the feminist theological commitments of the editors, are
prefaced with grounding inquiries into the body, specifically in female bodies, is not
necessarily surprising or troubling. 32 What I want to note in comparing these two
volumes, though, are certain significant disappearances or omissions. Mentioned in
Introducing, ecofeminist concerns disappear in Controversies. Introducing gives some
attention to disability studies and disability theology (fields which significantly challenge
and enrich inquiries into embodiment taking up ability and normalcy), presenting a few
pages on Nancy Eiesland’s The Disabled God within a chapter discussing the
construction of bodies which need redemption or might signify the divine. Controversies
does not include disability among the themes mentioned, disability appears only in a brief
reference in a chapter on the intersections of Christian diet programs with capitalist, racist
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Marcella M. Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood, eds., Controversies in Body Theology (London:
SCM Press, 2008), 3.
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Ibid., 5-6.
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After all, I locate myself as a feminist theologian and concur with feminist assertions that what
has come to be normative has been shaped on concepts/conceptualizations grounded in the male body.
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and misogynist ideologies.33 And Introducing highlights reflection on embodied (sensual)
experiences, specifically laughter, as very promising in being able to avoid the pitfalls of
biological essentialism in body theology. Such embodied experiences “of the flesh” are
taken up in Controversies by a chapter inquiring into cosmetic surgery and cultural
representation of women and a chapter on cutting (self-mutilation) of women as
embodied deconstruction of pain and Christian communities.34 But the explicit references
to disability theology and phenomenological approaches in Introducing have vanished in
Controversies.
The disappearances of certain embodiment differences between the publications is
disconcerting to me, because these works are most commonly cited in queries on the term
“body theology” and thus set the parameters of how body theology as a term and field is
framed. Body theology then appears as an outgrowth, subgroup, niche work, or synonym
of feminist and sexual liberation theologies: the framework is given by feminist/sexual
theology (though grounded in a variety of feminist theories), and the main concerns of
“body theology” today (still) focus on the effects of social constructions of (gendered
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Lisa Isherwood, "Will You Slim for Him or Bake Cakes for the Queen of Heaven?," in
Controversies in Body Theology, ed. Marcella M. Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood, Controversies in
Contextual Theology (London, UK: SCM Press, 2008).To understand why certain diet programs could be
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disabilities have carried an extra burden since they are viewed as doubly transgressive.” (191) This makes
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subsumed under the experience of being a woman, and thus, in this chapter, the experience of surveillance
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female, lesbian, queer, or transgender) bodies.35 Therefore, “body theology” as presented
in these works might be more aptly named “body metaphor theology,” as bodily
experiences are resourced most often in a symbolic or metaphorical way. 36
While the critical analysis done in the works discussed so far is certainly
important, especially as it concerns real live bodies and suffering experienced, analytical
dialogues must be pressed further. Body theology must not be understood as a niche
interest/project or analogy for feminist theological work. Doing so submits to strategies
35

In Doing Contextual Theology, Angie Pears reinforces this connection, though she groups body
theologies in line with sexual theologies and queer theologies under the larger rubric of liberation
theologies. In surveying body theologies (and referring mainly to the authors I mentioned above (Nelson,
Isherwood, Stuart, and Althaus-Reid), she names as identifying characteristics the body as fundamental
resource for theology, a rejection of spiritual/material hierarchical dualisms, and a positive reading of the
body. But she also reinforces the impression of body theologies as those inquiring into human sexuality and
sexual bodies as the point of reference for embodiment – a delineation I find neither useful nor desirable.
For example, disability theologies are referenced in one passing sentence under body theologies and receive
no further mention in the book. See Angie Pears, Doing Contextual Theology (New York, NY: Routledge,
2010), 117-123.
Genealogically speaking, three distinct frameworks have contributed to feminist and sexual
theology: a) process thought (seeing the world and the divine as essentially relational and continually
evolving), b) liberation theology (theological and ethical formulations based on the lives of the oppressed
and justice formulated based on their experiences), c) feminist theory (investigating gender inequality and
critiquing social relations based on embodied experience). Jeremy Punt identifies these frameworks as the
patterns contributing to the conceptualization of body theology. However, I agree with Linda Hogan that
these frameworks are part of the genealogy of feminist theology, with body theology later becoming
defined by the three works mentioned here. See Jeremy Punt, "Paul, Body Theology, and Morality:
Parameters for a Discussion," Neotestamentica 39, no. 2 (2005). And Linda Hogan, From Women’s
Experience to Feminist Theology (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995).
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By no means do I intend to dismiss what theologies which seek to provide liberative metaphors,
as I am convinced that it does matter how we speak about the sacred/divine we experience or wish to see in
the world. The critique of Sallie McFague, for example, challenges traditional theological language as
exclusive. Because she understands language to qualify human reality, and metaphors as irreducibly
structuring our knowing, she seeks to affect the religious imagination through models and metaphors which
will bring about positive relations in the world. Thus she conceptualizes the human body as dependent,
liable to contingencies, and vulnerable, and then employs it as a metaphor to posit the world as body of
God in order to encourage a focus which prohibits the spiritualization of pain or the focus on existential
anxieties, but rather affirms all life as imbued with intrinsic value. Sallie McFague, Models of God:
Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 72-74. Sallie McFague, The
Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 18,168,171-73. For a
critique on how her body metaphor still depends on a concept based on whole, well-functioning “normal”
bodies, see Deborah Beth Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive
Possibilities (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 66-69.
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of containment employed to delimit the critical challenges and contributions presented by
theologies attending to embodiment to the larger field of theology and the humanities.
Emphasizing contextuality and embodied particularity may point out the pretense of
disembodiment in universalizing intellectual projects. Yet it also undercuts the critique
brought from particularized and contextualized marginal positions by placing the burden
of proof for wider relevance on those theologies described as contextual, situated, or
emerging from so-called particular (read: non-White, non-heteronormative, nonEurocentric) locations.37 To label body theology as a niche theology is to
compartmentalize and dismiss the insights offered through body theology analysis for
and by the larger normative/operative intellectual structures that legitimate knowledge
and theological projects.
Framing a “Constructive Body Theology”
This project seeks to make a contribution by proposing a robust and complex
notion of “body theology” and demonstrate what kinds of analyses this re-envisioned
approach can do. For the sake of naming some of the underlying commitments and
presuppositions I bring to “body theology” (the definition, principles, and trajectory of
which I will work out in the following chapters) I follow Deborah Beth Creamer’s
succinct description of what she names “embodiment theologies:” those beginning with
the assertion that theological reflection is always done as embodied selves, yet that bodies
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My critique here is indebted to Dr. Willie Jennings and his references to strategies of
containment employed on liberation theologies. Willie James Jennings, roundtable conversation with
students at Iliff School of Theology, Denver, CO. January 5, 2013.
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have not been taken seriously in the doing of theology. 38 Having grown out of liberation
concerns related to gender and sexuality, and highlighting the political and the
experiential, body theologies take as starting point a conscious focus on embodied
experience, using it as a critical source for reflection on and construction of theology.
These theologies acknowledge the role of particularities of embodiment and make
credible arguments about the role of bodily particulars such as gender, race, sexual
orientation, etc. in establishing a difference in one’s position and experience of the
world.39
“Body theology,” as I will work it out in this project, begins with these
acknowledgments and commitments. I consider bodily experiences as significant, even
fundamental, starting points for and concerns of theological reflection and construction.
More than simply affirming bodily experience, body theology as inquiry with particular
critical principles begins with attention to complex differences and inherent ambiguities
of particular embodied experiences, and demands that these bodily sites of experience are
recognized as significant, if not crucial, to our understanding of the human condition of
all.40 Depending on context, a body theology then might find a home in feminist
theology, womanist theology, mujerista theology, disability theology, queer theology,
contextual theology, or postcolonial theology, but it is more broadly cast to be adequately
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the dominating mainstreaming discourse.

25

contained by any of these labels. I want to establish body theology as analytical
principles in conversation with different theologies which hold concerns and
commitments in regards to engaging and exploring varied embodiments and their effect
on our orientation in and interpretation of the world.41
In conversation with and indebted to the theologians who have shaped my own
theological interests, skills, commitments, analyses, and desires, I offer “body theology”
as a framework of principles that seeks to claim the concern for specific and particular
bodies as relevant to all. The “body” in “body theology” then is not an adjective, but
rather a verb (as much as that is grammatically possible) indicating an em-body-ing of
theology, a concern with lived, embodied experiences as source and grounding for the
doing of theology, common to various theologians otherwise differently grouped. It is
then not a theology of the body, which starts with theology and seeks to inform and direct
bodily issues;42 rather, it is a theological stance beginning with bodily experience and
seeking to speak back to or engaging in a dialogue with theologies, social theories,
cultural analysis, etc. It is those embodied/body theologies I want to engage with, and
ultimately, suggest critical principles for.
As mentioned above, I will argue that body theology does not need to be “godtalk,” but rather, body theology is a critical inquiry into and within human experiences,
beginning with and taking seriously bodily experiences. If we consider history of
religions scholar Charles Long’s definition of religion as orientation in/to the world, as
“how one comes to terms with the ultimate significance of one’s place in the world,” and
41
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trans., Michael Waldstein (Boston, MA: Pauline Books & Media, 2006).
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assert that orientation is more than just structures of thought but “experience, expression,
motivations, intentions, behaviors, styles, and rhythms,” 43 then our bodily experiences are
orientation in the world.44 Our means of situating ourselves in the world is in our being
embodied selves: in and through our bodies we come to perceive the world and are
perceived by it; our bodily experiences give rise to thought. This implies that our
orientation to the world takes place in a vulnerable space, susceptible because of its deep,
flexible physicality and because of its exposure to social forces.
Body theology begins by seeking a more complex understanding of how and why
human existence manifests as bodily inhabitation of time and space. Any theological
enterprise, theistic or not, explicitly attending to embodiment or not, is always, as Gordon
Kaufman noted, a constructive project following experience, because all theologizing and
analyzing is based on and follows experience and articulates that experience and its
meaning through a particular lens.45 Thus “body theology” in this project is the doing of
theology within a body framework. As such, it begins by seeking to appreciate bodily
experience and sketching an understanding of it in regards to our embodied existence.
Body theology as analysis of human experience places bodily experience and expressions
of the embodied subject in time and space at the center of meaning-making, and frames
bodily experience by attending to sensory perception, the interplay of bodily experience
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and the complex productions of culture, and inherent power dynamics within which both
are found.
I consider this move as critical to grounding any theological enterprise in bodily
experience. While remaining committed to feminist theory and analysis, I reposition the
theoretical lens with which we approach bodily experience at an intersection with other
disciplines. If particularities of embodiment make a difference, as feminists claim, then I
need to know not what the body is, but how we are bodies. As I mentioned earlier, my
reflections on personal experiences provided me with a hunch that there is something to
sensory perception that might help to explore bodily experience. Turning to
phenomenological concepts, particularly those of Merleau-Ponty, exploring bodily
experience as perception will allow me to follow the cues of the living (and dying) bodies
of my grandmother and my mother. The senses and perceptual experience are the
juncture at which my various questions and pursuits might be usefully explored. As
exploration into perception and bodily experience, the potential scope and breadth of this
project is vast, and so inevitably, this project is selective and eclectic, drawing on
philosophical, historical, anthropological, and ethnographic perspectives to frame a
theological reflection.
The attention to sensory perception is not merely one of many possible
approaches that I could choose from. I will show how attention to sensory dimensions of
embodiment is a fundamental component of bodily experience and thus can lend
complexity and strength to other approaches, such as religio-cultural analysis or theoethnographic studies. I strive to offer an integrated view of the role of perception in
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bodily experience; and bodily perceptual experience both as a relationship to a world and
as in itself a kind of structuring of world and defining of meaning.
While the very act of critical analysis on bodily perceptual experience demands
certain abstractions and presuppositions (such as presuming that distinct perceptual
capacities can be identified and discussed analytically), I hope to show that (and how) the
dimensions of bodily perceptual experience are intimately connected to our emotional,
intellectual, and other personal experiences; in fact, that bodily perceptual experiences
are always implicated in, embedded in, and subtending of our existence, there is no
experiencing that is not bodily perceptual. Moreover, any given context and culture
provides perceptual matrices through which bodily experiences are made intelligible, and
in turn, individual and culturally informed bodily experiences shape our sensory
perceptions. By developing a better understanding of what bodily sensory perception is,
my project seeks to encourage new theological investigations into bodily experiences and
processes beyond potential essentializations of bodily perceptual functions.
Project Outline
I turn to feminist theology because of the explicit commitment to embodiment and
the difference bodily experience makes found in this field. Therefore, my review in
chapter two demonstrates theoretical perspectives on perception explicitly or implicitly
drawn on in feminist theologies. I offer representative indications of phenomenological
conceptions found in feminist theologies, which feed into understanding bodily
experience. I discuss how these conceptions factor into theologies which have sought to
construct theological claims by returning to bodily experience in one way or another. I
discuss the challenges inherent in embedded concept of perception, and how they may
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undermine the theological project they are supposed to support, most significantly by
resorting/succumbing to Cartesian dualisms sought to be overcome.
In chapter three, I make a case that our existence in the world is always
fundamentally and significantly a bodily perceptual orientation. In other words, we are
always feeling, tasting, touching, hearing, thinking, imagining beings; and these
perceptual acts are how we exist in the world and how the world makes sense to us. It
also orients us towards the world in specific ways. At stake in not carefully
conceptualizing our sensory perception is that, while we might point out differences in
embodiment or bodily experiences, conceptual shortcuts regarding perception might lead
us to “flatten” bodily experiences into examples of our situation, rather than
understanding them as integral to our situation in the world. I make my case by exploring
phenomenological concepts such as bodily intentionality, and habit, and do so through
the pivot points of gender, race, and normalcy.
In the chapter which follows I apply a comparative lens to the concept of bodily
perceptual orientation. I present historical and cultural comparisons in order to deepen
our understanding of our existence in the world as fundamentally bodily sensing. The
differences and incarnate possibilities regarding bodily perceptual orientation, regarding
the being, feeling, thinking, touching, speaking, etc., in the world, are not only
potentialities to imagine, but already did/do exist. Encountering these differences can
bring our own orientations in the world more complexly and viscerally to our attention.
In chapter five, I then present how we can now conceive of body theology as
principles which ground our analysis and investigations in bodily experience and frame
our approach to experience via bodily perceptual orientation. I return to theological
30

projects which attend to body/bodily experience, particularly the works of Carter
Heyward and Marcella Althaus-Reid, to demonstrate the difference a re-evisioned body
theology as analytical principles can make. Returning to my personal questions raised in
this introduction, I frame answers by approaching my own familial bodily experiences
through “body theology.” I conclude this project by looking out into further fields of
study or issues of interest which might benefit from body theology queries.
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CHAPTER TWO: SITUATING FEMINIST THEOLOGIES
PHENOMENOLOGICALLY
Both feminist theory and theology have shaped and influenced the concerns I
bring to this project. To demonstrate the importance of carefully attending to sensory
perception in order to complexly understand bodily experience, I will present the
spectrum within which perception is conventionally framed in feminist theologies,
implicitly or explicitly. This will help us better understand the stakes involved regarding
under-articulating or ignoring to frame a concept of perception and its place in bodily
experience, and support my search for a complex and integrated view of the role of
perception in bodily experience.
Feminist theologies, because of the explicit commitment to embodiment and the
difference bodily experience makes, have provided me with guidance as I embarked on
my own journey of critical thinking and engagement with my experiences, and have
ignited a spark of academic, theological passion in me. I might come across as critical,
maybe even unappreciative of the perspectives provided to me in the theologies surveyed
below. Yet I hope it nevertheless becomes clear that I could not engage the questions in
this project without the supporting shoulders of my brilliant and daring feminist
theological foremothers.
I will begin below by situating my interest and concern regarding bodily
experience and perception within a larger conversation of feminist theory and theology.
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After a broad sketch of the feminist dimension informing my theological work with
highlighting approaches to bodily experience and perception, I will switch angles and
provide an outline of the spectrum within which perception has been conceived in
traditional phenomenologies. Feminist theologies, implicitly or explicitly, employ
phenomenological concepts along this spectrum in efforts to bolster theological claims. I
will show how this resorting to perception in an effort to overcome body/mind dualism
and re-validate bodily sense experience as epistemological resource may nevertheless
implicate and undermine the theological aim precisely because of the way perception is
conceived of.
To conclude this chapter, I will provide a conception of bodily experience and
perception which avoids the problems highlighted; a conception which I will explore in
depth in the following chapter to propose as the theoretical frame for exploration of
bodily experience as theological resource.
Situating Bodily Experience and Perception in Feminist Theology
After Descartes’ epistemological base of cogito ergo sum (“I think, therefore I
am”), the body and those associated with it (i.e., women, racial others) have largely been
dismissed from Western intellectual traditions.1 The body/mind split of the
Enlightenment was not a new development, but the emphasis shifted from the body as a
mundane (though suspect) factor to being considered an obstacle to rational thought.2 The

1

Descartes’ statement here refers to the philosophical assertion that, as human beings who are
primarily thinking beings (who are rational and detached from the sensual world), we can only be certain of
objects (the worlds outside of our minds) if they conform to the representations we hold of them in our
minds. We can even be sure of our own existence only as and within “I think, I am.”
2

The philosophical roots of judging the physical senses as distorting perception of objective truth
or even incapable of perceiving such, and of only the discerning mind being capable of accessing true
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post-Cartesian body was a fixed biological object, some “thing” to be transcended to free
the person into full subjectivity by pursuit of rational activity. 3 Because women were
considered too steeped in their bodies, their rationality and intellectual ability were
questionable because of their supposed sensuous nature. Early feminist theory challenged
this and focused on the body/mind, female/male binary split in order to elevate the
feminine from its position of the other, the less than fully human. 4
The feminist theory emerging in the 1960s out of and in tandem with the feminist
movement of that time set the intellectual course for a developing Euro-American
feminist theology.5 Feminist theories and theologies took up new philosophical and

essences are found in Plato and Socrates. But it is Cartesian philosophy which first provides a systematic
philosophical account, building on Hellenistic traditions. Descartes articulates the mind/body dualism in De
Homine, conceiving of body and mind as separate entities, the former affecting the latter through
sensations, but the mind affecting the actions of the inferior body.
3

Descartes’ concern was to establish reason as the foundation for a universal science. He sought
to establish systematic doubt as the method to establish a firm foundation for comprehensive scientific
philosophy and knowledge. This foundation was the intuitively perceived existence of the finite self. This
self subjected the realm of physical facts, events, and experiences to scrutiny and investigation. Sense
experience can be deceiving, and thus any experience needs to be subjected to doubt. While Descartes left a
lasting legacy, this is not to say that Cartesian trajectories have been left without critique. For a sample of
early and later rejections of Cartesian dualism, see Stuart F. Spicker, ed. The Philosophy of the Body:
Rejections of Cartesian Dualism (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1970).
4

These strategies are not confined to early feminist theories and theologies, but their trajectories
continue today, as for example found in the feminist philosophy of Luce Irigaray or feminist theologies
turning to bodily experiences/faculties traditionally associated with women to value their epistemological
and theological meanings. See Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference(Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1993). Paula M. Cooey, "The Word Became Flesh: Woman's Body, Language, and
Value," in Embodied Love: Sensuality and Relationship as Feminist Values, ed. Paula M. Cooey, Sharon A.
Farmer, and Mary Ellen Ross (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1987). See also the below discussed
Carter Isabel Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The Erotics as Power and the Love of God (San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1989).
5

Neither feminist theory nor feminist theology begins at that time. One of the ways feminist
thought has been traced is by referring to what has been coined “first wave feminism,” a period of women’s
activism during the 19th and early 20th century which saw a focus on suffrage and the production of Stanton
and Anthony’s Women’s Bible. The emergence of feminist theology as a discipline does not occur until the
1960s, which is why I begin my discussion with this time period. However, one could also argue that
when/wherever women have been / are oppressed one could find instances of what is now called feminism,
though not gathering under the name of this modern concept.
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theological frameworks to promote the affirmation of women’s full humanity. They
began affirming women’s experiences as valid, even indispensable, resources for
theorizing and theologizing and saw women’s praxis as liberating activity central to
political and cultural (and for theologians and some theorists, spiritual) life. 6 The move to
explicitly value experience is not necessarily a new methodological move, as the appeal
to experience in the study of religion and theology has roots in (masculinist)
Enlightenment thinking.7 The methodological revolution was women’s experience as the
primary resource. Placing women at the center of theoretical and theological reflection
reframed epistemology as it had been defined. Valid knowledge and the means of its
production were no longer solely limited to that which passed as scientifically objective,
namely the uncritically male and masculinist Enlightenment thinking. 8
Seeking to challenge sexism in religious traditions, early feminist theologians
pursued a variety of strategies, and commonly a spectrum between two broadly sketched
ends is used to frame the approaches taken (though many might be better described as
falling somewhere in between): There are those feminist theologians who sought to detect
and remove androcentric symbols and practices, using women’s experiences as a starting
point for dialoguing with and within their respective religious traditions. They came to be

6

Hogan, 16.

7

An example is Schleiermacher, who articulated religion as an interior, personal experience. See
Grace Jantzen, as referred to inKwok Pui-Lan, Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 54.
8

For discussion of the epistemological shifts, see Alessandra Tanesini, An Introduction to
Feminist Epistemologies (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1999)., Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth
Potter, eds., Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1992). Or for more explicit connections to
theology, see Lucy Tatman, Knowledge That Matters: A Feminist Theological Paradigm and Epistemology
(Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2001).
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known as “reformists.”9 Others, known as post-Christian or radical feminist theologians,
determined Christian traditions to be too deeply steeped in androcentrism and sexism, so
they sought to theologize outside of Christian texts and traditions, hoisting new
symbolism, metaphors, rituals, etc., or re-appropriating ancient, pre-Christian religious
symbolism.10
Regardless whether one most identifies with the reformist or the radical end of the
spectrum, the smallest common agreement among feminist theologians is that bodily
difference (and/or discourse thereof) has social consequences; different bodies leads to
different (bodily) experiences, and different experiences are valid sources of evidence.
Roughly, feminist theological uptake of “body issues” ranges from following a
masculinist standard (rejecting the body in pursuit of intellectual equality), to reclaiming
and revalorizing the body and cultural associations with it (nature, nurture, cycles) as the
very essence of the female, to the most recent poststructuralist concern with instability,
cultural inscriptions on bodies, bodily experiences, and embodied potentialities. 11
Feminist theologians today are routinely challenged to not only address the gendered
dimensions of life, but be able to attend to intersections of race, class, abilities,
nationality, and other dimensions leading to marginalization of bodies. Experience
remains a significant factor in theorizing from a variety of standpoints and towards
various ends.
9

Key figures among them are Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and Rosemary Radford Ruether.

10

Carol P. Christ and Mary Daly are often highlighted as models for this approach.

11

Margrit Shildrick and Janet Price, "Openings on the Body: A Critical Introduction," in Feminist
Theory and the Body: A Reader, ed. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999),
3.
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While most contemporary feminist theologians might agree that the instability and
flexibility of the concept of “woman” is desirable and useful for feminist theology, not all
might agree that the same is true for the concept of “experience.” 12 With the category
“women’s experience” under scrutiny (very much from the beginnings of feminist
articulations), how a feminist theologian decides to employ this category depends on the
epistemological framework and methodology chosen, a choice which then marks the
emerging theological perspective.13 Appeals to experience are most commonly
distinguished between essentialist and constructivist frameworks. On either side of this
divide (with feminist theologians now often acknowledging that a strict binary division is
neither possible nor theoretically desirable), experience is highlighted as embodied
experience. Theologians who operate within the essentialist framework anchor their work
12

Remember, for example, the famous Sojourner Truth speech Ain’t I a Woman decrying the
racism and exclusion of black women from the category “woman” in the mostly white women’s movement
of the time. Mary Daly is another popular example of attracting criticism for essentializing “woman” as
white; most known is Audre Lorde’s charge against Daly as either excluding black women’s experience or
essentializing non-white women as victims.
13

For example, marking corresponding connections between a certain feminist vision and divine
reality, revealed through accessing and expressing a certain “experience,” runs the risk of conceptualizing
said “experiences” as unmediated, untainted material to be accessed. Assigning ontological normativity to
select “experience” is evident when patriarchal religion and myths are critiqued and followed up with
“recoveries” of more authentic matriarchal origins or feminine spiritualities. A recovering construction has
the potential to become ideology itself when it becomes more reflective of a cultural critique of a modern
crisis that, for example, seeks to reconstruct the female goddess symbol in the image of what is considered
to be lacking in the current context. This reads contemporary concerns into a historical situation in order to
use this constructed history to legitimize a project and the validity of such a method. Moreover, simply
accepting appropriations of accounts of, for example, medieval women’s spirituality often does not account
for differences. These accounts often characterize women’s spirituality as bodily-affective, which upholds
and reifies traditional stereotypes of the feminine. Yet historically, women’s spirituality emphasizing
embodied devotion and mysticism was no oppressed activity but was even supported by contemporary
religious authorities. It was the women who advocated for other kinds of spirituality (esp. one’s
emphasizing intellectual activities and interpretation outside clergy supervision) who were persecuted as
heretics and had their writings destroyed. See Monika Jakobs, "Auf Der Suche Nach Dem Verlorenen
Paradies? Zur Hermeneutik Von Ursprüngen in Der Feministischen Theologie," Sources and Resources of
Feminist Theologies (1997): 128-132., Anke Passenier, "Der Lustgarten Des Leibes Und Die Freiheit Der
Seele: Wege Der Mittelalterlichen Frauenspiritualität," Sources and Resources of Feminist Theologies
(1997): 196-197.

37

in gender fundamentals and differences and seek to craft and/or employ universalizing
frames of reference to structure their account of human experience. Theologians on the
constructivist side follow postmodern trajectories and investigate the social roots of
experiences of gendered personhood.
To sketch the wide field of feminist theologies today, we can acknowledge first
feminist theologians who prominently contributed in the emergence and shaping of
feminist theology as a discipline, like Mary Daly, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and
Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza. The first two began with the observation that women and
female bodies have historically been degraded by means of theo-philosophical and
scientific discourses of the time. Therefore, updating philosophical and scientific
evidence on the body provides the arguments with which to make a case for equality of
the sexes.14
Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza focuses on methods of interpreting Christian
scriptures, and in But She Said and other works also presumes women’s experience as
determinant of the validity of theological traditions.15 When referring to experience, she
explicitly seeks to utilize “feminist experience” or “feminist analysis of women’s
(socialized) experience” as resource and perspective on reality against which theological

14

I will discuss Daly and Ruether again below as exemplars for different phenomenological

stances.
15

Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation
(Boston: Becon Press, 1992). Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet.
Critical Issues in Feminist Theology (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1994). Elisabeth
Schüssler Fiorenza, Sharing Her Word: Feminist Biblical Interpretation in Context (Boston: Beacon Press,
1998).
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interpretations need to be tested.16 However, when Schüssler-Fiorenza posits “feminist”
experience as the source of liberating theologizing, 17 she frames the creation of a feminist
critical consciousness as originating “breakthrough” or “disclosure” experiences of
suspicion about the supposed naturalness of patriarchy. 18 While she does not explicitly
appeal to the utilization of perception, she reveals an implicit leaning on poststructuralist
tools (see below) in her drawing on Foucault’s articulation of docile bodies and the
disciplining of bodies to illustrate women’s oppression through cultural forces.19
Experiences of pain, suffering, oppression, violence are mediated through the surface of
the body, and while important, gain traction only in and through discourse, through a
critical feminist consciousness which enables “correct” perception.20
Theologians who plow the field of theological resources of embodied experience
with poststructuralist tools (for example Sallie McFague and Marcella Althaus-Reid) may
be eclectic in their methodologies and draw on linguistic, cultural, social and political
theories, yet all are influenced by and employing themes of subjectivity, language and
16

Schüssler Fiorenza, 21,34.

17

This comes close to the a priori access to truth found in Mary Daly, who would have only
‘women-identified women’ at the center of all ‘true’ interpretations, in Schüssler-Fiorenza, it appears as
only persons within the ekklesia of wo/men and engaging in the processes she describes, are able to
appropriate ‘experience’ correctly, that is, in a liberating fashion.
18

I chose to discuss Ruether and Schüssler-Fiorenza here at length, because much of what is
popularly understood to be “feminist theology” has followed these two scholars or at least used their
trajectories and/or taken cues from their methodologies. One reason might be Schüssler Fiorenza’s
employment of Marxian language and method as well as her liberationist language appropriated form
liberation theology, which is useful in theologies seeking to do a material analysis. Radford Ruther’s
methodology might find its popularity and resonance in many (feminist) audiences, western and nonwestern, as she charts an accessible middle way between the liberal and romantic types of feminist thinking
(women are equal and equally capable as men; women are aligned with attributes that need to be validated).
19

Fiorenza, Sharing Her Word: Feminist Biblical Interpretation in Context, 143-145.

20

It does not really matter what the island is made up off, but what is said about it and how the
treasures on it are described in pirate speech.
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social construction of identity. 21 These theologians seek to affirm the instabilities as well
as the generalities articulated in “experience” by particularizing social location.
Poststructuralist methodologies allow theologians to focus on language, symbolism, and
myths and the power inherent in linguistic systems to shape social structures and
therefore experience. This kind of focus often supports theological aims of subverting
dominant and oppressive symbolic. New understandings and models of the body allow
for new metaphors and re-symbolization in theology to express and address embodied
experience.
For example, Sallie McFague understands language to qualify human reality, and
metaphors as irreducibly structuring our knowing. She therefore seeks to affect the
religious imagination through models and metaphors which will bring about positive
relations in the world.22 Her epistemological claim connects the quest for truth and
meaning to embodied locations, as she defines experience in its basic sense as the act of
living.23

21

I will discuss Althaus-Reid again below as exemplars for different phenomenological stances.

22

For example, in Models of God and The Body of God she uses scientific theories and other texts
concerning North American experiences of the ecological crisis as touchstones to investigate cultural
models and paradigms that construct experiences and with it Christian identity and practice. McFague,
Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age. McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological
Theology. For example, she uses the Big Bang theory as a cultural text and ‘common creation story’ which
informs contemporary experience, and through it theorizes unity and diversity and applies this to a theology
of nature. See McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age, 45-46. McFague
situates her project in an epistemological discussion between idealism and positivism, in which she is
critical of both, though more so of the latter than the former. She is skeptical of unitary tendencies in some
idealist immaterial epistemological claims (direct correlation between metaphor and reality), and resists
tendencies to deny reality outside of language, but frames human existence as hermeneutical in nature.
Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1982), 39.
23

McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology, 47.
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Yet McFague acknowledges that one has no access to a raw experience of reality,
and, utilizing theories on metaphors (particularly Ricoeur’s hermeneutical
phenomenology), argues that all experiences are expressed in metaphorical constructions.
Moreover, she asserts that human access to reality is partial and always mediated through
linguistic metaphors. At the same time, metaphors are productive of reality, meaning that
metaphors can produce and offer new/different experiences, and her works attempt to
find metaphors to express radical relationality between all that lives. 24 While experience
begins with bodily sensations, the latter serve in constructive processes of associations,
connections and interpretations within signifying systems. 25 While metaphors are central
to knowledge and language, McFague acknowledges “sensuous, affectional, and active
lives at the most primordial level,” providing the base for metaphors and symbolic
systems.26
Mujerista, womanist and postcolonial theologians (like Ada María Isasi-Díaz,
Delores Williams, Kwok Pui-Lan) often share concerns and methodological features with
poststructuralist theorists regarding embodied experience.27 They often seek to make
explicit the connections between particular and historicized social locations and

24

McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age, 26,51.

25

McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language, 32-35. Perception is
a “seeing-as,” it is not simply reception of sense data, but involves recognition of what is seen. This
recognition is part of an interpretation process, and McFague argues that perceiving is always interpreting,
it always takes place in our contact and response to reality and our environment. Analogies and metaphor
guide us in our interpretative acts and are also created by us to re-interpret and continuously respond and
engage our contexts and re-reading historical experience. McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of
God in Religious Language, 34-38.
26

McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language, 37.

27

I will discuss Ada María Isasi-Díaz again below as exemplar for a phenomenological stance.
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embodied differences to make use of historically marginalized experiences as a central
resource in doing theology. Often using socio-cultural and ethnographic accounts or
localized “thick descriptions,” they make an effort to point to the abjected, embodied
experiences which provide the grounds for emancipatory and liberating theological
formulations.28 This strategy borrows (or at least echoes) the concerns and methodologies
of more explicitly poststructuralist theologians, albeit from different locations.
Delores Williams describes triple inscriptions of racialization, masculinization,
and sexualization on black women’s bodies (using historical experience to analyze
contemporary socialized experience of black women). In Sisters in the Wilderness, she
draws on novels which describe and ground the experiences of African American
women, making experiences of race and class intersect with gender to articulate women’s
experience.29 Williams, in a womanist methodological vein, retrieves embodied
experience (e.g. motherhood, surrogacy, ethnicity, wilderness experience)
hermeneutically and for the purposes of developing reading strategies of biblical texts
and other literary sources supporting full moral agency of black women. Important in this
constructive theological work is critical reflection on experience (embodied and
narrated), especially as it concerns the body doubly marked by race and sex; this often
takes the shape of analyzing stereotypes and cultural images of black women and the

28

“Thick description” is a methodological concept offered by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. He
proposes to provide dense descriptions of small, real-time lived experiences (rather than aiming for broad,
all-encompassing descriptions devoid of detail). Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York,
NY: Basic Books, 1973).
29

Delores S. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993).
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construction of race.30 Her conception of perception is less explicit, yet what leaks
through is an understanding of perception as sensitivity to lived experience, particularly
regarding oppressive structures. While embodied knowledge can be found expressed in
bodily movement (singing, dancing, gestures), highlighted is often the making intelligible
of embodied experience through critical intellectual attention.
Kwok positions the “Asian woman” as a multiple, fluid identity, grounded in
communal (rather than individual) experience and in particular historical contexts and
struggles, and signifying a political position rather than an essential definition.31
Discussions of experience, particularly Asian women’s experience as theological
resource, most often center on experiences and feelings of fragmentation, displacement,
alienation, and oppression under colonialism and its aftermaths. Kwok points out that to
talk about Asian women’s experience generally, “experience” needs to be understood as a
social construct. Asian feminist theologians resource this experience often via utilizing
narratives (since story telling as been the chief means of transmitting wisdom between
generations of women) and social analysis.32 Similarly to Williams, perception in regards
to experience becomes a tool utilized for critical analysis, particularly hermeneutical
approaches to narratives of experience.

30

See also for example the ethical work of Emily M. Townes, Womanist Ethics and the Cultural
Production of Evil (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).
31

Kwok Pui-Lan, Discovering the Bible in the Non-Biblical World, ed. Norman K. Gottwald and
Richard A. Horsley, The Bible and Liberation Series (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995), 26. Kwok,
Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology, 36.
32

Kwok Pui-Lan, Introducing Asian Feminist Theology (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press
Ltd, 2000), 38-41.

43

These are just few examples of what can be found in today’s feminist theological
field, in which “embodied experience” as a category is accepted as dynamic and
conceptually unstable. The challenge for feminist theory and theology in using “women’s
experience” is that of acknowledging and accounting for and theorizing with difference. 33
The plurality and the diversity of the lives, choices and values of women are all bound to
class, race, culture, physical make-up and other factors. Theologians utilizing
“experience” today need to attend to how human experiences are bound up in bodies and
the particularities through which we encounter the world.
The body matters, and the most basic feminist consensus is that any theoretical
investigation needs to begin with this acknowledgement.34 It is also important to realize
how dangerous the vulnerable body is: The body vulnerable to disease, decay and death
terrorizes the human imagination, and modern medicine embodies a war on this body in
the form of therapy or ennobling duties of care in the name of love. The dominant social
approaches to the vulnerability of the body reveal that within the larger project of
modernity, human bodily experiences of finiteness and mortality are abject to a culture
which normalizes idealized images of able-bodiedness. Bodies which defy the norm
appear as dangerous “other,” and in a world which worships reason and intellect, the
vulnerable and disturbed mind incites terror.35
This concern is highlighted in the feminist theological landscape by feminist
disability theologians (like Nancy Eiesland and Sharon Betcher) who frame the body as
33

See Fulkerson, 13-18.
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Shildrick and Price, 1-3.
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Newell.
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the locus for theological reflection, yet explicitly seek to deconstruct persistent notions of
“normal” embodiment. Paying deliberate attention to the physical body and its
representations, these theologians resource lived experiences of persons with disabilities
to utilize this multifaceted body knowledge for doing theology, for grounding symbols,
metaphors and models of God.36 These theologians highlight the ambiguities of
nonconventional bodies and their potential as resource for re-conceiving notions of
wholeness, mutuality, survival and care. Lived experiences of persons with disabilities
are tapped for the alternative knowledge regarding the disabled body and the specific
social and existential bodily experiences of it to “think with” it about difference.37
If “the body,” as it is presented to me, is always an inconsistent production, then
there is never an unmediated access to a pure corporeal state or to pure bodily
experiences. Even the so-considered neutral, biological body itself is an effect of
language, a product of the representation of scientific “objectivities” which materialize
the body within normative charts, in stages to be manipulated or (more or less)
intelligible diagnoses. That even the medical body is far from fixed or factual can be
observed in how changes in cultural understandings are reflected in scientific language
and descriptions of bodies.38 The methodological issue here is that when we name our
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Nancy L. Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville,
TN: Abingdon Press, 1994).
37

Sharon V. Betcher, Spirit and the Politics of Disablement(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007).
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See for example Lynda Birke, "Bodies and Biology," in Feminist Theory and the Body: A
Reader, ed. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick (New York: Routledge, 1999). She describes changes in
conceptualizations of the immune system as a defense system of a closed body system to a flexible
response system of a permeable body. See also again Emily Martin, "The Egg and the Sperm: How Science
Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles," in Feminist Theory and the
Body: A Reader, ed. Janet Price and Margirt Shildrick (New York: Routledge, 1999).

45

bodily experiences, we are always involved in a dialogue that is already framed by the
discourse(s) we find ourselves in, and we materialize our bodies at the moment we
represent it with the references we choose.
While feminist theorists and theologians have become skilled in reading bodies as
signifiers of culture and detecting inscriptions on bodily surfaces, there are still remnants
of conceiving of the interior body as biologically fixed and either “passive,” inaccessible,
or universal.39 This stance rests on biology being conceptualized as fixed and
reductionistic, rather than within parameters of indeterminacy and transformation. 40 This
kind of Cartesian binary leaves liberal humanist parameters of health/disease,
whole/broken, etc., in place and unproblematized; for example, corporeal distress (pain,
physical suffering) is an experience of vulnerability that happens to a subject in a body
previously or otherwise “whole”/“healthy.”41
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Interestingly, while bodily surfaces, such as skin, have received much attention in regards to
social values are inscribed on the skin, the skin as sense organ is also more complex and undifferentiated
than the other sensory faculties. Skin therefore is a sense organ and a social-bodily canvas it enables
perception as well as the site of where tactility is “seen;” this links tactility and sight closely together.
Sander L. Gilman, "Touch, Sexuality and Disease," in Medicine and the Five Senses, ed. W.F. Bynum and
Roy Porter (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993). With this linking, it appears that the
visual investigations “into” skin have eclipsed explorations of skin in regards to its complex tactility and
related sensory dimensions. Mark Smith notes that tactility was deeply implicated in modernity (e.g., in a
kind of skin consciousness regarding race, gender, class, comfort, capitalism; the look, haptics, protocols of
touch), and rather than touch losing importance, it was that ideas about it changed. He also cautions against
too closely linking touch and sight, and even collapsing the two so that inquiries into the visual aspects of
skin/touch stand in for exploring tactility more complexly. Mark M. Smith, Sensing the Past: Seeing,
Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching in History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007),
95. For a volume of essays discussing touch/tactility, see Constance Classen, ed. The Book of Touch
(Oxfod, NY: Berg, 2005). Also note a compilation of essays into the history of touch, particularly the role
of tactility in early modernity and its relation to epistemological organization and definitions of
subjectivity. Elizabeth D. Harvey, ed. Sensible Flesh: On Touch in Early Modern Culture (Philadelphia,
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).
40

Birke, 44-48.
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For intriguing and exciting theologies that take up this issue, see Creamer. Or Betcher.

46

Bodily experiences of pain and suffering are then bodily signs to be interpreted, to
be used as indicators in an analysis. Control over one’s body and being human is kept in
close theoretical connection (and threatens the loss of humanity or subjectivity for those
who cannot control their bodies).42 This approach also forecloses potential theoretical and
theological thinking in and through (not just about) our “real” bodily experiences. It
prevents theologizing from bodily experiences as bodies in pain, as “bodies out of
control,” from within the very bodies that actively inform our perception and experience
of ourselves in the world.
Conceiving Perception
Feminist theologies may name (women’s) bodily experiences and thereby make it
a conceptual category, holding up specific bodies and/or experiences to “truth,” be it via
ontological epistemological access to it, or be it as indicator or text offering truth about
social and cultural forces. Sometimes experience is used to demonstrate the power of
cultural inscriptions on embodiment, sometimes experience is the site of identity.
Sometimes embodied reality is investigated for the wear and tear of the effects of
sin/oppression, sometimes it is held up to demonstrate the body as a site of contestation
over who gets to control whose body.
What I will diagnose as inattention to perception is what leads to conceptual
problems when bodily experience is used as an access point for theology. Rather than
talking through the body or bodily experiences, feminist theologians more often than not
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Margrit Shildrick and Janet Price, "Vital Signs: Texts, Bodies and Biomedicine," in Vital Signs:
Feminist Reconfigurations of the Bio/Logical Body, ed. Margrit Shildrick and Janet Price (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 5.
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end up talking about the body. This may be traced partially to the ways in which
theological scholarship in the Anglophone academy has been framed and validated, it is
also connected to the ways in which our language limits us in our theological expressions
(after all, there is no existing English word that described what we might want to see as
body-mind unit). But it is also partially due to the ways in which the body/mind dualism
leaks back into our theologies, and I am making the case that it can leak back because we
have not paid attention to carefully articulate our conception of bodily experiences and
perception.
The theologians surveyed above employ different methods in accessing and
conceptualizing the body, experience, and perception. When it comes specifically to
sensory perception though, what emerges is a spectrum between two perspectives on
perception: an empiricist view on perception, and an intellectualist view. In other words,
the descriptions or implied conceptualizations of perceptual experience fall on a spectrum
between considering perception a mechanical bodily function (the senses as bodily
channels for truth “out there”), or of perception as function of the mind (the senses as
providing the data which the mind then perceives, judges, and interprets).
To be able to more fully engage with the phenomenological aspects of a feminist
theology, I will now turn to sketch the spectrum within which traditional philosophical
works have framed perception, frameworks which make their way into theological
projects. I will show how even those phenomenologies (philosophies of perception)
which seem to be on opposite ends of the spectrum still share common underlying
presumptions and are complicit in continuing the pervasive Cartesian dualism of
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body/mind. Theologies which point to sensory perception as a way to overcome bodymind dualisms, but implicitly or explicitly embrace phenomenological concepts
upholding them, end up undermining themselves and maintaining this separation of body
and mind by not giving careful attention to the understanding of perceptual processes.
The scholars solicited as exemplars for what is at stake in theological projects do
not necessarily fall clearly on one end or the other of the phenomenological spectrum,
often because their phenomenological concepts are not explicitly articulated or do not
receive the sophisticated attention other philosophical issues receive (such as
discourse).43 Below, I offer a phenomenological spectrum with inserted theological
connections to highlight the importance of being attentive to our theological conception
of bodily experiences and perception.
Concepts of Perception: Relevance in and to Theological Projects
Sensory perceptions have often been conceived of as either mechanistic or
intellectual functions, positions that are still commonly held today. These theoretical
stances should come as no surprise and neither should the confusion surrounding
perception. We hold commonsensical notions of perceptual capacities, and tend to
“know” what they are—we define vision as “seeing with my eyes,” or olfaction as
“smelling with my nose.” Yet we continue to inquire into the complexities of different
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Further, my solicitation of select theologians is neither exhaustive nor fully representative.
Rather, I draw on the works of some key thinkers in feminist theological discourse that have influenced
feminist theology as a field as well as my own theological formation. Overall and most generally, common
to these theologians is the concern with theological imagery. My selection is not to imply that these
theologians are the “worst perpetrators” of the issues I will highlight, nor are they the only ones. Rather,
given their influence on my own feminist theological journey, they exemplify the theologies which refer to
bodily experience in one manner or another, and they have been conversation partners in my initial quest to
explore bodily experience for constructive theological projects.
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perceptual capacities in a variety of ways, though not necessarily in an interrelated
manner.
Take vision, for example: It is not intuitively evident what vision is and how it
functions. Philosophers since antiquity have developed theories on vision and have come
up with diverse concepts of processes regarding visual perception.44 Questions regarding
visual perception are engaged in a diversity of fields: there are empirical questions
inquiring into the physical mechanics (e.g., examinations of lenses, the retina,
projections), scholars investigate psychological aspects (e.g., questions regarding the
inversion and reversion of projected images, brain processes which appear to transcribe
data into “right side up single vision”), and we also find philosophical questions
regarding the nature of perception (nature of knowledge, images, language, etc.). When
different approaches are aligned with different disciplines, some inquiring into the bodily
mechanics, some inquiring into the workings of the mind, body/mind dualism might be
upheld, though this is not to be read as a scholarly determination or conspiracy to
perpetuate this Cartesian split. Rather, it points to the depth of the perpetual mystery
surrounding perception itself.
The pervasive mystery (or shall we say: conceptual uncertainty) regarding the
processes of perception is also traceable in traditional phenomenological theories.
Conventionally, the spectrum along which perception has been conceived falls between
the empiricist/objectivist and the intellectualist/idealist ends. Very roughly sketched,
44

For an exploration of the many conceptions of vision, see Nicholas J. Wade, A Natural History
of Vision (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). Wade describes Plato and Euclid, for example, who defined
optics mathematically and conceived of vision as reception of geometrical projections. Descartes traced
vision to the movement of light through air. Hobbes conceived of color as an apparition through motion
working in the brain.

50

empiricism considers perception a mechanical bodily function, a reception of sense data
which carries meaning through sensory bodily channels; intellectualism considers
perception a function of the mind that receives perceptual data through sensory channels
which the mind then perceives, judges, and interprets. Empiricism and intellectualism
hold similar views of the world as object of perception, the world as self-contained
“nature.” But the two positions disagree about the role of consciousness in the process of
perception.
Below, I will discuss these positions in more depth and embed critiques provided
by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenologist who provides the phenomenological
perspectives for my exploration of bodily experience in this project.45 Woven into the
exploration of this spectrum of phenomenological positions are the connections to
theological projects. I will show how different theologians explicitly or implicitly take up
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty is the phenomenologist of choice for this project for two reasons. While
other scholars have critically expanded and appropriated his thought further, Merleau-Ponty remains useful
as this dissertation seeks to discuss and analyze phenomenological presumptions present in feminist
theologies as well as point to ways beyond the drawbacks and problematic consequences inherent in
different positions. Merleau-Ponty provides just this kind of discussion with his own contemporary
conversation partners, a discussion complex enough to make it valuable for transfer to my own interests.
Further, he maintains the focus of discussion regarding embodiment on perception, a focus which I would
like to maintain as well. However, Merleau-Ponty’s work is not without criticism. For example, Shannon
Sullivan critiques Merleau-Ponty for obscuring differences in his account of intersubjectivity by grounding
embodiment in pre-personal functions. She also challenges his embodied subject for its inherent maleness,
challenges also made by Elizabeth Grosz and Judith Butler. See Shannon Sullivan, "Domination and
Dialogue in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception." Hypatia: Journal of Women in Culture and
Society 20, no.4 (1997). Grosz, Elizabeth. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994. Butler, Judith. "Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological
Description: A Feminist Critique of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception." In Thinking Muse:
Feminism and Modern French Philosophy, edited by Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1989. Others have challenged Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological assertions
for its erasure of difference regarding race. Jeremy Weate, for example, employs Frantz Fanon’s critique of
phenomenology to contest Merleau-Ponty’s notion of bodily freedom with Fanon’s geneology of
unfreedom of the black body. See Jeremy Weate, “Fanon, Merleau-Ponty and the Difference of
Phenomenology,” in Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi, (Malden, MA, Blackwell, 2001), 169–183.
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positions along this spectrum, and I will point out what is at stake in holding the
respective conception of perception.46
Empiricism Described and Critically Analyzed
In empiricist thought, the world is distinct and separate from the perceiving
person, but we can come to know about this world through perceptual processes.
Sensation is a bodily capacity, perception an activity of the mind, and the mind obeys the
laws observed in nature.
In short, empiricism involves a view of perception as the reception of simple,
basic sensory units (e.g., a certain intensity of light as simple retinal stimuli) that are
independent of one another in quality and quantity. Bodily perceptual faculties (eyes,
nose, ears, etc.) are independent channels and “recorders” for these independently
received sensory units (the units recorded via my eyes are not the same as those recorded
through tactile channels). To achieve the perceptual outcome of, say, seeing and touching
a body, is to combine the received perceptual units and based on previous experiences,
having learned that these perceptual units belong together so that we can account for
them as distinct perceptual whole, such as “body” or “apple.”47
An early empiricist conception of perception is found for example in Aristotle, in
which the mind receives the form of the object: Seeing an apple is to receive in the mind
via the eye the form of the apple, though not the juicy fruity substance. The mind itself is
46

Again, these theologians will serve as exemplars; therefore I will focus on the
phenomenological aspects in their work rather than providing full reviews of their scholarly corpus. My
aim is to provide useful illustrations that may raise questions and connections in regards to our own
theological work via these established scholars.
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David R. Cerborne, "Perception," in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, ed. Rosalyn Diprose and
Jack Reynolds (Stocksfield, UK: Acumen, 2008), 122-123.
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a tabula rasa into which experiences of the world enter through the senses. This is a
skeptical kind of empiricism: While we might not know the things themselves, we know
how they appear to us in our mind, and only what appears to us, our mental pictures of
the world, are the objects of knowledge. Thomas Aquinas critically builds on this
Aristotelian view, though he finds fault in the concept that the mind knows only its own
ideas. Aquinas asserts that what we perceive is not a form or an idea, but we perceive
external objects through our ideas, through our mental pictures. The mind perceives
through images provided through the senses, images are the means by which we perceive
objects in the world experientially.
Philosophers like John Locke carry on this school of empiricism, and argue that
the only knowledge achievable is knowledge based on experience, a posteriori. Our ideas
about the world are derived from experiences, from sensation and reflection on it. An
object has primary qualities (the structure which makes it an apple) and secondary
qualities (varieties of color, size, texture, but varieties which still adhere to the primary
qualities). What is received in the mind through perceptual processes is an idea or picture
of the outside world. Significant to the processes of perception are sense data transfers
made possible through bodily capacities, the bodily derived and transmitted sense date
then causes ideas in the mind of the perceiver. 48
David Hume is more skeptical about the perception of the world as ideas in the
mind. While we perceive the world through our senses which deliver images to our mind,
48

Locke also differentiated between complex ideas (ideas which can be broken down in
component ideas such as the idea of an apple, which can be separated out into ideas of round, red, sweet,
juicy, etc.) and simple ideas (ideas which cannot be further broken down, e.g., the idea of “red”). All ideas
are caused by the material world, mediated/transmitted by our perceptual faculties. John Locke, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1975).
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but the perceptual senses are conveyers or channels which cannot necessarily be trusted.
It is convention which leads us to suppose that our sensory perceptions deliver accurate
representation of the external world. Yet because we can also experience hallucinations
or dreams, the senses show to be unreliable and deceptive. Only experience can prove
and justify what we know about the world, though experience cannot help us (dis)prove
the doubt we might have about the very perceptions we have in experience.49
Considering the empiricist camp, Merleau-Ponty criticizes its views of perception
for separating sensation from perception. Presupposed in empiricist views is “sensation”
as building blocks on which perception rests. Sensation is presented as readily available
to analysis. This kind of distinction breaks down perceptual processes into cause and
effect mechanisms, separating though linking sense data and bodily sensory capacities via
sensation. One way for empiricists to conceive of sensations has been to invoke sensation
as impression sensed by the subject: Color, for example, is not a property inherent to the
object, but an impact made on the eye; my visual faculties are affected in a particular way
by the object causing a sensory impression.50 In other words, the ripe apple I am about to
eat is not inherently red; rather, my eyes pick up light waves, and I make a judgment that
the sensory units of shape, size, and color come to me from an apple.
Merleau-Ponty notes that conceiving of sensation as distinct from perception
differentiates between lived experiences and sensation: Experience is filled with meaning
49

David Hume and L.A. Selby-Bigge, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and
Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1975), 149-162.
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See above. Locke, for example, has conceived of primary and secondary qualities of objects.
Only primary qualities (such as solidity, number, shape) exist in the object itself and are certain; secondary
qualities, color being conceived as such (also taste, smell, sound), are not possessed by the object, but are
affected in the subject and do not provide measurable truths about an object.
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to me, whereas pure sensation—understood as undifferentiated impact such as light
waves hitting my retina, sound waves entering my ear—has no meaning in itself.
Empiricists consider meaning as found in the impression formed within me, created in
my mind through conscious processes of evaluation and judgment. For example, to
experience color, I receive sensations on my retina, certain wave lengths of light reaching
my eye, and I perceive this sensation in my mind and through convention or evaluation
perceive the color red. This view of sensation, Merleau-Ponty points out, has several
significant implications to my experiencing in the world: There is a strong delineation
between me and the object I perceive; there are objectifying processes undertaken by me;
there are implied strong delineations in the causal relationship conceived of between
sensation (the reception of data, the experience of a sensorial impact by me) and
perception (the forming of meaning).51
When theologians appeal to sensory perception as equivalent to knowing (as akin
to receiving ideas about the world) they may uphold the inherent mind/body dualism of
this empiricist phenomenological perspective. When perception is reception of
knowledge and apprehension of reality, feminist theologians may charge women to
recover their ontological ability to perceive/receive knowledge through their senses.
Carter Heyward and Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, for example, through their
positive association of embodied sensory perception with nature and the sacred, imbue
sensory capacities of the body with the ability to access unmediated, untainted
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans., Colin French (New York:
Routledge, 1962), 7-8.
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information or truth about a situation.52 Both theologians seek to overcome body/mind
dualisms by conceptualizing body and mind as a unit: Heyward uses the term “bodyself”
to articulate a subject or self not separated from the body and defines the “soul” not as an
essence or separate spiritual component of the bodyself, but as the “relational spark”
connecting all creatures.53 Moltmann-Wendel articulates body and soul as a unit, a field
of energy, the seat of feelings, the sphere of thought and relationship,54 and asserts the
importance of the senses to conceptualizations of the body, as the senses extend the
body.55 Meanings are not natural or biological occurrences, but the ensemble of
potentialities which are given value in a particular society. 56 But it is the senses which are
charged with the reception of meanings, from socially assigned meanings to divine
revelations, and the bodily capacity for sensation affirms the epistemological authority of
bodily functions which reveal the world to us and make it intelligible for us. 57
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Heyward. Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, I Am My Body: A Theology of Embodiment (New York:
Continuum, 1995).
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Heyward, 18,89,93.
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Moltmann-Wendel, viii,42,46.
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Heyward, 163n3.
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Ibid., 93-94. Heyward uses the example of encountering difference to show the connection
between sensory intelligence and bodily boundaries. To Heyward, bodily boundaries in the encounter with
the bodily-different other need to be fluid and permeable, while sensory apprehension in a strange
environment registers difference as dangerous and evokes thick, self-containing boundaries. Heyward, 110113. Moltmann-Wendel affirms experience when she also assigns epistemological value to female bodily
functions such as giving birth. Yet Moltmann-Wendel overlooks the socially-constructed link between sex
and social preferences when she lists social differences related to gendered bodies (for example, linking
gendered differences in preference for sports or other types of play to essential male/female differences).
This misses the link between female body experiences and social restrictions on female bodies. MoltmannWendel, 86;100.
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Purely empiricist conceptions, however, are fraught with theoretical problems:
Understanding sensation as such, placing meaning-making processes as social or
intellectual processes, renders bodily sensation itself devoid of meaning and separate
from the structures of perception. It implies that my bodily taking in the smell of a
person’s skin, feeling it, seeing the color of it and touching it, is simply the intake of
independent sensations, whereas perceiving a lover or perceiving an abuser is an
intellectual or social process (their differentiation unclear) of putting sense data together.
Yet these empiricist conceptions can only explain the deduction that indeed all these
sensations taken in with my bodily sensory tools add up to a person in close proximity.
The emergence of meaning needed to judge this person to be a lover or a perpetrator of
violence, or possible connected revelations of the divine, remains unaccounted for.
This kind of positing bodily sensations as building blocks in a theory of
perception is also problematic in other ways. It constructs sensation as something that
allegedly explains perception while at the same time sensation supposedly has nothing to
do with perception as activity of the mind.58 It presents the sense data of the person
(visually received image of a specifically shaped body of a certain type, size, and color, I
am receiving tactile data and a scent, etc.) as something that effects and leads to my
perception of a person; therefore sensation explains how it is that I come to perceive
anything. Yet it makes a distinction between sensation and perception as if the two could
exist independently of each other, as if I could ever sense something without necessarily
perceiving it.
58

Monika M. Langer, Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary
(London, UK: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1989), 4.
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In addition to highlighting the theoretical error of separating sensation from
perception in empiricism, Merleau-Ponty also points out that the lived experience of
perception is that of always perceiving meaningful wholes: I experience sensations within
a figure-background structure. Without the latter, we would have no sensation of
something.59 I always perceive a person first, and already within a given context, before I
can then abstract and tease apart the different components (color, smell, size, texture) of
this perception. The concept of undifferentiated sensation without meaning in itself,
however, cannot explain how I would come to perceive something meaningful, like a
friend at a party or a stranger on the street.60
Theologians conceiving of the senses as bodily receptors of knowledge
concerning a person’s world fail to account for how perceived meanings then are formed
or changed (how new or additional sense data can invoke different meanings in the
mind). We actually do experience a person in an immediate perception with associated
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Merleau-Ponty is strongly influenced by Gestalt psychology on this point. More specifically, he
learned about Gestalt psychology from Aaron Gurwitsch, who combined a reading of Husserl’s
phenomenology with the Berlin Gestalt School (Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler). Gestalt theory rejects
mechanistic assumptions and argues that sense experience has a holistic and dynamic character, perceiving
intelligible forms and shapes (Gestalt). Experience rests on meaningful, coherent configurations, which
often fail to correspond to sensory stimuli in a direct way (i.e., sensations do not show constancy in their
relation to stimuli). Merleau-Ponty recognizes the enormous philosophical implications of this Gestalt
claim, not just for thinking perception as an aspect of psychological functions, but for thinking perception
as essential to our being in the world. Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty, ed. Brian Leiter, Routledge
Philosophers (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 20-21.
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Merleau-Ponty, 4-5. For example: Where empiricism conceptualizes perception as passive
reception of sensory data (e.g., the data of light, color, shapes are received by the eye, odor is received by
the nose), sensory faculties become independent organic receptors. The perception of an object is the result
of combining and accounting for the received data (“I see and smell a flower”). Merleau-Ponty charges that
this position is untenable: Perceptual experience is that of sensing things, and we sense them in context, i.e.,
perception is not awareness of sensory data (“I see light and colors and feel a smooth hard surface”) but of
sense data in context (I see red as the red of an apple, I feel softness as the softness of a blanket) and of
objects (“I see and feel a table”). Empiricism also problematically presupposes but leaves unaccounted for
an interpreting consciousness, as we will discuss below.
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meaning, and the same person can be perceived with various meanings in different
contexts. Theologians appealing to the senses as channels for perception run the risk of
maintaining that ultimate “truth” about a perception is connected to egocentric reflective
judgments of a cogito, a separate mind in a body, a concept which is exactly what the
feminist theologians mentioned seek to refute, yet reinstate.61
Not all empiricist philosophers posit this differentiation though. Some of those
who recognize the flaw in conceiving of pure impressions or sensations move to situate
sensory qualities in the object. Sensations received by the subject, such as color, taste,
and smell, are then theorized as inherent properties of the object. Yet Merleau-Ponty
rightly diagnoses this approach as equally flawed in replacing one extreme version of
object-subject dualism with another: Sensory perception and meaning have simply been
reworked from a radically subjective process to a radically objective and determinate
property. Objects are posited as existing in a world that is in-itself: Everything has clearly
defined boundaries, inherent properties and meanings. The subject’s perceptual
experience is now conceptualized as analogous coherence between sense impression and
the properties of an object that is isolable, self-contained, and determinate.62
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Consider also Mayra Rivera’s comment regarding sensuality and materiality in theology: “The
senses do not belong or give access to a ‘natural’ realm and they are constantly changing in relation to
things, including the technologies that we invent to approach the world. Nonetheless, when it avoids the
illusion of having escaped the realm of discursive influence, an appeal to the senses may call attention to
the non-human […].“Approaching material things as relations, rather than as objects encountered by fully
constituted human bodies, suggests a promising way to theorize the materiality of bodies as well as of
things. […] The crucial affirmation of materiality and the body in theology must resist the tendency either
to reify or idealize them, instead theorizing materiality in its dynamic, complex relationality and
incompleteness.” Mayra Rivera Rivera, "Corporeal Visions and Apparations: The Narrative Strategies of an
Indecent Theologian," in Dancing Theology in Fetish Boots: Essays in Honour of Marcella Althaus-Reid,
ed. Lisa Isherwood and Mark D. Jordan (London, UK: SCM Press, 2010), 92-94.
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As in the aforementioned approaches, this empiricist view upholds a strong
subject-object differentiation, presupposes strong and singular specific object-perception
connections, favoring analogous connections. This discounts sensory ambiguity as a
deficiency in the subject (e.g., inattention, sensory deficits). Indeterminacy is a perceptive
blunder by the subject, not a possibility of the perceived object.63 Theologians relying on
these kinds of conceptions do not account for how more complex meanings can be
perceived through the utilization of bodily channels simply transmitting sense data.
Mary Daly, for example, asserts that a feminist consciousness awakens deprived
and dormant senses to allow women to perceive the dimensions and effects of patriarchal
oppression. The newly sharpened senses allow women to perceive “gynaesthetically”
(that is, to perceive and recognize patterns of oppression), and this newly honed
perceptive ability also aids in the implementation of liberative action. 64 In Daly, women’s
sensory ability is framed ontologically as well as epistemologically: women are
biologically different. This has ontological dimensions, and it makes perception
ontologically sexed. In an empiricist vein, the senses then become bodily functions
operating like channels: they may be congested or cleared, but they are passive receptors
of knowledge. Daly conceptually separates sensing from perceiving, thinking, imagining,
acting, and speaking; even as she attempts to hold them together, she connects sensation
to perception and knowledge in a mechanistic way. The senses function as receptive
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The point-by-point correspondence between stimulus and elementary perception is the
“constancy hypothesis” of empiricists. The objective world is given, and emits stimuli received by the
sense organs, this connection is a constant. This however fails to account for discrepancies such as optical
illusions (e.g., of size or color). Ibid., 7.
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Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978),
341,401-405.

60

organs whose capacities are biologically-ontologically determined and, once “reawakened,” aid in the use of other capacities such as perceiving, thinking and speaking. 65
While Daly’s larger theological project involves highlighting and struggling
against persistent mind/body/spirit separations imposed on and maintained through
patriarchy and androcentric language, her framing of perception with empiricist
conceptions undermines her project significantly. Daly attempts to frame body/mind/soul
not as separate entities, but rather as different aspects of the same self. Daly describes
women as being deeply connected to the world and as capable of tapping into the
interconnection of the world through women’s range of subtle and complex sensory
powers, accessing what she calls “deep memory.” 66 When addressing the patriarchal split
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Considering speech as an action and expansion of the self/mind/body, a linguistic revolution is
Daly’s (theological) solution, and she seeks to strategically invent and reappropriate words and grammar to
speak and write “woman” in order to create a female mystic symbolism which will allow a re-membering
of the creative integrity in women. This shares similarities with the philosophical project of Luce Irigaray.
Critics of Daly’s project point to her exclusive dismissal of differences and her universalizing of women’s
oppression, the patronizing, racializing undertones when Daly essentializes non-White women as victims.
In my reading, it is not the victimization of non-White women where I locate the strongest indictment of
racial stereotyping. I find Daly to mirror the patriarchal gaze when she draws the biology-oppressionsymbolism connections in her discussion of women’s global oppression: The Indian wife stands in for
gender oppression in marriage, the Chinese woman symbolizes oppression of sexuality and erotics, the
African woman illustrates bodily sexual violations, while the European and American women become
illustrations for the oppression of female wisdom, spirituality and autonomy of mind. Thus, Daly keeps
bodily associations and hierarchies common to Enlightenment taxonomies intact. Mary Daly, Pure Lust:
Elemental Feminist Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 175. Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of
Radical Feminism, 24.
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Daly, Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy, 80,91,353. The soul as the animating principle
is wholly present in each part of the body as the intellectual principle that is united to the body as the body
forms. This also grounds her claim of ontological differences based in biological differences. Insisting on
women’s biological ontological difference, Daly valorizes female bodily functions like menstruation,
pregnancy, childbirth as biological and symbolic – they are ontologically different experiences which need
to be perceived and expressed grounded in feminist consciousness. Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of
Radical Feminism, 83. Daly, Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy, 344-345. This conceptualization
also explains Daly’s preference for bodily integrity and her valorizing and normatizing of bodily wholeness
and sex/gender conformity. Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, 57,238.
Transgenderism and transsexuality might be judged to be bodily mutilations caused by or effecting a
mind/body/soul split, which might explain Daly’s expressed contempt for male-to-female transsexuals
(claiming that most transsexuals are men, trying to take creative capacity away from women). Also not
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and control of mind/body/spirit and the “pollution inflicted through patriarchal myth and
language on all levels,”67 Daly diagnoses the effects of this oppressive split in the
pervasive sensory deprivation of women, a deprivation that destroys women’s capacity to
feel and perceive and know deeply and therefore act authentically. 68 The world in which
women live is not ambiguous; rather, inattention or sensory deficits/deprivation results
inflawed perceptions and inauthentic knowledge.
Daly’s appeal to the senses resorts to a strong dualism in which the biological
capacity to sense the world is causally connected to the epistemological capacity to
perceive truth about the world. Daly’s conception of sensory capacities and perceptual
abilities makes linear connections between biology, symbolism, power and language, but
rather than overcoming dualisms, she reinforces them by positing the senses in a biomechanical manner as channels to perceive truth which then gets expressed in language
according to this perception in the mind.69
Merleau-Ponty assesses that dissecting perception into sensations, qualities,
stimuli, response, etc., upholds an objectification of the world with a rigorous subject-

faring well are gay men, lesbians who are not sufficiently "woman-identified," and more or less everybody
who is not a radical/Lesbian feminist is considered a traitor to the feminist cause, conforming to an
androcentric worldview.
67

Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, 9.

68

Daly, Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy, 63, 342.

69

However, any granting of special or particularly keen perceptual capacities to women (as in
Daly) maintains dualistic biological essentialism and universalizing of “woman.” It remains unclear how
exactly it is that female perceptual capacities are different or better than male perceptual capacities,
especially if the uniqueness of female bodies is located in bodily functions such as pregnancy,
menstruation, or lactation, bodily organs not immediately connected to, say, the capacities of sight or
hearing. Resorting to a connection between perception and consciousness to support a sexed/gendered
perceptual difference is equally unsound, because it upholds a consciousness/senses dualism, and makes
consciousness the cause and the receptor or perceptual insights.
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object divide and presupposes an objective world in-itself accessible through mechanical
perceptual processes. The various theoretical takes of empiricism conceptualize
perception by theorizing how an object affects perceptual experience. “Sensation” is
often the empiricist notion of choice to explain perception: It seems commonsensical that
objects are sensorially perceived and bodily senses are the physiological tools available to
the subject. But no matter where empiricists locate the process of sensation, perception is
reduced to a causal process of an object bringing about a sensory impact; felt sensation is
conceived as the experience of impact on sensory organs. The perceiving subject has at
her disposal a physical system which receives stimuli to which she responds in ways
determinable by empirical observation.70
But in any possible empiricist stance (sensory impressions formed by the subject
upon stimulation, or sensory qualities inherent to the object and analogously received by
the subject with her sensory capacities), causal theories of perception still fail to explain
exactly how an object can cause a perceptual experience. When empiricists attempt to
answer the question of how a sum of independent sensations can lead to the perception of
an object (e.g., how does a figure stand out from a background), the go-to explanation is
to invoke sensation along with mental functions like association and memory. 71 That is,
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In one possible empiricist conception, sensation is a differentiated building block: it is implicitly
independent of perceptual processes and by implication cannot serve in an explanatory function. In another
empiricist conception, sensation is understood as an unambiguous correlative process between object
qualities and perceptual experience, but the ambiguous nature of perception (with perceived information
and meaning depending on context) is unaccounted for and produces mischaracterizations of our actual
perceptual experience. Merleau-Ponty points to ambiguities in perceptual experience and the dependencies
on context by using examples like Müller-Lyer’s optical illusion (two lines which are equal in length, but
appear as various in lengths). Merleau-Ponty, 6.
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Another notion invoked to explain perceived object unity, but also discrepancies between
perceived object and immediate sensory effect (as in an optical illusion), is attention. I will return to this
notion in more detail shortly in my discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s take on intellectualism. But in terms of
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particular distributions of sensations are thought to invoke similar distributions
experienced in the past and with it invoke the references we learned to associate with
them. This, however, simply defers the problem of how sensations invoke perception of a
unified object standing out against a background: the past event to which the association
refers still poses the same question, and our search for the original invocation of meaning
is caught up in an infinite regress.72
This is a theoretical bind Rosemary Radford Ruether encounters when appealing
to perception. Like other feminist theologians, she understands dualisms of any kind to
distort reality and, as such, cause and perpetuate structural and individual sin.73 Ruether
paints a complex picture of human embodiment and existence in a matrix of energymatter. Energy and matter are not separate; energy is organized in patterns and
relationships and is the basis for what is experienced as visible things. Human
consciousness and intelligence are a most intense and complex form of inwardness of
material energy itself.74 The individual self, which is an individuated ego/organism,
ceases in death (the cessation of consciousness as interiority of that life process which
empiricist theorizing, attention is invoked to explain why, if all sensations are equally present and available
to the perceiver, some qualities are perceived and others are not. Attention equals perceptive focus in this
framework. Yet again, as we will see below with memory and association, what exactly triggers
attention/inattention is unaccounted for. Empiricism, by explaining perceptive processes as external,
mechanical relations only (in an attempt to leave out acts of consciousness), puts the notion of attention
into infinite regress: what triggers attention must be triggered by something else, but no original trigger can
be given. Ibid., 26-27.
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Her method of choice is to employ dialectical thinking and to construct syntheses between
posited dualisms and to recover positive aspects of what traditionally has been devalued: mind/body,
man/woman, white/black, human/nature, orthodoxy/heresy, transcendent/immanent, etc. See Rosemary
Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983).
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holds an organism together), and dissolves back into cosmic matrix of matter/energy
which is the basis for new life.75 This cosmic matrix is what enables “revelatory
experience,” the breakthrough experiences beyond ordinary fragmented consciousness
which provide the grounds for theologizing. 76 Because oppressions are social and cultural
products, they can be overcome through re-socialization, which revelatory experiences
make possible.
In Ruether, the subject (the energy-matter-ego-organism) has experiences, and
these experiences appear to be organized by the mind (complex form of material energy).
Revelatory experiences, brought about by a honed utilization of bodily and intellectual
senses, are equaled with consciousness of evil (the perception of evil).77 Ruether uses
brain research to argue that women already have a biological and cultural advantage for
psychic wholeness due to their advanced integration of rational and relational modes of
thought.78 And because of women’s socialization towards rational and relational modes,
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Ibid., 257. Ruether’s conceptualization of the body as energy/matter fits with her concept of
“experience.” If the energy released from the organism in death returns to the cosmic energy cycle, then the
breakthrough revelatory experiences are a tapping into this cosmic matrix.
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These feminist (because brought about through consciousness-raising) experiences provide
interpretive symbols illuminating the means of the whole of life. Starting with the experiencing individual,
they become socially meaningful only when translated into communal consciousness and becoming
collectively appropriated by a formative group. Ibid., 13.
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Ruether, 113. She specifically investigates research into the relation between the two brain
halves. However, Ruether neglects that scientific research into the brain itself might already be culturally
ordered, research in which cultural gender divisions are read into “objective” biological observations. For
an example of how culture shapes scientific facts, and casts scientific observations in gendered terms, see
Martin. See also chapter three.
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women have a “perceptive edge” in terms of psychic integration and revelatory
experience.
Because she is describing consciousness-raising processes as intellectual
processes (though we remember that she understands intellect/mind as a form of complex
matter), Ruether is employing an empiricist separation between intellectual perception
and biological sensing. Her concept of experience also rests on a presupposition of
perception being different from experience, with (accurate, revelatory) perception
functioning as the result of a heightened consciousness applied to experience. Once a
woman is open to a feminist consciousness, she is able to perceive her individual, bodily
experiences from a feminist perspective, and now needs to move from deepened senses of
anger and alienation to a sense of a redeemed, liberated self.79 Perception functions as the
unexplored tool or channel of consciousness, and serves the mind to interpret
experience.80 The cosmic matrix (which enables revelatory experiences of truth by
collecting the energies of previous lives and their experiences) about the world still defers
the problem of how sensory experiences invoke perceived meaning; the origin of truth
ends up being projected into a matrix which has no beginning.
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Ruether, 184-189.
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Understanding perception as correlative process of sense experience and qualities of the world
can render “truth” and “meaning” in the world static and fixed. This stance implies that perceptual
differences now have a hierarchical aspect in regards to truth. In other words, it ties knowledge to the
external world, and posits hierarchies of perceptual consciousness in regards to perceivers. For example, if
I do not perceive and associate certain embedded structures (say, sexism) as connected to my experience in
a certain way, I either fail to sufficiently tune my senses or my feminist consciousness to the overarching
“truth” in the world. This stance undermines any attempts of conceptualizing contextual and historical
differences or shifts and interrelations of meaning. Effectively, this universalizes certain interpretative
methodologies by adding fixed perceptive associations as a biological and theological capacity for
theological work.
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Summing up Empiricist Conceptions and Connected Theological Dilemmas
Empiricist notions of perception are caught up in a paradox. By invoking memory
and association, they presuppose that which they seek to explain (the actual process of
association), and defer to a consciousness for which they cannot account via empiricist
methods. Furthermore, they undermine the positing of sensations as building blocks. If a
specific sum of sensory data invokes an association or a memory, it cannot be neutral. It
must possess more than just factual qualities and inherently hold a guide for its own
interpretation. Resorting to memory and association then only highlights the circular
theoretical explanations of empiricism and the shortcomings of sensation as main
explanatory principle.81 The latter is especially evident when expanding the equation of
sensation with experience to more complex perceptions, such as spatial and temporary
relations: If all experience is dissectible and analyzable in terms of quantities of
differentiated sensation, then knowledge cannot be more than an anticipation of
impressions.82 The process of association and recognition of unity (seeing a thing as a
thing) remains unexplained and relegated to a consciousness equally unexplained (though
crucial in the operation of identification of configurations). 83
Empiricism, Merleau-Ponty thus asserts, is descriptively wrong in the claim that
perception is simply an awareness of sensations: describing experience via sense
impressions fails to explain sensation itself. Also, it is incoherent when it attempts to
81

Merleau-Ponty, 22.
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This is a position Hume is content to rely on. While the external world is “out there,”
perceptions are only evidence from which we can infer existence of exterior objects and knowledge about
them, but we cannot perceive things as they “really” are.
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capture the content of experience in terms of sensation while at the same time putting
forward experience as brought about by sensory stimuli.84 In other words, the empiricist
position is not accurate in the claim that perception equals attending to the senses. Nor is
it logically consistent to define experience as consisting of and caused by sensation. Such
a position bestows sensation with the dual, but discordant purpose of describing and
explaining experience.
Attempting to hold on to sensation as a concept and fix loopholes in their own
theorizing, empiricists can no longer maintain purely empiricist methodologies.
Theorizing perception via empiricist avenues in the end fails to adequately account for
structures of perception, structures which allow us to perceive whole objects and
qualities. It also conflates felt sensation and associated meaning, presenting a linear or
consistent relation between sensation, perception, and knowledge. Empiricists externalize
these structures and imbue them in the elementary sensation perceived by a stimulus via
the constancy hypothesis. But because this cannot explain perceptive confusions or
varieties in association, it leaves processes or dynamics of perception unaccounted for in
the end.85
Turning back on their concerns with dualist notions of body/mind, even
theologians like Daly, Heyward, Moltmann-Wendel or Ruether, who passionately argue
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against a separation of body/mind rendering female bodies passive and biologicalmechanical, have rendered it passive yet again by appealing to sensory capacities which
turn bodily sensation into purely receptive channels and/or by implying perception to be
the intellectual grasp of bodily sensorially received data. Being unclear about how bodily
experiences are connected to or brought about by sense data and perception curiously
separates the body from the mind. It relegates the body to the role of mere vessel for
sensations with perceptual capacities which can be honed and utilized by a
consciousness.
Epistemologically, rendering sensory perception a biological capacity (however
spiritually or intellectually honed) in empiricist conceptions (even those which may allow
for socio-cultural influences) makes it difficult to account for any knowledge gained
through perceptual ability, especially different knowledge acquired from a different
standpoint (be it the female body, the racialized body, or the poor body). In other words,
it makes it difficult to explain how embodied experience can be the sensing of for
example, oppression, without resorting back to conceiving of knowledge as associating
and anticipating certain patterns of experience and identifying them as “oppression.”
Either this association must have a specific origin which was clearly identified as
oppression and is easily transferable to other experiences (thus universalizing and
simplifying either oppression or experience), or this association is made by a
consciousness (but how is still not explained).
When appeals to the senses are made in feminist theologies, they may be
connected to liberative epistemological strategies of tuning into the “real world,” or of
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tapping into traces of a “world untainted by sexism/oppression” (as in Ruether). Yet this
upholds divides of natural vs. cultural, and often associates this “natural” world with an
ideal world free of oppressive structures. This nature/culture divide, deliberately placed
or not, frames sensory perception as a biological, but somehow “culturally sensitized,”
tool which is supposed to be able to bridge the dualism it was conceived within in the
first place. For example, the perceiving woman has at her disposal either a physical
system which she simply needs to hone or “fine-tune” in order to receive knowledge
about the world (e.g., in Daly or Moltmann-Wendel), or the perceiving woman has innate
bodily and mental capacities to perceive her environment which she needs to reawaken in
order to make perceptive and interpretive associations (as in Ruether).86
It does not matter if the empiricist conceptions of perception found in theologies
are expressed explicitly or implicitly, or if they show more or less theoretical
sophistication. Any resourcing of bodily experience which utilizes a plea to the senses as
86

Serene Jones cautions against establishing universal principles or themes under which
“women’s experience” become subsumed, such as posing ‘relationality’ as intrinsic to female human
existence. As Jones comments, relationality can serve as the structure to appropriate or fit in that which is
marginal, and she also wonders if valorizing traditional stereotype of women being more relational can
really be liberating. Also problematic is the thinking of relationality as essentialized female experience,
based on care and nurture in the essentially female (biological) capacity to reproduce and mother children.
Valorization of bodily experiences described as uniquely female, such as menstruation, seems useful in
countering social constructions of menstruation as symbol for female excess, lack of control and messiness.
Jones, "Women's Experience between a Rock and a Hard Place: Feminist, Womanist, and Mujerista
Theologies in North America," 39. Also Serene Jones, Feminist Theory and Christian Theology:
Cartographies of Grace, ed. Kathryn Tanner and Paul Lakeland, Guides to Theological Inquiry
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 47. I echo this concern. Relationality, if used in an undifferentiated
way, can easily neglect to take a postcolonial analysis into account, in which relationality is complicated by
relations to colonial power and within imperialist structures: Relationality is not necessarily inherently
innocent, thus a women’s experience of relationships can be marked by oppression as well as complicity,
be it in deference to cultural customs or survival struggles. This potentially falls back on regarding the
reproductive body as something essentially female, regardless of intention or ability of individual women to
exercise that capacity. Theologies that valorize women as life-givers valorize biological capacities and
connect affirmation of women to their considered biological (reproduction) and social (relationality)
capacities. This kind of deduction raises questions about the humanity of those women who cannot or want
not bear children, or who fail to show nurturing and caring traits.
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“better” access to “truth” or “meaning” maintains caught in dualisms of many kinds and
on many levels and ends up perpetuating them in significant ways (though it may be
unintended). In empiricist conceptions sensory capacities remain fixed in a biologically
determined body, and this obviously undermines any attempts to move beyond
body/mind dualisms.
Intellectualism Critically Analyzed
Intellectualism (also called idealism or cognitivism, depending on discipline and
context) is the most pervasive theoretical thread in the phenomenological movement.
Traceable (though not exclusively originating) in the diverse manifestations of Cartesian
and Kantian rationalisms, intellectualism conceives of our essential relation to the
world—of the content of our attitudes about the world—as thought.
Descartes conceived of the mind as that which apprehends ideas, rationally
formed. Body and mind are two distinct entities; bodies are made of physical properties,
the mind takes up properties of thinking, seeing, feeling, sensing, etc. Edmund Husserl,
the considered founder of the phenomenological movement, alludes to Descartes as the
“patriarch of phenomenology,” describing his own phenomenological approach as a new
Cartesianism.87 Cartesian conceptions have habituated us to think of the body as an
object, and of perception as an action of the subject. From this perspective, bodily
experiences and perception as mental activity are at best causally connected, and this
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Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans., Dorion
Cairns(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 3-5.

71

makes it difficult to conceive how physiological, spatially-grounded facts can be
commensurable to psychic facts not located in time and space.88
Immanuel Kant, more known for his epistemology, nevertheless leaves a legacy
on phenomenological thinking. He distinguishes between the way objects are “in
themselves” (called “noumena,” which one cannot directly experience), and the way
objects are interpreted in one’s perception and understanding (“phenomena”).89 Kant
drew a contrast between receptivity and spontaneity, a distinction which comes close to
basic intellectualist aspects of perception, the sensory and motor dimensions. 90 For
analytical purposes, I could make a distinction between two aspects of perception that
underlie the traditional objective-subjective, physical-mental divide: a) the relative
passivity of sense experience, and b) the relative activity of bodily skills.
A Cartesian cogito of some kind is common to both empiricist and intellectualist
approaches: a mind that synthesizes and “manages” sensory information. Yet
intellectualist theories conceive of perception fundamentally as cognitive and subjective
activity. The “I” actively transcends itself and grasps the world. The world exists as such,
though only for the conscious mind which “knows” it. As a form of idealism,
intellectualism is a response to the considered flaws of empiricism, especially the
positing of the consciousness as just another thing in the world subject to natural laws
88

Merleau-Ponty, 77. Or posing this as a question: How can there be a connection between
something that exists somewhere in space (is spatial-physiological), and something that exists nowhere (is
psychic), and what would this connection be?
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(such as causation). Intellectualism conceives of consciousness as wholly different from
the world. Taken to its logical conclusion, intellectualism then has to argue in support of
a consciousness constituting the world, a consciousness that is the “I” transcending into
the world. There is a world in itself “out there” existing independently of the conscious
“I,” but we cannot know about this world “as it is,” only as it is constituted in my
consciousness.
Intellectualism, though it seeks to overcome the mechanical sensory model of
empiricism, renders perceptual experience just as static and shares much with the
empirical views it seeks to overcome, for example, the conceptions that raw data is
passively received through sensory faculties and knowledge conforms to independently
existing objects. Intellectualism understands perception as the exercise of thought and
judgment involved in experience, executed by an evaluating subject.
Phenomenologically, this describes sense experience as distinct from, but analogous to,
thinking. Consequentially, rendering experiencing akin to thinking absorbs sense
experience into thought and cognitive structures without accounting for the ways in
which thinking and bodily perceptual experiences differ.91
More specifically, intellectualists attempt to address the concept of attention, used
by empiricists to theorize how it becomes possible that in the reception of sensory data an
object stands out against a background for the perceiver.92 Where empiricists fall short
because of their theoretical inability to resort to consciousness (though they imply it),
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intellectualists propose that it is the constituting activities of consciousness which create
the structures of perception.93 Whether or not this structure is perceptible to the subject
has no consequence in intellectualist theories. Consciousness, by its very existence and
activity, produces structures which aid the subject in perception.94 Intellectualists do not
need “attention” in order to explain perception, but use it to help illuminate perceptual
structures.
However, Merleau-Ponty points out, if consciousness in its activity produces
structure, it must have these very same structures itself. In other words, if consciousness
provides the structures of perception, then in the moment of perception we already
possess perceptual structures. This makes certain actual perceptual experiences
theoretically untenable: I could not possibly be perceptually deceived (as in optical or
other sensory illusions), and contingency and learning remain unaccounted for
theoretically. Conceiving of a consciousness possessing and producing structures of
perception implies that perception is always complete, determinate and definite. Yet our
lived experience shows that we continue to explore and learn about that which we
perceive.
Intellectualist perspectives are unable to meaningfully employ concepts such as
attention. Indeed, “to attend” is to progressively formulate that which initially occurs as
indeterminate and ambiguous to us. Therefore, the experience of attention shows that at
the beginning of perception, there is neither sensory chaos nor unambiguously
93
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Without this structure-inducing consciousness, there is either perceptual chaos, or a Kantian
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perceivable qualities; at the end of perception, there is no complete transparency and
coherence.95 Attention itself is creative, and this creativity is motivated exactly by this
initial indeterminate horizon of perception.96 Intellectualism thus needs a different
concept to link sensory data impinging on the subject to the perceived sense image of
unified objects.
The problems inherent in intellectualist conceptions may make their way into
theological projects which emphasize consciousness-raising. For example, Ada María
Isasi-Díaz’s theological project is that of detecting, describing, and valuing Hispanic
women’s moral agency and subjectivity. 97 Among those themes, she uses, for example,
the experiences of particular community struggles and that of mestizaje (signifying the
racial and cultural mixed-ness of U.S. Hispanics), mined for processes of meaningmaking.98 Her method is strong on being sensitive to culturally specific historical,
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socialized, and feminist experiences, and she constructs insightful theological
formulations.99
Perception is significant to Isasi-Díaz where consciousness and conscientization
are concerned. Sensory perception to Isasi-Díaz is the most basic level of sensitivity in
consciousness, a level shared with animal life.100 But understanding (she refers to
Bernard Lonergan’s use of Hegel’s term Aufhebung or sublation101) is used to describe
complementation and interpretation of what is sensed. Unique to humans is the
incorporation of sense perception with other, higher, levels of judging and choosing.
Because conscientization as critical reflection on action leading to awareness is
connected to higher levels of consciousness Isasi-Díaz describes, sensory perception in
her work is the raw material, but nevertheless needs to be absorbed into a consciousness
which “pays attention” in order to be put to use for processes of liberation. Knowledge
about the world still conforms to a world that exists independently and offers meaning to
the person sensing and reflecting on her sensory bodily experiences in her environment.
Conscientization is the exercise of thought and judgment; the evaluative perception
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employed by a person who holds perceptual structures in her mind which aid in her
perception of her world.
Theologians leaning in intellectualist directions in terms of phenomenological
conceptions are bound to the ways in which they (implicitly or explicitly) propose a
judging and evaluating mind processing perceptual data gained in bodily experiences.
Judgment in intellectualist conceptions assumes the coordinating function within
consciousness, whilst also taking on the explanatory burden for phenomena such as
optical illusions (or even the discrepancies between what is projected on a retina and the
perceived object).102 Within this theoretical assembly, perception is rendered an
intellectual construction. Sensory data is received, but to perceive is to interpret,
elaborate, or use that data to conclude and determine. The experience of perception is
now the intellectual activity of judging: Every time we see, hear, taste, smell, or touch,
we actually judge that we see this, hear that, smell this, or touch that.
Merleau-Ponty argues that this intellectualist version is not how we experience
perception in real life. Purely physically, we do “see” (receive an imprint of an image on
our retina) upside down, but we do not experience upside-down images which we then
judge or interpret right-side up. And we do experience differences between sensing and
judging, as evident in attempts to make sense of sensory illusions or to explain
hallucinations.103
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Contrary to intellectualism’s conception, perception is not thought. The latter is
based on and presupposes perception. Merleau-Ponty insists here on an irreducible
phenomenal difference between perception and thought and observes that we perceive
before we think, and we learn how to think about what we see, rather than attaching
preexisting thought to a sensed world encountered by the act of thinking. 104 At the same
time, thinking itself is structurally much more like perceiving than rationalistic concepts
account for: both are intentional,105 both share some underlying structural features (e.g.,
perspectival orientation), because both are anchored in the body. 106 Merleau-Ponty asserts
that judgment is secondary, not integral, to perception. The intellectualist trajectories of
phenomenology (beginning with Cartesian rationalism and moving through Kantian a
priori categories of judgment enabling perception) posit an autonomous and disembodied
consciousness. In the Cartesian model, the mind holds “ideas” (or “representations” in
Kant) and therefore is able to imagine and perceive. These ideas are objects of
consciousness: the subject is aware of ideas and has attitudes about ideas. This fails to
acknowledge that all subjects (including their mind and its functions) are inherently
embodied and situated.
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the problem of explaining the process of my hallucinating is merely deferred. The process of distinguishing
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Even theologians who explicitly and adamantly seek to do theology from
embodied perspectives and grounded in bodily experiences may be tripped up by
intellectualist notions making their way into their projects. Marcella Althaus-Reid, for
example, seeks to ground her theological engagements in the lived, embodied
experiences of women in Latin America, who face multiple layers of oppression. 107
Althaus-Reid investigates lived realities of bodily experiences, comparing them with
religious narratives and symbols, looking for possibilities of identification and liberation
in sexual metaphors employed for the theological imaginary. 108 Constructively, she then
proposes a perverting and “indecenting” of theology by constructing positions from
sexual marginal epistemologies: telling sexual stories and doing theology of sexual
stories, bringing them into dialogue with economics and politics and the oppression
occurring through them.
Because Althaus-Reid connects perception to recognition of meaning and
reception of sense data, perception can be conscious or not, but conscious perception is
linked to particular standpoints and social location, revealing particular (hidden) truths. 109
107

Using socio-cultural analysis and ethnographic tales, Althaus-Reid argues that economic,
political, sexual, and religious structures all work together to form systems and orders of decency which
determine the lived reality of women. Althaus-Reid names this kind of liberation theology “Indecent
Theology” and argues that this is the case because it exposes and deconstructs the relationship between the
sexual and the theological, a relationship defining the order of decency which underpins other oppressive
orders. Decency/indecency operate to define what stands as “normal” in terms of the economical, sexual,
racial, and theological, and this decent and normal masks the multiple oppressions and interrelated
structures of oppression at work. Marcella M. Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in
Sex, Gender and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), 2,17,22-26.
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For example, she finds subversions in theologically engaging the poor raced transvestite who
seeks to survive marginalization and oppression by prostituting in a nightclub. She resists essentializing of
‘the poor’ as well as their desires, and complicates religion, citizenship and notions of justice through her
theological readings of sexual practices and embodiments. See Ibid., 32-33,85-86,112-114,136-137.
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While she does not articulate it specifically, at times she implies perception to be bodily
function which can be put to use in accessing experience and providing information
useful to processes of interpretation and meaning-making. Other times, she implies
perception to be something that is also socially influenced, particularly when it comes to
recognition and reception. What is perceived/recognized is already shaped by the social
and cultural imaginary, for example, certain physical appearances of a person are already
shaped as perception of a criminal.110 In her theological project, Althaus-Reid invokes
employing a phenomenological method which understands perception as the capacity for
objective observation and for “truthful” description of sensory information of a lived
experience/phenomenon.111
When Althaus-Reid specifically seeks to tap into (sexually and economically)
marginalized bodies and experiences as theological resources, her phenomenological
stance binds her to utilizing bodily experiences as metaphor (albeit lived).112 She
indicates that perception is more than physical sensing, more than accessing objective
data to receive knowledge. Perception and affect are linked to each other and to one’s
social location; neither is free from social and cultural inscriptions. Althaus-Reid links
perception and recognition, the latter being shaped by the cultural imaginary, though she
also sometimes likens perception to a bodily mechanism which accesses experience and
110
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aids in meaning-making. We can also detect how this inadvertent employment of
intellectualist conceptions upholds the body-mind dualism and its cause and effect
mechanisms. The mind receives data of the external world, and in a separate internal zone
the world is represented. An isolated body causally affects the mind, though the purely
mechanical relations of a physical universe are upheld: an external physical world shapes
the organization of the interior mental world, and this relation can be reduced to physical
laws of causation.113
Summing up intellectualist conceptions and connected theological dilemmas
Theologians drawing on intellectualist notions allow for the person to play a role
in the process of perception and in formulating meaning as it appears for her. But this
subject stands outside the world of experience and imposes meaning on the world. Even
when theologians insist that to be embodied in the world implies a situatedness in time
and space, implying a particular perspective which is only possible when one is in the
world, the embodied subject is still caught in transcendental frames, as mind
disconnected from body and world when perception remains an intellectual function. 114
When sensory perception is mostly thought of in terms of awareness but remains a lower
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or subordinate function of consciousness (as in Isasi-Díaz), bodily experiences become
subordinated to or absorbed in cognitive structures.
Where perception is understood as bodily mechanism and socially influenced
process (as in Althaus-Reid), we have observed that the theologies constructed by
resourcing bodily experience mine the latter for metaphorical and symbolic purposes.
Aiming to reshape the cultural imaginary, perception is a link and interrelated with
embodiment and social location and shaped by social inscription/cultural imaginary. Yet
inadvertently, a nature/culture dualism is upheld if the focus of theologies becomes the
reshaping of theological and cultural imagery: If perception is a biological mechanism
which is also socially influenced, it remains unarticulated how sensory perception is also
a factor in the shaping of the social and the cultural, and it becomes a “natural” ability
over against “cultural” powers. Consequentially, these theologies are about bodies and of
bodily metaphors, rather than theologies grounded in bodily experience.
Perception as intellectual capacity bearing on bodily sensory information
conceives of things and structures in the world as constituted by my perception, and thus
dependent on and even confined to my constitutive consciousness. Although I am real
and I exist, any oppression perceived, and structural violence sensed, would disappear
without me and my grasp on it. Experience is a resource for theology, but never more
than raw material on which to critically reflect. Experiences from a specific embodiment
and particular location can give rise to theology via conscientization (intellectual
processes) only. To paraphrase Gayatri Spivak, the subaltern may experience, but cannot
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do theology.115 This maintains certain hierarchies, not just of body and mind, but also of
intellectual processes.
Any theological focus on identity and subjectivity (often considered multiple,
fragmented, or intersectional in feminist and postcolonial thought) still upholds an
explanatory gap regarding perception. Articulating cultural forces on subject formation
and bodily experience and thereby forming cause-effect mechanisms still maintains
nature/culture, body/mind dualisms, and places processes of perception alternately in
either category. In other words, simply using either category or both to explain
experience (or identity, subjectivity) does little to overcome any dualism itself.116
Curiously, the subject itself, or subjectivity, falls into an “explanatory gap” in some
versions of this kind of approach, for example, when the brain is rendered an organ which
carries out thinking, remembering, imagining, acting, etc., in a system based on physical
mechanics. The mind is either reduced to the brain or becomes an unaccounted for third
party in this cause-effect model, a mind which nevertheless somehow has experiences as
a subject.117
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When the perceived world is rendered as separate from myself, things and others
exist and relate to each other independently of me. As detached perceiver, I can sense the
world from nowhere and everywhere and am simultaneously connected to the world only
as another alienated object, and my perception of the world is irrelevant to its existence.
The world and its goings-on are real, but I as perceiver am not necessary, do not have to
be a person involved in it. Even when interrelation of me-other and me-world is thought
of as constitutive of my identity, as long as conceptions of perception remain caught in a
subject-object divide, then “deep down” my subjectivity remains prior to interrelations
with other subjects and objects (the independent “I” comes before any relation/perception
of the world). Unwittingly, perception in empiricist and intellectualist conception can
(re)shape the subject of feminist theologians into the dis-embodied universalized male,
either by suggesting access to (universal) truth through sensory channels or by employing
phenomenological notions which disconnect the perception of the world from one’s
bodily location.
Situating the Theological Sense Regarding Perception
Lacking at present in feminist theology are methodological tools to address how
exactly the body is not just the passive material molded by language and social
inscriptions. How do we experience in our bodies, how does the body move into the
imagination, into concepts, into perceptions of the world? In other words, what exactly
can theorists and theologians alike learn about the “inner life” of the body and embodied
experience, and what influences are at work in how we come to feel it, perceive in it, talk
about it, and look at the world from and through it? And how can a theologian
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conceptualize (from) a particular bodily experience (be it disabled, raced, gendered),
without universalizing an able ideal, a white norm, or a naturalized gendered concept, and
also avoiding exclusive, segregated theological conversations? And as a caution to
myself, working within the Western academy, how do I (can I) cautiously entertain this
project not as to simply present dominant discourses with yet another tool to appropriate
or exploit other/othered bodies to “improve” Western discourses?
Surveying the spectrum of phenomenological approaches I have presented the two
ends of the spectrum within which perception has been conceived (empiricist and
intellectualist). At the ends of this spectrum, one can conceive of perception as a
mechanical bodily function (the senses as bodily channels for truth “out there”) or as a
function of the mind (the senses as providing the data which the mind then perceives,
judges, and interprets). Neither position might seem palpable to a feminist theologian
concerned with body/mind dualisms, yet when perception is unattended to, one may fall
anywhere in between. My goal in presenting the ends of the spectrum has been to
highlight the shortcomings of the phenomenological positions via their extremes, and to
allow us note where these conceptions of perception leak into theological projects.
If I want to pursue my questions which initiated this project, and turn to feminist
theologians who employ bodily experience and sensory perception in their work, I might
be bound to remain within the same spectrum they find themselves in. In other words, I
get caught between a methodological rock and a hard place: seek to hone my sensory
perception to receive truth about my experiences in/with my family, or install my
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perception and interpretation as a superior mind. Let me illustrate more clearly the
dilemma I find myself in.
I could attempt to ground my theological reflection on my grandmother’s
experience for example by employing sensory perception as access to experience. But for
lack of communication (verbal or gestural) I am left with “objective” data of what her
experience might or could be like, based on detached scientific observation and collected
sensorial evidence on persons with Alzheimer’s disease. My attempts at accessing and
utilizing her experience, what she might perceive sensorially, remain speculative, though
they gain a certain clout of authority backed by scientific inquiries into the universal. Or I
can move to a hard place and shift my attention to my experience, my first-person
perceptual account and descriptions of grandmother. This would correct the speculative
utilization of what Grandmom’s experience might be (should be) like, but shift the focus
on experience towards my personal perspective, to meaning and truth as only I
experience it. Grandmom’s experience and its meaning are either universal and exist
independently of my witnessing them, or I am bound to my perspective and can attest to
experience and meaning only as I perceive them myself. Neither approach addresses
complexly how it might be that bodily sense experience (mine or hers) informs my
theological reflections, and, as this statement also reveals, maintains inadvertently a
body/mind dualism in which the body experiences and the mind reflects.
In the case of my mother, I can pretend to perceive her meaning-making in the
world as if I am not part of her situation and not enmeshed with her in her experiences of
suffering and resistance. Theologically, I am then observing her bodily movements

86

through my perceptual capacities as if my sensory perception is capable of grasping all
meanings emerging for her. Or I can acknowledge that I am left with my own subjective
grasp of her experience; I cannot perceive of her experience, but only draw on my
experience of her, my perception and description of her experiences. Yet, honing and
employing my sensory abilities to perceive of my mom’s experience like an outsider is
imprudent not only (though significantly) because I am involved. Positing my perceptual
capacities as adequate for theological reflection and interpretation on her experiences like
an insider is imprudent because she is involved. And I still have not accounted for the
ways in which bodily experiences and perception are implicated with each other so that I
am not a mind evaluating my bodily perceptions.
Within this spectrum of empiricist-intellectualist approaches to perception, the
nature and processes of perception are insufficiently explained. Perception cannot be
adequately conceived as either a causal link in a mechanic, bodily process or as an event
or state in the mind or brain. When theologians employ embodiment to voice
dissatisfaction with pervasive mind/body dualism, perception cannot remain
conceptualized within a dualistic frame. What has emerged so far in this chapter is that
some phenomenological conceptions posit bodily experiences as offering up “truth”
accessed through perceptual processes. Theologies naming (women’s) bodily
experiences, and thereby making it a conceptual category, then may imply that these
bodily experiences may be accessed via ontological epistemological sensory capacities,
or they may serve as indicators or text offering truth about social and cultural forces
evaluated and interpreted through intellectual capacities.
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In the phenomenological spectrum presented, sensori-perceptual processes are
established as common universal. Theologies falling within this spectrum—either by
hailing sensory perception as the go-to avenue for women (or all persons) to access
truth/knowledge, by likening perception uncritically to apprehension (albeit from
different standpoints), or equaling it to recognition of reality—fall prey to the problems
inherent in this spectrum. This does little to deconstruct binaries of experience (e.g.,
male/female) or metaphysical dualisms (material/transcendent), but again constructs
idealized bodies and bodily functions, and particularly neglects implications of those
bodies doubly inscribed with difference (racialized women, women with menstrual
complications, intersexed persons, transgendered persons, impaired bodies, dying bodies,
etc.).118
Turning back on their own concerns, even theologians who explicitly seek to
overcome body/mind dualisms render the biological body mechanical and passive: Either
by appealing to the senses and therefore making the body no more than a vessel for
reception, by appealing to bodily function while at the same time applying normatizing
ontological ascriptions, or by focusing on the intellectual perceptual capacities to evaluate
social forces impinging on bodily experiences. These approaches, however, tend to
establish evidence of different bodies and bodily experience as evidence for the fact of
118
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difference (I see different bodies, therefore our bodies are different). This kind of shortcut
might prevent us from undergoing a more complex exploration of how difference is
perceived and established and how bodily experience and perception may play part in it.
An appeal to the senses does not grant access to unmediated truth or untainted
experiences, revelations of meaning or the divine; bodies, and their sensory capacity
themselves, are always differently constituted. To “be in touch with one’s feelings” is
always simultaneously less and more than just that, as we will discuss in depth in the
following chapter.
Moving Beyond the Empiricism-Intellectualism Spectrum
We have seen in the above describing and evaluating of the different positions
that empiricism posits a perceptual process which in effect renders the subject ignorant
(because consciousness is denied a role in the process, though invoked for other
functions). In contrast, intellectualism conceives of a subject completely cognizant of
what is perceived. But despite some of our actual sense experiences being ambiguous or
vague, both positions theorize perception as determinate and corresponding to a (selfevident) objective world: Empiricists understand this world to exist in itself, imposing on
the perceiver, and construct an absolute objectivity via this theory of perception.
Intellectualists conceive of the world as the immanent end of knowledge, posing a
concept of consciousness which sustains the objective world constructed by
empiricists.119

119

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 29, 35-39.

89

Merleau-Ponty charges that the inadvertent denial of the embodied nature of
perceptual experience is common to both empiricists and intellectualists. The former
treats the body as a mechanism; the latter treats the body only as an afterthought or
contingency to consciousness. 120 Both positions take for granted that there is an objective
world “out there,” a world described by science. Human beings are but one of the objects
in this world, and “experience” is the result of inter-object cause-and-effect relations.
Merleau-Ponty asserts that this approach is mistaken in its starting point: It is from
embodied experience that any scientific theories are derived, i.e., we interact with the
world before we develop our theories about it. This pre-reflective dimension cannot be
explained away by mechanisms or after-thoughts.121
We do not experience (in) the world as a thinker musing about an object of
thought. Thus we ought not conceive a perceiving subject solely as consciousness which
executes cognitive functions like interpretation of data, or which orders the matter and
meaning of objects according to ideal laws inherent to the object.122 Hence, if perception
is not what empiricists or intellectualists propose, what is it? For Merleau-Ponty, this
question can only be answered by maintaining the focus on embodiment. Merleau-Ponty
turns to the inherent embodiedness of perception to frame the subject as able to access to
the world only through the body and only as already situated in the world. Merleau-Ponty
considers the paradox or mystery of perception to be that a) the world is disclosed to as at
120
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all, that we are aware of things outside of ourselves, and b) that we are living beings
encountering the world via bodily perspectives, bodies which we have and are.123
Perception is bodily; it is as bodies that we perceive. We are not subjects positioned over
against objects, but bodily agents in and of the world.124 More concisely, perception is an
integral aspect of our bodily existence.
Merleau-Ponty’s famed thesis is the primary of perception, though he does not
bestow perception with exclusivity of evidence.125 Rather, perception in Merleau-Ponty is
that which constituted the grounds for all knowledge, and as such its study has to precede
all other layers of investigation.126 Maintaining distinctions between interior and exterior,
mental and physical, subjective and objective, is misleading when using them to frame
sensory perception. Merleau-Ponty conceives of these perceptual aspects as interrelated
and inseparable.127 His understanding of the various aspects of perception is always both:
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always passive and active, situational and practical, conditioned and free. 128 He insists
that our own bodily experience shows us this, because we do not experience an “I” in a
body that is simply a living organism functioning in a mechanistic manner. 129 MerleauPonty refers to pain to support this point: I feel pain not as caused by my body, but as
inhabiting my body. In other words, pain is not something that is distinct from my body,
a sensation inflicted on me by a pain-wielding body as agent, but I experience the
sensation of pain in me, in my body-self.130 I have pain and I am paining. Pain can be
scientifically measured and it is something that I feel and describe subjectively and
cannot relate objectively. 131
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty posits that perception is always in the middle of two
traditional categories, it is in fact the ground: the dualist categories employed depend on
and presuppose perception as the middle ground of experience. That is, I can have
subjective sensations and experience sensory qualities, but only because I can sometimes
generate them by abstracting away from my original openness to the world and zoom in
on isolated features of things and on bits of experience. I then suppose (rightly or
wrongly) that my sensations must correspond to those isolated features. This can go the
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other direction as well, taking my zeroed-in sense experiences and abstracting them away
from myself towards a world I posit as independent of perspective. 132
Merleau-Ponty gives us the human subject existing as embodied perceiver: I am a
body perceiving; my bodily experience is always perceptual; my perceptual experience is
always bodily. This is the presupposition unattended to in traditional concepts of
perception which understand perception as either causal (empiricist) or conceptual
(intellectualist). For Merleau-Ponty, to insist on perception as essentially bodily affirms
that perception cannot be theorized or understood when abstracted from its concrete
corporeal condition and/or when separated into bodily and mental functions. We have a
pre-reflective understanding of our own experiences, i.e., we do not think of our
experiences as linked to our bodies in a causal or conceptual way, but we understand our
experiences to coincide in relation with our bodies: our thinking, feeling, judging,
remembering, etc., is always coinciding with our seeing, feeling, touching, smelling,
hearing, etc.
For the purposes of my project, thinking of bodily experience as experiences of us
as living bodies shows that there are significant untapped ways to think about how more
complex experiences (such as oppression or structural violence) are embodied and
experienced in and through ourselves, not just inflicted on us. I might be able to draw on
studies correlating social location with bodily markers and specific physical/medical
conditions, but these studies alone cannot help me access bodily experience in a way that
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helps me understand how exactly a bodily condition or social location might orient me in
the world via my bodily experiences. To do theology complexly grounded in experience,
I need to begin by seeking to understand my existence in the world as constituted by my
embodiment and by my perception of and in the world. Thus far, I have sketched that to
exist in this world is to be embodied and to perceive a world, there is no me without my
existing as bodily perceptual orientation in a world.133
What does this mean? To exist in this world is always to already be as body, and
as body I always already am touching, feeling, hearing, smelling, and seeing the world.
As perceiving body, I am always already directed towards the world, as I turn my head to
see another person, turn my body to listen to a song, focus my bodily attention to the
touch and feel of another person: I am always existing by being bodily perceptually
oriented in the world.
We are our bodies, and we experience the world as we are in the world through
our bodies, as body-subjects. This leaves no room for an ontological separation of the
subject “I” and the body of the subject. Furthermore, I and the world are enmeshed with
each other, and what pervades this interrelation is perception. Perceiving always implies a
situatedness in time and space; it implies a particular perspective which is only possible
when I am in the world. And it is because I am in and of the world, that I perceive the
world inevitably as structured, meaningful, and whole.
In the following chapter, I will continue to explore the question of how to
conceive of experience by supporting the assertion that my existence in the world is
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always fundamentally a bodily perceptual orientation in the world. I will investigate what
this assertion entails and provide arguments to support this assertion, but also show how
understanding experience as bodily perceptual orientation is useful when seeking to
understand specific conditions of human existence. This will provide me not only with a
more complex (and I believe more useful to my project) conception of perception, but it
will allow me to understand how bodily experience and perception might be interrelated.
This in turn will present a robust framework with which to resource bodily experiences
for theological purposes.
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CHAPTER THREE: BODILY EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL
ORIENTATION
I have asserted above that my being in the world is always fundamentally a bodily
experiencing in the world, and this bodily experiencing is a perceptual experiencing. How
I come to be and move in the world is always a bodily being and moving, and the ways in
which I encounter the world, am shaped by the world, come to learn about the world and
myself is always based in and mediated by how I see, touch, feel, intuit, evaluate,
remember, etc., in and through my existence as a perceiving body. This basic condition of
my existence, which is also my condition for interacting in and with the world, is what I
have named bodily perceptual orientation.1
I showed in the previous chapter that uncritical theological appeal to sensory
perception as a method to discover meaning and develop truth claims may lead to
methodological dead ends. Namely, when body/mind dualisms are sought to overcome,
but perception is uncritically employed for epistemological purposes, what might be
posited is an understanding of having perception at one’s disposal, having sensory
experiences to which one can turn, which one can access and mine for their content.

1

In this chapter and throughout the rest of this project, I will continue to use combined terms such
as “bodily perception” or “bodily perceptual orientation.” Unless otherwise clearly noted, this is not to
indicate that there might be other kinds of perception or perceptual orientations. Rather, it is to remind
myself and the reader that perception and perceptual orientations are always inherently bodily, and I seek to
hold in close linguistic connection that which has often been conceptually separated and maintained
through philosophical body/mind dualisms.
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Implicitly or explicitly, this appeal to perception may leave perceptual processes and their
connection to experience framed within a dualistic body/mind split, undermining the
overall aim of theological reflections seeking to affirm bodily experience and overcome
the hierarchies and taxonomies developing out of body/mind dualisms. Implied are often
certain presuppositions: As conscious subjects we can turn toward experiences, accessed
via sensory perception, and access bodily experiences as something inherent to our
existence in the world, yet as something we have. Thus in this kind of turn towards the
senses to access the content of our bodily experience, what actually happens within
theological writing (the writing about this sensing of the body and bodily experience) is
that more often than not, bodies appear as objects, experiences as content accessed,
apprehended, and turned into text and metaphor to be read.
Invoking bodily experience this way for theological projects leaves the theologian
in a curious bind: I can attempt to analyze those bodily experiences and functions which
seem to be “common” in order to derive ways to analyze meaning-making in the world.
For example, I can invoke what are seen as common bodily experiences (death or pain) or
common gendered experiences (such as pregnancy or menstruation). But approaching
bodily experience with the hopes of tapping into meanings and truth claims inherent in
specific bodily experiences might lead me down empiricist methodological avenues
which may tempt me to essentialize or universalize bodily functions and/or fixed
associated meanings. Or I can attempt to prevent this by taking a first-person approach to
embodied experience by, for example, employing personal perspectives and subjective
descriptions of experience. Yet this might restrict my analysis of embodied meaning to
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the interpretation of the experiencing person and the ways in which perceived meaning is
subjectively interpreted and represented. Meaning and truth then might remain a
subjective intellectual enterprise.
On either end of the methodological spectrum and anywhere in between, the
theologian appealing to the utilization of the senses might find herself between a rock and
a hard place, the rock of fixed meanings out there which need to be received through
perceptual channels, and the hard place of subjective meaning created through
interpretation of perceived information. This can be partially tracked to the lack of
attention and clarity in how bodily sensory perception functions in our experiences, and
also to significant connections of the manner in which we are bound to the ways in which
our language limits our reflections and representations of bodily experience. The English
language, for example, does make it difficult to express our existence as unified body and
mind. English linguistic structures guide me to say that I have feelings or I am feeling
something, I have a body, that I feel pain in my foot.2 But existing in this world (as I will
further elaborate on below), I am a body experiencing, and my reflecting on experiences
is in itself an experience; I am a body perceiving, and my attempts to understand
perception are bound to my perceiving. Because our linguistic limits can too easily
constrict our theories and methods and turn on our efforts to overcome Cartesian
dualisms, it is crucial to clearly articulate our conception of bodily experience and
sensory perception when grounding theology in experience.

2

Some feminist theorists and theologians then construct terms to signal something beyond the
body/mind dualism partially enforced through language, such as body-self, body-subject, corporeal self,
incarnate subject, just to name a few.
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As we have seen in the previous chapter, even when explicitly challenged,
body/mind and subject/world dichotomies are still permeating the concepts and theories
of perception and how theological projects link perception and bodily experience. If
theological language and power dynamics within and between discursive structures were
the sole concern of a theological project, then this lack of theoretical attention to sense
perception could be defensible. But I am convinced that theologians who want to take
seriously the charge to overcome harmful body/mind dualisms must consider and
overcome these dualisms found in concepts of perception, lest we undermine our own
projects.3 In other words, challenging body/mind dualisms by, for example, making
women subjects and elevating bodies from a pure object status is not enough, if we still
continue to conceive of perception in ways that uphold body/mind separations. Therefore,
body theology cannot just claim and/or describe a sense experience and assert a role for it
in the constitution of theologically valuable experience. Body theology must consider
perception to grasp more complexly the nature of body-world-culture relationships and
what constitutes a “real” embodied experience at a given moment in a given context in
time and space.

3

To elaborate on this point again by drawing in my grandmother and my mother: Focusing on
language and power dynamics in linguistic structures shifts attending to Grandmother’s experience towards
a discursive framing of her situation and experience. But it remains unclear how a change in discourse
about Alzheimer’s disease and aging might actually influence her experience, or how it might influence the
meaning created for/by her, especially as her cognitive abilities decline. Is she just a body without a mind?
Can she perceive and with what? Am I the mind observing her body as object? Similarly, I can understand
my mother’s experience to a certain extent by focusing on her self-understanding as shaped by concepts of
“foreigner,” “daughter-in-law,” or “immigrant.” But what do I know about her experiences and meaningmaking beyond what she tells me in broken German? How would I understand how her bodily perceptual
experience is involved? Am I the educated perceiver-judge interpreting meaning for her sensory experience
and acts?
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In this chapter, I will explore how we can understand bodily experience and
sensory perception in interrelated ways. I have asserted that perception is a bodily
experience inherent and significant to our being in the world: to be in this world is to be
in a body, to feel, touch, smell, see in a body; to experience the world and be experienced
by the world in a bodily way also positions us towards others and the world in specific
ways. Now, after having asserted above that bodily perceptual orientation is how I am in
the world in the previous chapter, I will explore the what of this claim, the question of
what understanding perception and experience as our bodily perceptual orientation in the
world entails, what it is and what it does, before moving on to further explore the how in
the following chapter. I will show that it is important to not only give appreciative nods
towards an interrelation of body/mind/world, but that it is crucial to begin to think
through this interrelation complexly. Complexity does not imply an inability to
theoretically frame this interrelation, nor should potential messiness deter us from giving
this interrelation careful consideration.
Body theology grounded in experience needs to be able to answer questions
regarding what experience is and what it tells us about the human conditions we seek to
inquire into. Below, I will begin by presenting certain theoretical assertions connected to
my understanding of bodily perceptual orientation as condition of being, in order to
sketch the theoretical framework I consider crucial in developing a robust body theology.
Namely, I will assert that that experience is bodily perceptual orientation, in other words,
to experience in the world is to experience through and with our senses, the world we
experience is always shaped by our perceptions, and reversely, how and what we
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perceive with our senses is also shaped by the world. To perceive then is to engage in
bodily and socio-cultural acts. I will then defend my assertions by using gender, race, and
normalcy as pivot points for exploration of how bodily perceptual orientation comes
about, and what bodily perceptual orientation tells us about conditions of human
existence, about the meanings and values experienced and expressed. Rather than giving
exhaustive accounts of race, gender, and normalcy, I will let these concepts serve to
ground my exploratory movements into how bodily and social dimensions of our
perceptual existence come to be implicated in and through our bodily existence in the
world.
It should become clear in my exploration that neither dimension of perception can
be understood as distinct or separate from the other; rather, each dimension is part of the
interrelated dynamic that is our bodily perceptual orientation in the world. Similarly,
none of these concepts (gender, race, or normalcy) can be explained solely within the
perceptual dimension it is utilized for in this chapter. Nevertheless, gender, race, and
normalcy are useful in exploring what bodily perceptual orientation is and how we can
understand and explore bodily perceptual orientations through concepts such as bodily
intentionality, perceptual movement, perceptual habit, and mutual perceptual becoming at
work in bodily perceptual orientations. Each of the three sections will pick up perceptual
concepts with varying degrees of attention. Taken together, the three sections connect to
each other, expand and explore each other by adding different angles and weaving in
further illustrations or investigations.
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Bodily Perceptual Orientation in the World as Condition of Being
We need to abandon concepts of the body (and the world, for that matter) as
mechanical/biological object found in the above discussed empiricist-intellectualist
spectrum, and we also need to let go of any notion of perception as purely intellectual
processes of apprehension, judgment and interpretation. Then we can begin to outline
how the body figures in our experience of ourselves and the world, and begin describing
how our experiences and perception might be our judging and evaluating and thinking
about the world. To live is not to live in a body, but as a body. To exist in this world is
not existing in a body which we then use to experience the world, but to experience the
world as body. To live as body is how we perceive, feel, think, will, act. What and how I
perceive (in) the world is not caused, but constituted by and embedded in the structure
and capacities of my specific embodiment. And because my “body is my point of view of
the world,”4 the minimum condition for my existence is my bodily perceptual orientation
in the world. What does this mean?
I can experience only insofar that I am a body that rises towards the world, and
experiencing as an essential bodily capacity is perceptual. Sense experience is intentional
and transcendent (about something and reaching towards something), extending me as
body out into the world, while at the same time embodied and contingent (situated and
dependent on something). It exceeds the narratives and expressions a subject can give: I
can tell a story about cooking with my mother, and this story can be heard, utilized, and

4

In other words, I can never have a perspective in and on the world that is not derived from a
perspective I first have from my specific bodily incarnation. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception,
70. We will explore the implications of this claim in more detail below.
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analyzed, even if I never had this experience in the first place. But my experiencing as
such, my ability to perceive, cannot be divided into exclusive dimensions; I cannot have
experiences in the absence of embodiment, embodied capacities and perceptual abilities.
My experiencing of cooking with my mother cannot be actualized without my living this
experience.
To begin with understanding ourselves as bodily perceptually oriented subjects in
this world, we need to begin with re-orienting our questions about bodily, thus
perceptual, experiences. Rather than asking “What kind of bodily experiences do I
have?”, I need to begin by asking “What are bodily perceptual experiences?” And “What
perceptual experiences are me?” or, “Who am I in and through perceptually
experiencing?”
Bodily Perceptual Orientations: Theoretical Assertions
If the minimum condition for the subject to exist in the world is bodily perceptual
orientation, then this is not reducible to an “I perceive, therefore I am” (as a mind
deducing this fact from accessing perceptions). Rather, the minimal condition of the
subject is “I am perceiving.” There is no separation between the conscious “I” and the
perceiving body: I am a body perceiving. To exist as a human being in this world, I am a
living conscious body; I can never be a consciousness without a body or a body without
consciousness. Perception is at work in all dimensions of this bodily existence, as we will
explore in more detail below. Perceptual processes are body-conscious-ly, world-ly, and
culture-ly. In other words, in all aspects of my existence the interconnected and
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interrelated dimensions of body- mind-world, perception is embedded. As Merleau-Ponty
puts it:
Bodily experience forces us to acknowledge an imposition of meaning which is
not the work of a universal constituting consciousness, a meaning which clings to
certain contents. My body is that meaningful core which behaves like a general
function, and which nevertheless exists, and is susceptible to disease. In it we
learn to know that union of essence and existence which we shall find again in
perception generally […].5
Meaning is not inherent in either objects or subjects that exist separately, and thus
meaning is not transmitted in transactions between sender-perceiver, nor is it
interpretation of and within a subject-consciousness. Perceiving is the act of tracing
elementary meaning through sensory means, but this meaning is neither solely created
through my mental faculties, nor is it simply received through my perceptual capacities. 6
Rather, meaning emerges from the gestalt that is self-world; it is shared between body
and world in the same way that it is shared between a figure and its background.7 My
first, most basic experience is always of a whole, with various elements in my experience
having a relation to the perceived whole. In other words, I experience a situation as a
whole, and the meanings invoked by various elements are in the situation itself. Meaning
is not imposed on a situation, but meaning imposes itself on us in the situation, or rather,
meaning emerges coinciding with the emergence of the experiencing person. And this
meaning emerges through perception. I will argue and demonstrate in this chapter that
5

Ibid., 147.

6

“In this primary layer of sense experience which is discovered only provided that we really
coincide with the act of perception and break with the critical attitude, I have the living experience of the
unity of the subject and the intersensory unity of the thing, and do not conceive them after the fashion of
analytical reflection and science.” Ibid., 238-239.
7

Watkin, 24.
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perception is an active bodily process of structuring or organizing a given sensed
environment, and in this organization of perceptions myself-as-body and the perceived
world/objects are constituted as such.8
The meaning(s) and subjects emerging in a given situation are not arbitrary; they
are based on human concepts, which are relative to particular cultures. But noting that
meaning is connected and shaped by cultural context does not negate the previous
assertion that meaning is not imposed by human subjects, but emerges in interrelations of
body and world. Cultural contexts shape the body-world interactions and orient us
towards certain interpretations, so that certain meanings appear inescapable. Cultural
contexts provide the horizon, which is only one of many possible, within which
perception takes place.9
Regarding experience, Merleau-Ponty asserts that
there is a logic of the world to which my body in its entirety conforms, and
through which things of intersensory significance become possible for us... A
thing is, therefore, not actually given in perception, rather it is internally taken by
us, reconstituted and experienced by us in so far as it is bound up with a world,
the basic structures of which we carry with us, and of which it is merely one of
many possible concrete forms.10
An experience, an object, the world, is not given to me in perception, rather, my
body conforms to a logic of the world, conforms to subtending settings of our sensory
experiences. Merleau-Ponty calls this the pre-reflective realm of experience. We will
8

"The properties of the object and the intentions of the subject . . . are not only intermingled; they
also constitute a new whole." Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior (Boston, MA: Beacon
Press, 1963).
9

Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology,
the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, 12.
10

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 326. Emphasis in original.
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explore below how bodily perceptual movements are possible because I have a prereflective understanding of my body, an understanding that I do not need to consciously
reflect on in order to operate from it.11 My movements in and toward a world manifest in
bodily perceptual intentionality, and always in reference to a pre-reflective dimension
shaped by the cultural, human life-world, a dimension which subtends our bodily
perceptions.12
This subtending dimension of perception must not be understood as a natural
material world existing independently from me, a world in which I simply appear. Rather,
this subtending pre-reflective dimension (pre-reflective in the sense in that it subtends my
experience without my conscious or reflective efforts to connect to it) is the condition by
which the world and I appear; it is the condition of our coinciding perceptual emergence.
Exploring the pre-reflective dimension to perception is attending to the conditions of
emergence of the perceived world as well as the conditions of emergence of the subjectbody who perceives.13 In other words, the exploratory questions shift from “What am I
experiencing?” to “How did I arrive here to perceptually experience something?” and

11

This concept will be referred to and explored below as body schema.

12

Merleau-Ponty, appropriating Gestalt psychology, describes this dimension as
horizon/background of perception, a concept which I will not be able to explore fully here.
13

I take my cues here from Sarah Ahmed and her exploration of phenomenological background
and arrival. Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2006), 38. Ahmed, when exploring phenomenology in her work, critiques the oft used
bracketing method of Husserl. “Bracketing” as phenomenological method suggests that we can set aside
our own presuppositions when observing a phenomenon, set aside that which is familiar to us so that when
we suspend all our usual prejudice, we can perceive the world and the object of our attention unbiased,
fresh. Ahmed critiques Husserl’s bracketing method for failing to account for arrival. In other words, we
still rely on that which we pretend to bracket. We pretend that we can set aside our own cultural and
practical knowledge and look at for example a table as if we had no idea what a table is or what it can or
should do. Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others, 32-39.
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“How is my arrival in the world a form of emerging as bodily perceptual existence which
is also the co-inciding event in which the world of my perception emerges?” Or, put
differently again, to understand my existence as bodily perceptual is to understand that
my perceptions of a cultural, socioeconomic, sexual, raced, religious world and
experiences in it co-incide and depend on my emerging and arriving in the situation as a
cultural, economical, social, racial, sexual body. While I might pretend to bracket such
qualifiers (e.g., bracketing my gender or race in order to arrive at an “objective”
observation of experience), whatever I pretend to bracket is what I arrive with in the first
place, and what is in the bracket also shaped that which I am facing, the object of my
study. To bracket the background, my arrival in the situation, is to erase the shaping and
coming into being of the object which I am now studying, as if it simply floated in time
and space. To bracket my own arrival and history is to bracket the history of the material
world also, and significantly, it brackets the mutual constitution of me as body and the
world and its objects.14
Bracketing the arrival of the perceiving body also relegates to the background that
which “performs” our perceptions of the world, namely our bodily perceptual abilities.
Therefore, my orientation in this world is fundamentally a bodily sensory alignment by
the world. Bodily perception is my existence and transcendence as a subject. But this
extension in and comprehension of the world is not enabled by my senses; i.e., I do not
have senses with which I “do” perception. Rather, bodily extension in and comprehension
of the world depends on and is my sensory perception, and moreover, I am already

14

Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others, 32-39.
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perceptually aligned in certain ways. Perceptual alignment is what determines if others
are left, right, front, behind, near, or far; but also if others are desirable, approachable,
graspable, or even visible and existing at all, in other words, if bodies and objects are in
line, aligned with our orientations.
It is not just others and objects in space shaped by and for us through our
orientation in it. Conversely, I as perceiving body am also shaped through these
orientations in and orientations of space. This is because, as Sara Ahmed argues in Queer
Phenomenology, bodies as well as objects take shape through being oriented towards
each other. Habituated orientations—lines of perception, lines of desire that become
compulsory—thus affect and regulate choices and limits of bodily shapes and also bring
about sexualization and racialization and other bodily shapings and perceptions. In other
words, orientation is not unilinear; it is not one-directional. It is not just our embodied
selves who orient our lives and perspectives outward in space. Others and objects in
space also orient us. Our environment with others and objects embodying it is the space
we move into and co-inhabit; I am also shaped and oriented by my surroundings. Bodies
and objects take shape and shape each other through being oriented toward each other. 15
Below, I will defend these assertions by presenting arguments through
investigative movements. Using gender, race, and normalcy as pivot points, I will explore
how perception and experience are embedded within each other. I begin with exploring
the phenomenological concept of intentionality, presenting it as bodily perceptual
movement. I will explore this bodily perceptual movement and dynamic of experience

15

Ibid., 54.
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through investigating gendered movements. I will then move to discuss bodily perceptual
habits and their sedimentation through exploring the habit of perceiving raced bodies. In
the third and last section, I will explore language and perception, and how we can
conceive of the interrelated dimensions of body, mind, and world within which language
emerges, using normalcy as pivot point of investigation.
Perceptual Intentionality: Perceptual Experience of Gender
Perception: Bodily Intentionality
Significant to exploring bodily perceptual orientation in the world as minimum
condition for our existence is to conceive of bodily existence and bodily structures as
intentional. Phenomenology’s founder Edmund Husserl famously located intentionality
in consciousness: all consciousness is consciousness of something.16 All conscious acts
are of or about something, intending something. Conceptualizing this structuring of our
consciousness was Husserl’s attempt to solve the Cartesian legacy, by posing the mindbody split as a false dichotomy. 17 But Merleau-Ponty, responding to what he considers
Husserl’s continuation of Cartesian dualisms, crucially situates the intentionality of

16

It was actually Husserl’s mentor, psychologist Franz Bretano, who termed the directedness, the
about-ness of consciousness, “intentionality.” But it was Husserl who began using this term to challenge
Cartesian conceptions of the mind. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen, "Introduction," in The
Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen(Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5.
17

Husserl’s phenomenological conception of consciousness as intentional then implies that
perception is not solely an interior event; rather, it is essentially transcended and open to the perceived
world. In regards to perception, intentionality (the sensing of or about something) implies that the existence
of the perceived object does not depend on the sense experience of the subject. Rather, its existence goes
beyond what is perceived; it transcends the consciousness of the self. Moreover, meaning then is neither
solely in the consciousness of the perceiver, nor inherent in the object; meaning is always located in the
perceptual interaction. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans., J.N. Finley, New ed., 2 vols., vol. 2
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2001; reprint, 1921), 77-93.
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perception as incarnated, as bodily. 18 Bodily experience as intentional is always already a
consciousness of/toward/about something, body and consciousness are irreducibly
embedded, and as conscious bodies our intentionality grounds our relationship with the
world, namely our mutual constitution in bodily experience.19
Theoretically, this presents perception not as access or apprehension but poses
perception as that which “indicates a direction rather than a primitive function.”20 This
implies that perception presupposes situatedness, that the perceiving subject is
specifically located as body in time and space. And it implies orientation: Not only is
what I perceive always in reference to my body, my embodied perception is always a
facing of something.21 Bodily intentionality, the bodily extension through perception, is a
sense of situatedness through “my ownness” and belonging, of relationship and
participation, as I will further examine below.22
Perceptual bodily reference is intentional and charged with significance:
something is up or down, to the left or right, appears large or small, appears to precede
me; something is graspable; it is something for me; it is something I can reach from here;

18

Merleau-Ponty asserts that Husserl maintains the “I” as foundation for all knowledge and then
turns to intersubjectivity to explain the “I.” To Merleau-Ponty, this is simply a modern version of
Cartesianism. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, viii-xxi.
19

Paul Rodaway, Sensuous Geographies: Body, Sense and Place (New York, NY: Routledge,

1994), 18.
20

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 12.

21

Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others, 27. Given my Euro-Western
cultural context, using the metaphor of “facing something” is easily read analogous to visually facing it as
in “seeing something.” This is not an implication I would like to infer. Below, I will discuss a variety of
ways other than seeing in which we can perceptually face something.
22

Rodaway, 8.
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it is something I want.23 Perception therefore orients me towards possible tasks and
towards possible ways of achieving my objectives. In perceiving something, I am already
positioned towards it: I am already perceptually directed towards it and towards
perceiving it a certain way. But what these statements also imply is that what is perceived
is already posited as something, something other than me which I perceptually grasp with
inherent meaning for me.24 My sensory perceptions of objects in the world contain
projections, apprehensions—significances of perceived objects that “speak” to my body,
to the ways in which I can project my body in relation to objects and movement within
the world.25
For example, when I join my mother in the kitchen and she directs me to sit down
and watch her, I can sit down on a chair without having to make an effort to register and
compare perceptual information with the location and movement of my body and chart a
plan to achieve my sitting. Rather, I simply move to sit down, because I perceive the
kitchen as my environment, and I perceive my mother, the stove, the chairs,
already/always in relation to my body: I am facing my environment and perceive the
chair to my left as a sitting opportunity for me, and as I am facing my mother in the
kitchen, other areas of the house remain out of focus or on the periphery of my perception
(I might hear my sister talking on the phone in another room or marginally perceive my

23

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 138. The “I” of this understanding is prereflective (a concept we will explore further below), what Merleau-Ponty coins the tacit cogito. See
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 369-409.
24

I will discuss and make clear in more detail below that this perceptual grasp does not imply a
strict subject-object divide, but rather a mutual implication and interrelation.
25

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 153. Langer, 44.
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father through the window as he works in the garden). Further, in my perception, my
environment is already emerging with a certain significance: it is a certain chair I desire
to sit on, and I know I will be able to sit on a chair and rest my arm on the table because I
can project certain bodily movements into my environment.
What tends to be obscured, however, is that this directedness, this perceiving of
what is in front of me with significance and meaning, comes about through my bodily
intentionality: my bodily existence is a perceptual openness, a perceptual reach into the
world. This is what makes my existence inherently transcendent. And because my
transcendence into the world is perceptual, it is inherently bodily. Intentionality as bodily
perceptual implies that bodily sensory perception is always intentional and meaningful
(always reaching outside of my bodily self, and always already grasping significances
perceptually), and reversely, intentionality and meaning are sited in bodily sensory
perception.26 In other words, my body is inherently transcendent because sensory
perception is bodily, and bodily sensory perception takes part in bestowing meaning.
Bodily intentionality is my perceptual extension as an “I can.” In other words, my basic
experience in the world is not that of thinking about my experience in the world but of “I
can” in my world, of grasping perceptually how I can extend and move in the world. 27
Let me explore this assertion further by investigating bodily movement.
26

Merleau-Ponty argues the point by looking at learning bodily habits, such as driving a car or
playing an instrument: I can steer a car through a street or play an instrument without constantly having to
analyze sensory data comparing the width of my vehicle with the street, or the position of my fingers in
relation to the instrument. Thus, my perception and movements are not that of a body in a geometrical,
cartographical space, but of a body relating practically and in movement to/in what Merleau-Ponty calls
“practical” space – a space correlating to my bodily perceptual movements. Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of Perception, 141-146.
27

“Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’.” Ibid., 136.
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Movement and Body Schema
Crucial in further understanding intentionality as a bodily dynamic, always
embedded in our bodily experience, is to understand bodily perception as movement and
movement as bodily perception. As already hinted at in the illustration of my
experiencing myself and my mother in the kitchen, it is in moving that I understand my
body-self as unified whole. It is in movement that I understand
the body… [a]s an expressive unity which we can learn to know only by actively
taking it up, this structure will be passed on to the sensible world. The theory of
the body schema is, implicitly, a theory of perception.28
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of body schema may be understood as something like a
blueprint that configures my specific way of being as body in a given environment: body
schema structures perceptions and sense of self and/in relation to environment; it
configures my movements and postures.29 The body schema is a set of enduring
dispositions and capacities responsible for our enduring sense of bodily position and
possibility.30 Put differently, the

28

Ibid., 205-206. While this quote is lifted out of Smith’s 1962 translation, I maintain my
preference for schema over image (Smith uses image).
29

Merleau-Ponty's schéma corporel is translated as “body image” in the Colin Smith’s widely
used English translation of Phenomenology of Perception, but I prefer the term “body schema.” “Body
image” can be misleading because of prevalent uses in psychology (the early use, the habitual account of
images accompanying various impressions and bodily movements; the adjusted use, the image of a
universal body and the awareness of general functions; nowadays the use in psychology to refer to
perceptions of one's own body along social and aesthetic dimensions). Merleau-Ponty understands “body
schema” to be not an image and more than just an understanding of the location of body parts. The body
schema is a nonrepresentational structure of the body: My body is what embeds me in and directs me
towards the world; my body schema informs my sense of perception and perceptual agency in a specific
environment at a specific time. Ibid., 100-101.
30

Using “blue print” or “enduring dispositions” might lead to a misconception of the body schema
as a fixed entity or a perceptual faculty. As I hope to show in what follows below, the body schema is a
fluid, or moving schema of perception. It is dependent on the body-world interrelation, which continuously
evolves. For an in depth philosophical exploration of what a moving body schema entails, see David
Morris, The Sense of Space, ed. Dennis J. Schmidt, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy
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body schema is that in virtue of which a bodily movement is a finely coordinated
ensemble of motions intentionally organized in advance towards targets that are to
be meaningfully moved.31
When reaching for a bowl in the kitchen, I do not make separate, distinct
movements with different body parts; rather, I reach for it as a bodily unit with
coordinated movements. When reaching for the bowl, I already prepare to grasp it tightly,
in a different anticipation from how I might tacitly prepare to grasp the (perceived as wet)
kitchen sponge. Perhaps the bowl is covered with a cloth and it looks full and heavy to
me, so I prepare to lift it with strength, but in fact it is empty and I now happen to yank it
off the table because my bodily movements were geared towards a heavy object. The
body schema, my tacit awareness of my bodily self as unit, enables this coordination or
perception and bodily movement in and towards my environment.32
The body schema is crucial to my self-perception as bodily whole as well as to
my perception of my environment and the unity of perceived things: I interpret myself as
more than just a conglomerate image of my body parts and my experiences with/of the
body. It is in bodily movement that I experience myself moving as bodily unit: I sit down
in the kitchen chair in what I experience as a fluid movement from standing to sitting; I
move as a bodily unit rather than different body parts making separate motions.

(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), 53-80. For a complex investigation into the
coming about and workings of the body schema (though she uses the term “body image”) as well their
ethical dimensions, see Gail Weiss, Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporality (New York: Routledge,
1999).
31

David Morris, "Body," in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, ed. Rosalyn Diprose and Jack
Reynolds (Stocksfield, UK: Acumen, 2008), 116.
32

Carman, Merleau-Ponty, 231. For example, through the body schema, I know how I can move
from a standing position towards a chair, and if a chair’s surface will accommodate my desired sitting
position. Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 98ff.
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Perception and movement here are embedded with each other. Only because of my
perceptual capacities can I move into and in the world, and only because of my
movement can I perceive myself as bodily unit and project and “do” my movements.
Similarly, this sense of bodily unity supports the unity of embodied perceptual
processes: Because any bodily movement is a synthesized assembly of various motions
involving various body parts affecting a sense of bodily unit, any bodily movement also
affects a synthesis of perceptually received data towards perception of something whole,
a unified object. For example, when rolling a piece of dough between my fingers, I do not
need to spend conscious effort to synthesize my fingers into a unit (hand), nor do I
perceive several lumps of dough (one for each digit making contact), but I am perceiving
a single, spherical object. This is not merely either a cognitively or mechanically
achieved synthesis. This synthesis is effected by the structure of myself as conscious
moving body: like movement effects a bodily sense of unity, so movement effects
perceptual unity—unity of perceptual collaboration and contingencies.
“Motility is the primary sphere in which initially the meaning of all significances
(der Sinn aller Signifikationen) is engendered…”33 Movement is embedded with bodily
perception, and their interrelation is significant to understanding bodily experience:
movement brings about meaning; meaning is sited in movement; and because perception
is embedded with movement, meaning is embedded with perceptual processes.
Movement is at play in all sensory perception. Even vision, for example, which in
contemporary Western culture is often understood as passive reception, is effected and

33

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 142.
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affected through movement.34 Sensorimotor movement affects and effects visual
perception, or more generally, the relation between stimuli and motility constitutes
perception. Take color, for example:
Thus, before becoming an objective spectacle, quality is revealed by a type of
behaviour which is directed toward it in its essence, and this is why my body has
no sooner adopted the attitude of blue than I am vouchsafed a quasi-presence of
blue. We must therefore stop wondering how and why red signifies effort or
violence, green restfulness and peace; we must rediscover how to live these
colours as our body does, that is, as peace or violence in concrete form… red, by
its texture as followed and adhered to by our gaze, is already the amplification of
our motor being.35
There is a motor significance to color which must be understood in terms of an
embodied dialectic, i.e., bodily movement brings about acts of evaluation which reveal
the motor values of color. This dialectic implicates sensation and movement in mutual
transformation. In other words, the relation between sensory perception and embodied
movement does not cohere to physical laws, but is a situation which is eternally open to
its own development. Scott Marratto illustrates and supports Merleau-Ponty’s assertion
by using research by cognitive scientists O’Regan and Noë, who demonstrate that visual
perception of color does not just relate to, but requires eye movements: seeing colors
such as red depends on the structure of the changes occurring when movement occurs
(movement of the perceiver or the perceived).36
Perception and movement then also indicate dialectics between body and world.
These dialectics implicate perception and movement in mutual transformation. In other
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words, the relation between embodied movement and sensory perception does not cohere
to physical laws, but is a situation which is eternally open to its own development. 37 To
draw on the perception of color again, each of my specific and contextually contingent
involvements with a color (e.g. the red of my blood when I cut my finger, the red of the
chili peppers on the kitchen table, the red in the German flag at the airport leaving my
parents) reconfigures my sensorimotor bodily perceptions in following encounters with
that color, i.e., opens up new possibilities or manners of perceiving this color when I am
confronted with it again. And each future encounter with that color (the red of chili sauce
in an American Thai restaurant, the red of the oil color with which I am painting, the red
of the American flag hoisted on the university grounds in Denver) involves a further
articulation of the history of my involvement with red. This implies that perceptual
relations or “laws” (like the perception of red connected to a certain length of light
waves) are also contingent to historical, cultural, and individual contexts. 38 Red is never
just red, and red never just is. Is it always the red of the shirt I am wearing today as I am
typing in my office, or the red of the paper flower in the card from my parents that I
remember receiving in the mail yesterday. 39
Perception and movement are embedded in each other: Perception is an outward
movement of my body-self towards the world. Perception is an activity (not a channeling
of information), a motile engagement through which a world appears. Even when I stand
37
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still to observe my environment, my gaze is a spatial outward movement of my body into
the world, and my perception also entails a temporal movement, since perception is
always temporally spread out. Perception brings forth movement and meaning: Sensory
perception extends me in the world and orients me towards possible tasks and towards
possible ways of achieving my objectives. I am grounded in perceptual apprehension of
my environment, apprehension which requires not thought or reflection, but bodily
intentionality which is sensory perception. In that sense, perception is projection of
movement and meaning:40 Perception as bodily intentionality is mediated by knowledge
of how sensory information would change if or when a particular path of exploratory
perceptual movement is pursued. Importantly, this knowledge is tacit, or pre-reflective, in
that it does not depend on the actual execution of exploratory movement; rather, it is a
tacit sense of an open-ended range of sensori-motor actions and correlated sensory
information.41
When seeking to understand the relation between body and world in regards to
bodily perceptual experience, this kind of conception of bodily intentionality shifts our
explanations away from causal conceptions between perceiver and perceived to
conceiving of relations of intentionality.42 Relations of intentionality are at least two-fold:
40
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The intentionality of my bodily self and the intentionality of the world interrelate.
Because I exist as body in an environment and perceptually extend into the world, my
intentionality is not a separate consciousness directing outward movement. A kitchen
cabinet is high for me, a napkin is out of line on the table for me; the world is there
towards and for me. The world is intentional, and its intentionality, this about-me-ness of
the world in my experience affects my perception and the meaning of my environment in
ways I do not consciously choose, in ways that do tie meaning to how the environment
appears as inevitably meaning something (i.e., the for-me-ness appears to me as meaning
inherent in the object). In other words, it is neither nature nor culture, but the relation
between body and world toward and about each other that effects my perceptions and
therefore experiences and conduct.43 And relations of intentionality exist between
conscious intentions and pre-reflective bodily intentions, relations which orient me
towards the world and my concerns in and with it:44
When my mother teaches me how to cook a dish, I already move into this
experience perceptually. It is not my mind utilizing my senses to access the situation. I
move into the situation bodily by seeing, touching, smelling, hearing, remembering,
asking questions, etc. When my mother instructs me to get up from the chair and stir the
food on the stove, I do not have to direct my perceptual attention to my hand to
intentionally guide it, or figure out how exactly to hold the spoon. I just move to stir the
43
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food. I move around the kitchen without consciously giving myself instructions on where
and how to move my body. I intuitively reach for a footstool to access items on a shelf
otherwise beyond my reach. Unless there is a problem—an item I did not see blocking
my access to the stove, the spoon greasy and slipping out of my grip—I am moving in my
body without having to think about it. I might ponder a shopping list, listen to my mother
share the next step of the meal preparation, or absentmindedly gaze out the window. I do
not think about stirring food to then execute a plan. Yet I have a perceptual understanding
of how my body can move in this situation, and what certain objects in my environment
mean to me, how my environment is for me. I am not explicitly aware of how my body
reaches for the spoon and how my hand anticipates the spoon by taking up a receptive
gesture. I have a conscious intention, to stir the food in the pot. Yet my bodily
intentionality that is my sensory perception directs my extension and movement into my
environment, it orients me by bestowing meaning and significances to my surroundings,
specifically in regards to my particular embodiment and capacities. My bodily
movements are intentional but do not necessarily occupy my conscious awareness. This
is what Merleau-Ponty calls “motor intentionality,” the movements of my body within
which my body “disappears,” the ways in which my body operates without my conscious
activation of it.45

45

Ibid., 106.

120

Gendered Bodily Intentionality
To emerge as female person, to perceive and be perceived as gendered female, is
to emerge as a body shaped in certain ways and to move in habitually gendered ways. 46
Habits are patterns of movement, ways of moving, closely connected to our
understanding of ourselves-as-bodies seen in our body schema. A habit is always both
motor and perceptual; a habit is to tacitly understand what is given to me in my bodily
capacities as well as what is given to me in my environment. For example, to know how
to type is to have acquired the habit of typing, to have a “knowledge in the hands” of
what my hands can do, of where the keys on the keyboard are, and to experience an
agreement between what I aim to type and what is given to me to achieve this, to
experience the harmony between intention and performance.47
Bodily perceptual movements and habits are neither universal nor natural. The
fact that I can learn to type, change my ways of typing, adjust to different keyboards or
adjust to changing manual capacities demonstrates that. There is a bodily biological
dimension of habit: my bodily capacity to acquire habitual movements through repetition.
In moving and in learning to move, I have a bodily capacity for habit, and habits are
embedded in bodily dimensions.
I am as body in bodily movements that are bodily habits, for example, I do not
always create new ways of lifting a cup or holding myself up and swinging my arms as I
walk, nor do I have to figure out my walking movements in different but similar (say,
46

I understand sexed and gendered bodies as different, but interrelated concepts. Biological sex is
not gender, but we come to perceive and anticipate a gendered body embedded with our perception of a
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level or sloping) environments. Yet, acquiring of habits is not simply memorizing a
bodily task in order to avoid discontinuities in our experience (such as always figuring
anew how to eat with a spoon). At stake here again, if we mistake bodily acquisition of
habits with for example memorizing or reflexive mechanical bodily movements, is the
invocation of a dualism, either by the installation of a consciousness controlling bodily
functions and movements, or that of behaviors simply as sum of mechanically linked
reflexes. Maintaining a body/mind dualism when it comes to the acquisition of bodily
habits then may lead to essentializing gendered movements (which I will discuss further
below) as biological-mechanical linked reflexes tied to sexed bodies (and therefore
naturalizing a connection between sex and gender). To invoke bodily habits as primarily
under the control of a memorizing or connecting mind might disconnect sex and gender
regarding observable gendered habits, but this runs the danger of relegating gendered
movements disconnected from the biological matter of sexed bodies.
Understanding my habits as bodily (understanding them as embodied and
practical know-how manifesting in my actions) encompass a dimension of bodily
adherence to my environment, habits of bodily adjustments to the space I inhabit from
breathing, bodily positioning for sleeping, eating, to habits such as typing. The bodily
dimension of habit also becomes evident in the ability to make bodily perceptual
adjustments and changes in habit, such as improvisation when playing an instrument, or
transferring bodily habits such as eating with the fork in the right hand instead of the left,
or quickly adjusting to a different size keyboard. Without being a body, I could not
acquire habits, and habits would not appear as such without the bodily dimension
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“containing” them.48 To acquire bodily habits is to grasp and incorporate tacit and
practical principles, principles which are only ever expressed in the actions to which they
belong, and which are always principles acquired within my own body schema and
within my pre-reflective relation to my environment.49 This is most evident in learning a
new skill, such as playing an instrument, a skill which I can only acquire by doing, by
incorporating or absorbing new bodily competencies and understandings into my body
schema. This in turn transforms my way of perceiving and acting in the world (a guitar
may transform from a musical instrument to mine, one which I can pick up in a certain
way and produce my musical performance with).50
This points to Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “habit expresses our power of dilating
our being in the world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments.”51
He not only points to the acquisition of skills through acquiring habits; rather, he claims
that a change in habit, a change “in our patterns of movement, is a change to our way of
being in the world - a claim that would be utterly extraordinary if we were not already
pursuing the problem of how meaning is engendered within bodily movement.”52 My
bodily movements are inherently infused with habits, and my ways of moving, habitual,
48
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are what give me a body schema, an “I can,” a bodily blue-print that configures my
specific way of being in my body in a given environment. My acquisition of habits is
realized in bodily intentionality, in my self-transcendence, in the ways I perceptually
move and express myself, project myself into my environment, in the ways I act and react, re-work my movements toward an anticipated and perceived environment.
Yet habits are social as much as they are biological, and though these two
dimensions need to be distinguished, they are not separate or reducible to each other. My
bodily habits are more than mere adaptive instincts; a feature of my life as human is that
of being a socio-cultural being, in other words, I do not simply adapt to my environment,
but I can also adapt my environment through the construction of material culture, through
the settling of my bodily habits into nature (i.e., I do not simply exist in my environment
detachedly, but my bodily habits “settle” through constructing houses, roads, villages,
churches, implements, spoons, musical instruments, etc).53
This physical transformation of the world only functions as culture to the extent
that it is used by persons, and used according to the meaning socially associated to it. For
example, a kitchen is only a kitchen in its specific socio-cultural construction as long as
people are disposed to prepare foods in this kind of structure and habitually refer to it as
kitchen. This kind of social habit (cooking in a kitchen) presupposes that the meaning of
“kitchen” has been incorporated within my body schema. And significantly, my
movements in a kitchen and incorporation of kitchen objects into my habitual movements
effect a further and crucial transformation of my way of being in and experiencing the

53

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 346.

124

world, for example, kitchen tools may become an extension of me as body as I cook.
Many of my habits are acquired from what I see performed around me and am able to
copy from a social collective pool.54
Gender is a bodily perceptual experience in which bodily and social habits are
implicated with each other. Iris Marion Young describes the habit-based, perceptually
shaped female body in the world emerging via gendered bodily intentionality in her
famous essay Throwing like a Girl. Bodily intentionality, the tacit understanding of “I
can” for women is also an “I cannot,” an inhibited and ambivalent bodily intentionality,
grounded in the situation of women (not in their anatomy or physiology) as condition by
sexist oppression.55 For Young, in women this “I cannot” is not in place of the “I can”; it
is not a female bodily intentionality in place of a male “I can” bodily intentionality.
Rather, it is a co-existing “I cannot” with the “I can” of “’someone,’ and not truly
her possibilities.”56
This gender difference in bodily intentionality, in self-transcendence, is a
perceptual difference, a gendered bodily perceptual orientation. And gendered bodily
perceptual orientations are both an effect of gendered differences as well as a mechanism
for their reproduction.57 For example, while boys might be encouraged to engage in
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rough play, a girl in this situation might be warned to not get herself hurt or dirty. To get
dirty or hurt during play (as effect of bodily movement and intentionality, and bodily
habits of play) can result in disapproval (from parents or peers, through social habits of
supervising children’s bodily movements), disapproval which signals the failure of
extending and moving like a girl, the failure of being a girl as failure of acquiring the
social habits of a girl, as well as the failure to achieve the perception or the status of
being a boy and acquiring social habits of a boy. 58
Gendered habits, habitually acquired gendered movements, demonstrate how
bodily experience constitutes a gendered world, and also in turn how gendered bodily
experiences are constituted by the world.59 My movements constitute my world and what
the world means for me in my own idiosyncratic physiological and psychical
constitution. But I am also constituted by a world acting upon me; my bodily habits,
subtended by my body schema, always already reflect the particularities and generalities
of a given situation in which social habits (or better: habits shaped and “moved” by social
values) bear on my bodily movements.60 Throwing like a girl, playing like a boy, sitting
like a woman, talking like a man, etc., are ways in which gendered bodies constitute the
world and the movement of bodies in it, of the meaning and movements with objects and
58
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within space. And this in turn constitutes the meaning of the gendered body, and how a
body and bodily movement are gendered by the world acting upon it.61
Bodily intentionality, the sensory perceptual projection or apprehension of
significances of my environment that relate to my specific embodiment, imply not only
possibilities, but also opacities, resistances, and limits resulting in inhibitions or
hesitancies in expressive bodily intentions.62 The gendered subject emerges out of the
space where her sensory perception is oriented in reference to her gendered female body.
A female body emerges as a body extending through specific gestures, postures,
perceptual acts (like speech, vision, or tactile movements), and perceives the world in
ways specifically oriented as gendered, namely what is perceptually within grasp or out
of reach. In the world, which is apprehended in my perception in relation to my bodily
intentionality gendered female, not everything is perceptually available to me, and
availability is aligned through my orientation as a female. Being bodily perceptually
oriented in the world as female is to be oriented in my movements along certain gendered
lines and alignments. This charges me as woman as “herself-as-body-agent” and my
environment with gendered significances: What is large or small, what is graspable, what
is achievable, what is something I want or desire, is experienced as oriented along certain
gendered lines of perceptual orientation.
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For example, the social habit of cooking in a kitchen is a habit socially shaped for
gendered bodies in the context of my childhood environment (familial and social). Thus
social mechanisms controlling and enforcing bodily movements also encourage a female
“I can” in the specific cultural constructions of this space: As woman, I am not out of
place in a kitchen, but rather my bodily intentionality can tap into a social pool of female
bodily habit, and kitchen gadgets may become incorporated into my body schema. For a
gendered male body, kitchen utensils might come to be perceived as objects to be utilized
(rather than bodily extensions of the self) in a space where bodily movements have not
necessarily been acquired as bodily habits. Thus the meaning perceptually emerging
between body and world is inherently tied to the perception of gendered bodies and their
movements. Perceiving myself and my mother in the kitchen emerges with bodily and
social meanings related to cooking, provision of food and nurture; perceiving my father
entering the kitchen emerges with bodily and social meanings invoking perhaps the
entering women’s space to receive a meal. These perceptions of bodily movements
emerge out of the interplay between bodily habits and social habits, the interrelation
between social deposits of habit and incorporation of those habits by gendered bodies,
and the transformation of our ways of being and experiencing the world: In my family we
take up gendered roles; my mother, sister, and I incorporate gendered social habits and
emerge in socially gendered space within gendered social roles, which transforms our
being and experience in the world. As women, we enter the kitchen of our home as
extension of our bodily space and tacitly know how to be and move in this space. The
meanings emerging between body and world as we move in the kitchen might be
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different from those emerging between the body of my father and the world/kitchen. My
father, incorporating male gendered social habits takes up movements through which the
world perceptually emerges differently, might be bodily and socially out of place and not
bodily habituated to a kitchen as cultural space for his body-self.63
Bodily Intentionality and Bodily Perceptual Orientations of Sexuality
Gendered perceptual orientations do not cause differences nor are they simply
given. But within sexing and gendering perceptual norms, bodies and world emerge
differently and are perceived differently. Gender, already deconstructed as universalized
concept in various feminist works, is an effect of how bodies are aligned within
perceptual grids that allow bodies to extend in specifically gendered ways, to take up
certain gendered objects, and effects how certain objects are taken up dependent on
gendering.64 The perceived differences in gendered bodily shaping are a sign of
perceptual orientations these bodies have taken, towards themselves and towards the
world. Bodily perceptual orientations involve inhabiting the world and occupying the
world with objects in certain bodily perceptual ways: Walking, speaking, looking, sitting,
dressing, scenting, etc., are determined by certain orientations to bodily intentionality. In
turn, bodies are shaped by the objects they take up and by how they take them up to
63
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extend themselves into the world, by which positions and gestures they come to be and
inhabit their environment.65
The contemporary concept of “gender performativity” is anticipated in MerleauPonty’s notion of habit and Young’s developing of intentionality to account for gender
differences. Judith Butler advanced gender identity as performative, explaining how
gender identity emerges from repeated accomplished performances.66 There is no
ontologically “natural” sex or gender; rather, gender is accomplished by repeating certain
intelligible performances—intelligible because they already conform to sexual norms
regulating and legitimating certain gender perceptions and appearances (and undermining
those different from the circumscribed).67 Sexuality as bodily intentionality, as bodily
perceptual movement also shows how we do not simply oriented towards, or transcend
towards something, but how our bodily perceptual orientation in the world is a bodily
dialectic. The body in its sexual intentionality, the body that transcends into the world,
perceives the proximity of other bodies around it and moves along bodily perceptual
gendered orientations with other bodies into and within the world.
Merleau-Ponty considers sexual existence to investigate the dialectic of
intentionality in body-world experiences, when intentionality of body and world come
together so that body and world come to exist and to mean something for each other
together. However, Judith Butler notes a heterosexual norm at work in Merleau-Ponty’s
account of sexed embodiment and bodily intentionality, with bodily perceptual
65
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orientations aligned with heterosexual desire. Furthermore, Butler points to an alignment
in Merleau-Ponty between male sexuality and a specific perceptual movement, namely
the gaze, which in gendered bodily perceptual orientations emerges as a disembodied
gaze that objectifies what it observes.68
Taking this critique into account, we can explore how bodily intentionality as
bodily perceptual orientation toward something functions in regards to gendered
sexuality. As Ahmed notes, to conceptualize sexuality and sexual desire as a facing and
moving towards an object of sexual desire, is to conceptualize sexual existence as heterodirectional perceptual orientation.69 To put it differently, to “have” a sexual orientation is
to imply a directionality, and with it a relational placement of bodies. This reinforces and
maintains the already discussed gendered bodily intentionality: To be placed directionally
and relationally is to be encouraged or limited in where-from and where-to and how I can
bodily perceptually extend and move. The lines establishing bodily perceptual orientation
align differently sexed bodies with differently gendered bodily perceptual movements
(performances) and align the directionality of gendered bodily perceptual orientations
towards the other sex/gender. Thus it is not simply that desire as bodily intentionality
orients me in a certain direction, towards the other-body of my desire, but the direction of
my bodily perceptual orientation takes also makes some bodies available for desire and
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leaves others un-desirable, unavailable for bodily perceptual orientation and intentional
movement of desire and connected sexual habits.70
We can connect here two earlier observations, namely that our patterns of
movement, our habitual intentionality, are a way of being in the world (and implicitly,
that a change in movement is a change of our way of being), and that our bodily
intentionality is a form of movement within which my body disappears. While the later
observation was made by Merleau-Ponty to highlight the ways in which I move my body
without consciously activating different bodily parts, I believe this extends to the ways in
which gendered bodily intentionalities are movements within which gendered bodies and
the gendering work/habituation/circumscribed performances disappear by way of making
heterosexual desire the “normal” bodily perceptual orientation of bodies, the “natural”
way of being in the world. In other words, sexual bodily perceptual orientations become
habituated in a way to make certain directions of (sexual) movement/desire normal, and it
is changes in those movements, such as turning from a heterosexual alignment, that make
this way of being appear different, not aligned, not straight, not normal.
This is also evident in (modern, habituated) alignments of bodily perceptual
orientations with identity, in this case sex, gender and sexual identity. To display a
certain bodily perceptual orientation in sexual desire is to be that desire, as in being a
homosexual or being a heterosexual.71 Sexed bodies become gendered along
heteronormative lines through bodily perceptual orientation and habitual intentionality, as
70
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sex and bodily intentionality become aligned: being a man is to be bodily perceptually
oriented and to move toward (desire) a woman through acquired gendered habits, and
being a woman is to be bodily perceptually oriented and to move toward (desire) a man
through acquired gendered habits. Bodily perceptual orientations toward sexual others
then confirm and establish the meaning of what I am as a body (woman) by directing my
bodily intentionality towards what I am not (man).72 Sexed bodies are aligned with
gendered motility, and are aligned with other bodies along heterosexual orientations to
line up sex and gender, regulating perceptual movements (desire).
To exemplify: I perceive another or myself bodily as “lesbian,” because my
bodily perceptual orientation directs me in certain ways that “lesbian” stands out against
those bodies falling in and disappearing behind a heteronormative line. This body stands
out to me because it fails to align with and follow gendered bodily motility, such as lines
of desire that direct a female body (physically, sexually, emotionally, visually, etc.)
towards a male body; it stands out to me because I perceive a bodily intentionality that
moves in the presence, but not in the face of (as in perceptually directed towards) male
bodies, and thus fails to maintain gendered movements along established perceptual
orientations. Thus my bodily perceptual orientations and dis-orientations lead to
recognitions and identifications as “lesbian” because I perceive that the sexual
orientation—my bodily movement and sexual desire towards another body—turns away
from what I habitually learned to face.
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I do remember when my perception of myself changed from “yeah, I can do that”
to “I cannot do that because I am a girl,” how my carefree movements and oral/aural
extension into the world changed to unconsciously guarded postures and monitored
speech. And I remember when my habitual, implicit perception of myself as “straight”
(my bodily perceptual orientation aligned to desire male bodies) changed to perceiving
myself as lesbian (my bodily intentionality turning from condoned gendered habits to
being directed towards female bodies, my bodily perceptual orientation aligning with a
“deviant” object of desire). This alignment with a lesbian bodily perceptual orientation is
only possible because “lesbian” is already a perceptual line, namely one that crosses
those heteronormative orientations established in the first place, one that turns from the
lines maintained as “straight.”
These kinds of perceptual alignments of gendered motility extend to perceptions
of interior bodily/biological functions as well as conceptual or cultural movements. For
example, social habits of perception along gendered alignments of movement (such as
passive/receptive femininity and active/aggressive masculinity) shape perception in
research on human conception. The descriptive language used betrays the perceptual
alignments. For example, the female egg described as dependent in its inhibited motility,
drifts along the fallopian tube and perceptually emerges as passively awaiting the arrival
of the fastest male sperm with the strongest thrust which will penetrate it: a scientifically
gendered perceptual alignment of body parts.73
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of the egg in the fertilization process (such as discovering that the egg actively takes in the sperm which by
its own movement would not be capable of entering through the egg’s membrane), these observations are
either still aligned with the above given frame of gendered motility, or framed within other cultural
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Another example of conceptual alignment of movement is that of “coming out of
the closet:” This figure of speech for a disclosing of a lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender identity (remember the above discussed alignment between bodily
orientations of desire and identity) invokes a bodily movement from invisibility or hiding
towards visibility and social disclosure of sexual preferences towards specific sexed or
gendered bodies not typically aligned with one’s own perceived sex and gender.
Significant here is that this kind of bodily movement is perceptually assigned to those
bodies that are not falling in line with the socially habituated heteronormative
orientations of sexual desire (“straight” bodies do not need to disclose their
heterosexuality and “come out”). This movement of disclosure towards bodily perception
as non-heterosexually desiring body is a bodily motility assigned and required of bodies
whose desires are not able or willing to maintain heteronormative alignments. In other
words, only bodies conforming to social habits of alignments have the privilege of
maintaining their invisibility; bodies crossing lines of orientation make movements that
bring them into perceptual focus. “Coming out” is a bodily movement which effects
bodily transformations regarding bodily intentionality, habits, and bodily experience in
the world.
My sexed and gendered body is an effect of the kinds of work that bodies do, the
kind of technologies bodies perform, and this in turn orients and aligns my body,
affecting what I “can do,” affecting my gendered bodily intentionality. I am oriented
towards certain bodily capacities and the spaces my body can be oriented in and aligned
stereotypes, albeit negative, such as the egg as female aggressor luring and capturing the sperm like a
devouring spider.
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with. In other words, my bodily perceptual orientations align my body with habits, and
align my bodily movements with and within certain spaces.
However, alluding to work and technologies of bodies and their perceptual
orientations, and keeping in mind that meaning might appear inescapable but is open to
change, already indicates that orientations and alignments do not just constitute bodies.
The world, the environment, space, inhabits bodies and is inhabited by bodies; it extends
bodies and is extended by bodies. This makes subversions possible through the bodily
activities performed in spaces that are oriented to not support certain bodily alignments
and orientations.
Bodies performing out of line, against certain orientations, bodies out of place can
also re-orient and reshape bodies and space.74 I am thinking for example of bodily
perceptual subversions in spaces such as pulpits inhabited by gendered female bodies
aligned with certain offices held until then by male bodies only. Or bodies performing
marriage rites against and out of line with heteronormative orientations to re-orient and
reshape the space of familial homes as public alignments (such as performing womanman marriage across gender roles orientations, or performing same sex marriage in a
church commonly associated with heteronormatively aligned ritual orientations). Bodies
and spaces can change through changes in inhabitation, through changes in bodily
intentionality/perceptual movement, through re-orientation of bodily motility and
alignments. And bodies can change through traveling and traversing space, moving into
spaces which are not oriented in ways that a body “knows.”
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Ahmed gives the example of the kitchen regarding changing of designs as well as bodies
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In this section, I have discussed bodily intentionality, bodily perceptual
transcending movements, and how we can understand bodily perceptual experiences of
gender, and gender as a bodily perceptual orientation. In relation to the larger project, to
understand gender in and as experience, we can now grasp how our senses structure
experience—and through it, a world—that is gendered, and how our perceptions are
shaped and structured so that gendered experiences emerge. Bodily perception then is
shaping and shaped by a socio-cultural world in which meaning and values emerge with
gendered connotations.
I already hinted at something like a common ground or dimension from which
perceptions emerge or stand out from. I will now explore this dimension of bodily
perceptual orientations through “sedimented habits” and by drawing perceptual
experiences of “race.”
Habits and Perceptual Orientations: Perceptual Experiences of Race
I can perceive a world and be perceived by the world because, and only because,
body and world are already attuned. And because body and world are already embedded
with each other, bodily sensory experience can be what it inherently is: a communion
with the world, a living in the world: “In order to perceive things, we need to live
them.”75 This brings us back to a theoretical assertion I made at the beginning of this
chapter referring to a pre-reflective dimension, the condition by which I appear and am
perceived in the world and perceive the world always already as a body emerging as
gendered, raced, and normally able. My perceptions, what and how I perceptually
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experience myself, the world, and things in it, are conditioned by this pre-reflective
dimension in which I as perceiving body am situated and immersed. How and where I am
situated by this dimension and how I emerge from it (arrive in the context of my
experience) is also significant to my perceptual experience, as we have already explored
somewhat in terms of directionality of perceptual orientation.
Before I begin to explore supportive arguments for these assertions, I would like
to orient us to my illustrative use of “pre-reflective dimension.” What I do not mean to
imply is that this perceptual dimension is a sort of perceptual layer “below” our conscious
reflections, like a base layer which we cannot reflect on. What I want to invoke (and
hopefully will be able to reinforce in our imagination) is that this pre-reflective
dimension is like a current that “floats our boat of experience,” like currents in an ocean
which give a vessel direction and movement, even when this movement is not felt. Or put
differently, it is like a layer of sound, a vibration, or current running through our
experiences with our bodily experiences that are more easily attuned to. Rather than
something to unearth or dig up, this dimension is a supporting note implicated in the
sounds and pulsating vibrations that make up our being alive, that make up our bodily
perceptual orientations in the world (though not inherently creating or implying harmony
or disharmony).76
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In what follows, I actually draw somewhat on Merleau-Ponty’s conception of
background/horizon, as some of my footnotes quotes will reveal. I will digress from his concepts of prereflective dimension and background/horizon, but make use of the latter in order to more complexly
explore the significance of the former, and to remain within the already sketched frame of perceptual
orientations and habits. Merleau-Ponty inherits the terms background and horizon from the two different
schools he is merging in his thought, phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. Both terms function
similarly (though not identically) in Merleau-Ponty’s work, connoting an indeterminate and ambiguous
background or horizon against which a figure comes into perceptual focus. The configuration of this
horizon or background is always changing, depending on context and depending on perceptual focus:
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If indeed, as previously explored, meaning emerges between body and world, then
the emergence of meaning in the perceptual interaction is never taking place in a void, it
always emerges from sediment habits. These habits though, the social collective pool of
bodily habits and perceptual meanings are not my fate, they do not determine my
experiences as body, rather, they are the “constant atmosphere of my present.” 77 For
example, my bodily experience as woman and socially acquired habits of being familiar
with a kitchen as a space supporting my bodily movements as woman is supported by a
pre-reflective dimension, by the sediment habits of social bodies before me, a dimension
which is not easily ignored or experienced “against” through conscious reflection and
decision. In other words, just reflecting on the sexist and patriarchal division of home
spaces and deciding that the kitchen indeed is not the place for a woman does not dismiss
or destroy the many dimensions of my bodily experiences when moving into my
mother’s kitchen (e.g., the emotional and physical familiarity connected to bodily habits
and tacit knowledges of how to move, how to cook, how to be).
This pre-reflective dimension of my bodily experience is then not the subtending
but buried layer from which meaning springs up seemingly arbitrarily. It is the dimension

gathered background changes, and as perceptual focus or orientation changes, what is determinate as figure
becomes indeterminate and relegated to the background, and what was indeterminate becomes determinate
as it emerges as figure from previously being in the background. There is a difference however in the
suggestions invoked by the terms: A “background” in some ways, though it is presented to me as I am
facing the figure, also connotes a certain temporal dimension, a past, a gathering which led to an arrival of
a figure; and a spatial dimension of what is gathered behind, what supports yet is hidden by the perceptual
arrival of the figure. The term “horizon” though appeals (also spatially and temporarily) to a futurity,
possibilities, an open-ended range that moves on as we move towards it. As already mentioned above, I
prefer to remain with the notion of dimension, partially also in order to elicit an imagery that allows us to
conceive of the dynamics explored below as concurrent and embedded with each other, rather than evoking
spatial or even temporal distance.
77

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 442.
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in which habits sediment, or the current in which habits join the flow so that when I
acquire bodily habits I am already submerged in a current so that my habitual acquisition
is as much an individual appropriation as it is my “going with the flow.”
This nevertheless does not negate the powerful, sometimes even violent dynamic
inherent in this current as well: Our “coming to be” in these habitual currents, the prereflective dimension shaped by cultural and historical contexts, allows a signaling of
possibilities and change, possibilities for turning the tide or ripples emerging, or different
involvements and significances to emerge. But it also implies that my arrival as
experiencing body infers a being surrounded, being immersed in, and being supported by
certain dimensions or currents of experience which dominate the conditions of my arrival
in a space already perceptually emerging as female or male, straight or gay or queer, able
or disabled, white or brown or black body.
Habituation, or sedimentation of habits, is “work,” bodily and social efforts which
can violently sweep up bodies to align them along socio-cultural ideologies. This “work”
of/in the currents that is our pre-reflective dimension might be obscured though, so that it
might appear ethereal or inconsequential to the here-and-now of my experience. Let me
explore what I mean by this assertion through investigating the perceptual emergence of
racialized bodies. How do I emerge from this pre-reflective dimension, and how is this
dimension significant, integral and supportive to my emerging as a perceptual body (a
brown woman) and the co-incidental emerging of the perceived (race)?
Perceptual Dimensions and Sedimented Habits of Perception
My act of perception… takes advantage of work already done, of a general
synthesis constituted once and for all; and this is what I mean when I say that I
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perceive with my body or my senses, since my body and my senses are precisely
this familiarity with the world born of habit, that implicit or sedimentary body of
knowledge... The person who perceives is not spread out before himself as a
consciousness must be; he has historical density, he takes up a perceptual tradition
and is faced with a present… [This body] is better informed than we are about the
world, and about the motives we have and the means at our disposal for
synthesizing it.78
Because my immediate perceptual experience is not of sense data but of meanings
or structures, or better, meaningfully structured objects and environments, I perceive in
the world within an already given logic and language. 79 It is a “logic of the world to
which my body in its entirety conforms, and through which things of intersensory
significance become possible for us.”80 This logic is bodily in the sense that it is “lived
through,” in that it is not primarily for a consciousness to account for, but is an imminent
meaning that is opaque to itself and is first grasped by the body. 81 To say it differently,
our bodily existence in the world is always intelligent, purposeful and skillful. But, this
intelligence and intelligibility, this purpose and skilful embodied action, is not derived
from a specific act of conscious intellection (prior and/or separate from it).82 Rather, our
embodied existence itself, qua sensory perception, is already and inherently intelligent
and purposeful. That is because our bodies and bodily movements emerge from a
historical and social (habitual) base. Our perceptual experiences take up habitual

78

Ibid., 238.

79
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schemas, or what Merleau-Ponty following Husserl also calls “sedimentations,” and
deploy them.
Our bodies and the world emerge from this sedimentation of habit and this
sedimentation is bodily: the histories which make up the pre-reflective currents and
emergence of body and world are performed bodily, in demeanor, posture, and gesture.
Body and world take up sedimented habit, historically and socially conventionalized
forms of conduct. To clarify, it is not the content of perception, the content of the work of
general synthesis, which is established once and for all. It is the general synthesis, the
reciprocal relationship between body and world,83 which is constituted once and for all.
Put differently, perceptions, bodily experiences and actions, all embodied dimensions of
life are open to historio-cultural change, except for the historicity of the body itself. Our
bodily perceptual habits may change, but that we are body-creatures of habit (taking up
perceptual traditions with individual expressions in the present) in a reciprocal
relationship with the world does not.84
When acting in this world, we are grounded in habitual patterns of behavior,
collective layers of experience constituted by myself and others which are taken for
granted, traditions or histories of bodily motility and perception. Present perceptual
movement and behavior is conditioned to conform to a past, yet it is not bound to it.
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Merleau-Ponty later thinks of this as chiasm, or the reversibility of the flesh. He begins to
question his own conception of perception, though this conceptual work remained unfinished. He describes
the lived world of the flesh, of which body and world are both part of, as something like the unfolding and
differentiation of flesh, yet flesh that is reversible; that touches and is being touched, sees and is being seen.
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible.
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Sedimentations establish a certain perceptual perspective, certain orientations (as
discussed earlier), but does not determine or confine the ultimate content of perception or
character of behavior. Choice/creativity is possible, though it depends on
habits/sedimentation, and both are necessary to our bodily existence.85 Put differently,
choice is only possible because there is already a cultural repertoire and meaningful
engagement with the world so I can choose in reflection what might be meaningful to
me—otherwise this ability to choose amounts to random indeterminacy. 86
For example, habituated gendered expressions precede me; I am already born into
a world in which my geo-socio-cultural group embodies gender roles in a certain way
(socially, institutionally, individually). To embody choice in my gender expression, I
must already make reference to the gendered habitual system in place; already engage
purposefully and meaningfully in socio-cultural and bodily relation with others in my
environment. Within my bodily capacities, I then can enact a choice as to creative
transformation or change in gendered habit, such as choosing only to wear pants, or
shaking hands with a firm grip. This choice can sediment as habit, so that my wearing
pants is part of a pre-reflective dimension of my experience (I do not always reflect on
my bodily movements and habits as I am wearing pants), or so that firm handshakes
extended by women is a sediment habit that is taken up by more women in a social group.
These habitual schemata can be understood by remembering the concepts of the body
85

For example, I need both, motor habits and the ability to spontaneously re-orient in new
situations to drive a car.
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Connected to this then is that choice is not a choice itself. The ability to choose is connected to
our inherent embeddedness in a world of bodily and cultural habits. Crossley, The Social Body: Habit,
Identity and Desire, 134. See also Stephen Priest, Merleau-Ponty, ed. Ted Honderich, The Arguments of
the Philosophers (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 150-165.
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schema, the tacit knowledge of my bodily capacities in a given environment: Like body
schemata, habitual schemata are tacit knowledges concerning social habits, socially
meaningful, conforming, and communicative bodily movements.
Body and world are dependent upon cultural repertoires and perceptual skills, and
just as much reproduce them; bodies “tend to do things” and the world “tends to be
things.” Sediment habits, historical and social continuities of bodily intentionalities and
movements, form the pre-reflective current in which our perceptual experiences take
place; sediments are histories as well as possibilities (in the linking of significances or
creating of historical/social intersensory connections). Attending to the currents of
sediment history via repetitive bodily action allows cultural theorists to analyze bodily
expression within the possibilities and constraints inherent in the dimensions of social
habitus or body-power.87
Significant to my argument here, our bodies and the world take the shape of
certain habituated repetitions, or appropriating Ahmed, habituated perceptual
orientations. “Orientations shape what bodies do, while bodies are shaped by orientations
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Habitus is Pierre Bourdieu’s term. Habitus is systems of durable, transposable dispositions
which integrate past experiences through the very matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions that are
necessary to accomplish infinitely diversified tasks. Bourdieu, cited in Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology:
Orientations, Objects, Others, 56. Body-power is Michel Foucault’s term, the power of social and political
orders to control, direct, delimit and co-opt actions of the body. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish:
The Birth of the Prison, trans., Alan Sheridan, 2, reprint, illustrated ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
Whether social order is explained via disciplinary technologies, symbolic medium of rituals, habituated
etiquette, or internalized restraints, social factors of order, structure, and control depends on bodies, albeit
an active one (many theories on the processes of social order depend on a passive conception of the body).
Bodily control, conformity and transgression, are possible because bodily experiences can be habituated to
conform (and conformity making transgression possible), but it is also through bodies that agents may
assert control over the social institutions which they have bodily created and maintained. In other words,
habituated bodily movements are created through social structures, and social structures can be rehabituated, re-shaped in bodily movement. See Simon J. Williams and Gillian Bendelow, The Lived Body:
Sociological Themes, Embodied Issues (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 48-66.
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they already have, as effects of the work that must take place for a body to arrive where it
does”88 and, I would add, how it does. Concepts such as sex, gender, normalcy, race, and
sexuality are not originary concepts or experiences. They must be understood as the
effects of repetitions, repetitions that are not neutral, but perceptual repetitions that shape
bodies in certain ways, and significantly, orient bodies perceptually in certain ways so
that in the moment of perceptual recognition, the work of bodily repetition disappears as
sediment. Put differently, the pre-reflective currents of our perception are never “just
there,” but are the effect of the work of habituating and orienting perceptual experience;
they are the sedimented habits grounding our bodily perceptual orientation.89 Perceptual
orientations are effected habits, open to continuity through repetition and open to change
through re-orientations.
Perceptual Experience of Race / Perceptually Experiencing as Racialized
For example, I also remember a shift in my own bodily orientations regarding
race and nationality. My body was a nationalized body when growing up in Germany.
Because of the reading of my skin color, it was often demanded that I hyphenate myself,
through questions like, You are German and…? I often refused to claim a hyphenated
identity as German-Thai in favor of labeling my parents with different nationalities.90
Looking back, I somehow “knew” through my bodily perceptual orientations that I could
88
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The identity of Thai-German also never emerged in my bodily perceptual orientations, since
Thai was a national identity aligned with mother, but not with me. My passport, language, and geographical
bodily perceptions oriented me spatially, culturally, and even emotionally in ways so that Thai hardly
emerged as meaningful in a way to be signified by lining up these identity signs in the order of ThaiGerman.
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not fully extend into space as a German “only,” yet that I indeed was also not GermanThai. I was not aligned in a way that I could for example extend bodily perceptually,
linguistically, and culturally as a German-Thai in a Thai context; perceptual orientations
by Thais would align me as foreigner. Differences in exposure to food and culinary
preferences did not make me a hyphenated German-Thai. Perceptual orientations allowed
me to be aligned as German citizen though (e.g. through my unmistakably German name,
my linguistic skills, my passport, my geographic-spatial origins), as long as I would not
visually extend into a space, as long as my inhabitation of space was not visually
perceived. Because skin color in Germany is oriented along national identity lines, my
skin color demanded identification along national orientations. 91
It was not until I moved to the United States that my body became a racialized
body, and it took me a while to be dis-oriented to the ways in which bodies are
perceptually shaped (from) within US national (body) borders. 92 Skin color in the US is
most often aligned along racial and ethnic orientations first. This, of course, has a history,
a sedimentation of bodily habits and activities, from which the perception of bodies and
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In this section I merely want to explore the what of bodily perception, such as race as bodily
orientations. I will get back to vision and other perceptual processes again below in more depth to explore
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world as raced emerges, and bodies and world hold raced meanings supported and driven
by spatial and temporal currents of sediment habits.93
Colonization, as global bodily movements, shaped and aligned bodies through the
movements these bodies took toward each other. Racial alignments of bodies was not
caused by white and black bodies meeting in space, rather, in a sense, bodies with
different hues of skin pigmentation meeting in space already arrived with sediment
history, from which bodily motility and with it bodily alignments emerged.94 Whiteness
is the orienting line which shapes and arranges the emerging bodies and perceptual
orientations so that bodies became oriented and aligned as raced. There is a current, or
currents, out of which bodies emerged as raced, and through which raced bodily
orientations aligned movements in space and with space, and which supported how
certain racially perceived bodies could move/be swept up in space along certain lines, or
were perceived out of line, out of currency.
By virtue of being pre-reflective, this dimension or current supporting our racial
perceptions is the condition by which raced bodies appear, the condition which mutually
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constitutes my emergence as brown body in a world with raced bodies and power and
privilege predominately in the grasp of white bodies. I do not have to reflect consciously
about my bodily skin tone or connect my perception of skin color to the person
embodying it: I walk through my neighborhood and see a Hispanic man tending his yard.
“His race” is not a natural material bodily condition, but sedimented habits of
racialization, racial taxonomies and bodily alignments are the current running through my
bodily experience. So when I walk through my neighborhood, I already perceive a
Hispanic man according to my social habituation, before I might consciously reflect and
ponder why and how his brown skin featured into my perception and the emerging
meaning (e.g., I begin to wonder why my tacit bodily experience aligned him as out of
place in the neighborhood, or perhaps in line with social habits of yard work, but out of
line with home ownership in this space).
Orienting devices that do the repetition which allow for habits to sediment
disappear through their work, and they also occlude the presence and force of this prereflective dimension by orienting our perception to what emerges: in this case, raced
bodies. The current from which bodies and meanings emerge is not necessarily what is
repeated, what orienting device is at work. But the current also supports the directionality
of perception that is generated (the product of effort that becomes effortless through its
own repetition and work, the work that disappears as such through its repetitious
enactment), supports the movement of our bodily perceptions as we face “race” through
the force of gathered sediment, force determined through acts of habitual repetition.
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When we see a boat floating down a river, the alignment, directionality and
movement of the boat appear “natural,” though its stability, speed, and floating itself are
determined by the amount and force of the moving water. Transferring this image to our
discussion of racial perception, raced bodies do not appear as figures in perceptual focus
because they emerge from a sea of whiteness and blackness. Racial perceptions or
racialization of bodies (what is repeated), the fantasy of racial hierarchy (an orientation
device), and blackness as well as whiteness (the orienting lines along which bodies are
perceived and aligned) are already supported by pre-reflective currents, currents
supporting the repetition of racial perceptions, generating a directionality of perception
(in this example, racialism), aided by the ideological notions of racial hierarchies,
establishing racial orienting lines. This gathering current, this pre-reflective dimension
which supports the arrival of bodies emerging perceptually as raced, might be the
political-economic project of colonialism.95 Racialism as a naturalized orienting line, as
natural perceptual directionality in which the repetitious work establishing racial
perception disappears, occludes from focus the driving currents of bodily perceptions and
orientations containing sedimented habits.
One example for a forceful current of sedimented habit supporting and running
through the perceptual emergence of race might be nation and citizenship: At the end of
the 19th century, the US Census Bureau announced the end of the continuous westward
expansion. But with the frontier declared closed, the work of establishing the meaning of
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the American nation and citizenship continued. The sedimented social habits of nationbuilding bodily movements “floated the boat” of racial ideologies manifesting in laws
and classification systems by which races are invented, defined, characterized, aligned
and hierarchically organized.
The work to establish a centering anthropological image for the American citizen
to define nationhood plays out in the repetition of racialized bodily perceptions,
generating a directionality of perception, thus establishing lines of perception in which
raced bodies emerge, but which simultaneously aligns citizens and non-citizens. Social
Darwinism, which applies biological principles to social development, becomes one of
the orienting devices to building racial ideologies. Efforts of repetition in immigration
laws generate directionality of perception which establishes the American citizen as
white. The American nation as racially white appears as a “natural” directionality of
perception, so that we perceive inhabitants of “American” space as racial bodies.
The pre-reflective dimension, the current of sedimented bodily habits called
“nation” gains force through habits and transformation of habits, for example, legal
habituation and changing legal habits through acquisition of immigration laws guided by
racialized perceptual orientations. Legal alignment of bodily and social habits regarding
movement in or as citizen of a nation sediments social habits, which add to the force of
the current running through racial perceptual emergences.
More specifically: Immigration legislation, for example, the Naturalization Act of
1790 and those following, up to the immigration act of 1924, established immigration and
naturalization along racial lines, though not necessarily maintaining a focus on race. By

150

1882, regulation at the borders put laws in effect that allowed only healthy and selfsupporting persons in, refusing the poor, physically and mentally ill, criminals and moral
delinquents.
Medically and morally oriented perceptions aligned immigrant bodies, as certain
groups were associated with certain ailments. For example, Asians were screened
specifically for worms, Mexicans for lice, Jews for tuberculosis, Italians for criminal
behavior. Thus the perceptual orientation to raced bodies was aligned through, for
example, medical orienting devices, and race and ethnicity were visually aligned by
perceptions of health and economic ability (medical exclusions increased from 3% in
1898 to 69% 1917). For example, a Romanian family is described by an officer as
looking forlorn and frail, typical of the poor class. They stood in contrast to immigrants
from Scandinavia described as fine looking and healthy persons. 96
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dimensions gathering sediment. The “West”/Occident or “civilization” are other sediments in our prereflective current. And race is not the only perceptual orientation establishing the grid of national
alignments; class, gender, and religion are among other perceptual orientations and orienting lines drawn,
and any of these can also serve as sediment from which other orientations can emerge. See for example
Foucault’s tracing of the emergence of “sexual identity,” which in this framework can be understood as
emerging partially from a background of “modern democratic society” which requires regulation of social
bodies, “sexuality” turning into one of the political technologies, or orienting devices, along which to
perceive and align social and political bodies.
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Thus, only certain bodies can inherit or gather the kind of habitual schema which
aligns their bodily emergence within reach of objects of privilege (e.g., citizenship,
marriage, employment). Whiteness as a line of orientation aligns bodies just so in a space
that is oriented around a privileged kind of embodiment; certain bodies can more easily
take up social habits aligned with/aligning them with privilege. And consequently, all
others in this space become aligned and oriented in a way that the habitual schemata
available for bodily habits and movements leave certain things hard to/out of reach, or
leave their bodies out of line, even rendering certain bodies (non-white, non-heterosexual,
non-citizen) objects rather than subjects.97 The orienting lines of whiteness also serve as
vertical and horizontal lines of coherence, allowing certain bodies to move up or reach
across spatial, institutional, educational, economical, etc., lines.
Bodies can also “disappear” behind certain perceptual lines such as whiteness, 98
for example, when the sediment habit of perceiving citizenship leads to perceptual
orientations of American bodies as white bodies, bringing to focus those bodies
differently raced. This allows white bodies to disappear, or perceptually emerge race-less,
while racially perceived bodies—those with darker skin hues—emerge incoherent from
the sediment habitual schema regarding citizenship. For example, a social bodily habit
regarding legal enforcement of immigration, aligned through devices such as the 2012
Arizona law provision known as “show me your papers” (allowing Arizona law
enforcement officers to demand proof of citizenship/immigration status of people
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suspected of residing on US soil without proper legal documentation) emerges along
perceptual lines which allow bodies raced as white to appear in line with citizenship,
whereas bodies perceptually emerging as questionable in regards to citizenship/residency
are bodies racialized. The tacit knowledge concerning nationhood and citizen bodies
supports and is supported by perceptual orientations to race.
To stress an image presented above again: pre-reflective dimensions of bodily
experience are not simply deeply buried layers, barely impacting our perceptual
orientations. As illustrated above, it is a current which is implicated in and fed by our
bodily and social habits, supporting and supported by repetitive bodily movements which
allow for acquisition of habits which again sediment and gather in a current to be taken
up, repeated, and/or transformed.
To give another example, as a culturally Euro-Western woman, I might walk
down the street in a city. When a black male comes towards me, I unreflectively reach for
my wallet, to assure it is safely tucked away and out of reach from the passerby. I am not
consciously aware of doing this, though on a pre-reflexive level of bodily experience my
behavior is intentional and meaningful. When called to attention, I may be surprised at
my bodily movement and my orientation of intentionality. Through critical inquiry and
reflection I would be able to account for the meaning of this act through an account of its
historical dimension: Perhaps I have been mugged before, and any approaching man is
perceptually apprehended as a threat; the securing of my wallet aligns certain objects
outside of the bodily perceptual reach of the other. I may not have been robbed before,
but my bodily perceptual orientations are gathered in a current of cultural and historical
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sediment, such as the criminalization, vilification, outlawing, and violent extermination
of black male bodily intentionality and motility, the extension of black male bodies in
space.99
This history and social sediment is contained now in my lived bodily perceptual
experience, it is the current from which my body and the other body emerge as raced: a
brown female body, curiously aligned now along lines of whiteness, mutually emerges
with a black male body, now perceived as criminal threat, and with that, the meaning of
our bodies moving in our shared environment emerges also. The history which I now
inhabit as I inhabit the colonized territory called United States of America sediments in
bodily gestures, bodily intentionality. I may reflect on the meaning and significance of
bodily perceptual orientations by attending to the sedimentations of habits, and discover
that in the pre-reflective dimension I find a gathering of relations supporting my
perceptions (such as socio-historical and cultural stereotypical images circumscribing my
perception of a black body as criminal) as well as an indeterminate current gathering
perceptual possibilities (such as socio-cultural and historical bodily gestures like
conquest, slavery, abjection of black bodies, which turn the focus of my perception on the
habitual gestures that sediment these alignments and possibly even turn the focus on
orienting lines such as whiteness and white heteronormative patriarchy allowing for
perceptual re-orientations in the face of black male bodies).
But nation and citizenship remain a perceptual dimension which supports
perceptions of raced bodies, even when not-perceived bodies-out-of-space may come to
99

See for example Tina G. Patel and David Tyrer, Race, Crime and Resistance (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, 2011).

154

be perceived as bodily perceptual orientations shift. For example, abject bodies denied
citizenship and denied bodily extension in the nation as spatial community, such as
invisibilized undocumented domestic workers, may perceptually emerge as either
“illegal” or “undocumented” workers. But they may still be perceived along racial and
ethnic lines (brown bodies aligned with illegal immigration), and these orienting lines are
supported by and reinforce the pre-reflective current whose force divides who will be part
of the nation and lined up on a path to citizenship and who will be deported and aligned
behind national lines/border fences.
By focusing on the content of our perception, rather than the processes of bodily
perceptual orientations, we are oriented to overlook the subtending currents which
provide the conditions for our habits, their sedimentation, as well as the conditions for
new habit acquisitions. But it also occludes differences from our perception, things that
are out of line: for example, it occludes how our discoveries about race are dependent on
the creation and perpetuation of this very category itself. Just like currents are shifting
and indeterminate, so are the relations between sediment habit and perceptual orienting
lines or devices. For example, an orienting line such as whiteness can provide the
habitual schema supporting perceptions of gender, feminizing the racial other or denying
the racialized female body alignments with femininity. 100 Sedimented habits regarding
perception of nationhood can become an orienting device, aligning perceptual orientation
100
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towards religious bodies (as seen for example in perceptual orientations towards Persian
men aligned with emerging meanings of Islamic fundamentalist religiosity, which then
contribute again toward sedimentation of bodily habits—emotional, legal, cultural—
toward these bodies, as in fear, incarceration, wars against terror, etc.).
Understanding our orientations and perspectives on the world as fundamentally
embedded in and emerging from our bodily manner of existence then allows us to begin
grasping how it is not reason or intellectual reflection alone which effects and therefore
can address perceptual alignments which might appear problematic to us (such as
perceptual alignments of female bodies as submissive, queer bodies as deviant, or black
bodies as criminal). Rather, as we have explored thus far, habits and socio-cultural
practices are not simply matters of belief or conviction held in a disembodied mind, but
embedded within our bodily perceptual orientation as condition of our existence. Only
from this perspective can we understand more complexly how mechanisms of perception
lead to prejudice and oppression of bodies perceived as different, mechanisms so
powerful that appeals to intellect or mindfulness fail to prevent violence against bodies
perceived a certain way.
Relating back to the larger aim of this project, to develop a robust understanding
of experience for body theology, we can now understand how experiences of race (or
racialized/racializing experiences) come about in visceral ways, that is, involving all our
senses and the bodily ways in which we use them or are “used by” them. To interrogate
bodily perceptual orientation in order to usefully and complexly understand bodily
experience is to heed perceptual orientation as that through which one comes to terms
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with meanings (such as race, skin color, other bodily markers) in the world, and it is to
heed perceptual orientations not as structures of consciousness, but as bodily experience,
bodily expression, bodily motivations, bodily intentions, bodily behaviors, bodily styles,
and bodily rhythms. These orientations are not firstly and fundamentally expressed at the
level of thought, but give rise to thought, thought that embodies the precision and
nuances of bodily perceptual orientations.101 Below, in the third section of this chapter, I
will investigate this notion of thought, more specifically in connection to language as
habit and perception of normalcy.
Language and Perception of Normalcy
In the previous sections I have attempted to explore how it is that our being in the
world is fundamentally grounded in bodily perceptual orientation. Those explorations
could still leave room to posit interior conscious processes, such as a conscious subject
101

Here I am appropriating again Charles Long’s definition of religion: “Religion will mean
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directing recognition of different bodies along cultural schemata through interior mental
acts, disconnected from bodily experience and engagement in the world. At stake in
misunderstanding our processes of perceptual orientation as interior mental acts is that we
might mistake the pre-reflective dimension conditioning, our “take on the world” (how I
come to interpret and assign meaning around me), simply as a set of thoughts or beliefs
rather than a complex, internally heterogonous set of perceptual orientations embodied
through me.102 If the former were so, if our takes on the world, our views on race, gender,
and normalcy were simply a matter of internal thought, then changing those beliefs
emerging out of thought in accordance with “rationally” pursued knowledge should affect
our perceptions and embodied experiences in some ways so as to be in alignment with
our intellectual convictions.
For example, if I know “in my mind” that skin color makes no difference in
regards to the value or intellectual capability of a person, then I should no longer perceive
skin color in hierarchical ways, nor should I experience reactions to skin color that have
evaluative effects. Yet I do because there is knowledge tacitly present in my embodied
being which orients me towards others, as I have discussed above. And how is it then,
that I can “know in my mind” that my grandmother is still a human being as she is
seemingly unresponsive to personal interaction, but I seem to have to keep telling myself
that this is indeed so, all the while my visceral response to her betrays a perceptual
orientation incongruent with what “I think and know”?
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To address this question, I want to explore the relationship and dynamic between
bodily and social dimensions of our existence by using the concept of “normalcy” as
pivot point and through exploring the role of language. This will help us understand how
the bodily and social dimensions of perception might interrelate, yet this interrelation is
paradoxical and the dimensions irreducible to each other. In what follows, I will explore
the bodily perceptual social relations which shape bodily recognition, especially as it
concerns the shaping of bodily difference in terms of deviance and/or normalcy and the
system of social, economic, and political empowerment buttressed and justified by such
bodily perceptual orientations, manifest in language as always corporeal and social.
Language in/as bodily perceptual orientation
To help conceive of language as corporeal and social, of language as inseparably
related to body/mind and the world, it is useful to think of language through the previous
frame of perception. I have discussed in the previous chapter how separating perception
into, for example, bodily sensation, and evaluation and judgment in the mind, is
problematic: We experience the seeing or tasting or something not as separate entities of
a process (e.g., I do not experience stimulation on my retina, which I then evaluate as
distinct information regarding light, and then make a judgment as to what I perceive as
“person in front of me”), but rather, I see a friend coming through the office door. This is
because perception is always bodily (I have physical capacities in my bodily functions,
the interplay of my organs, neural system, etc.), conscious-ly (perception extends me into
the world, it is an engagement with the world that is more than just bodily reception of
sense data, perception makes sense of my world and how I bodily “fit”), and world-ly
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(the way I bodily perceive and which meanings emerge is also influenced by the world,
the social contexts, meaning systems and bodily alignments into which I am born and
which shape my acquisition of perceptual habits).
Now thinking of language, we can understand how there are different components
at work for language to emerge, components which are irreducible to each other, but
nevertheless inseparable. I have a bodily capacity for articulation and voice; I use my
lungs for a certain kind of breathing, which, coupled with my vocal cords, produces
sound; with my tongue, teeth, lips, and force of breath, I make speech sounds. I can use
my bodily capacity for voice to express myself, as form of communication. This extends
me into the world and is a form of engagement with the world, it involves conscious acts
of using voice and articulation intentionally, about something, towards a purpose. And
the world is also involved; without a world, there would be nothing to use voice and
articulation in reference to, and/or nothing to express myself for. My social context also
provides the socially shared rules, the sediment habit of linguistic rules such as grammar,
a meaning system within which I can use speech to communicate.103
In regards to understanding language as corporeal and social, none of the above
aspects can be separated from the other. While I might not be able to use my vocal cords
in ways to use my voice, I can nevertheless “speak” with my body, through bodily
gestures forming signs and even “tonality” through gestural emphasis (as we can see in
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Swiss Linguist Ferdinand de Saussure defined language as langue + parole: Langue is the
language system, the sedimented system of signs of the community in which we learn to speak; parole is
the act of speaking by a person, the social activity of using words to speak or write to communicate
something in a specific context. There is an interdependency between langue and parole; parole develops
langue, but langue is also implied by parole. Language as the sum of the two then also incorporates the
bodily capacity to speak. Ferdinand de Saussure, Albert Sechehaye Charles Bally, and Albert Riedlinger,
Course in General Linguistics, trans., WadeBaskin (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1986).

160

sign language, which is not a translation of spoken language, but has its own grammar,
rules, and system).104
Research into language acquisition and cognitive development shows that
phonology (organization of sound), morphology (formation and structure of words), and
syntax (arrangement of words) indeed are acquired through neural mechanisms in the
brain. By way of cognitive development we can observe timetables of linguistic
maturation connected to physical, biochemical, and neural development. By way of
pathology we can observe absence of capacity to organize sounds considered proper in a
given language, or an inability to arrange words according to cultural rules of syntax
connected to injury or disease affecting the brain. Yet the learning of words itself is not
reducible to a biological capacity. Cognitive linguistic research shows that it is rather a
rich and complex system of conceptual representations, capacities to infer the intention of
others, and perceptual sensitivities to cues given regarding meaning in the speech and
gestures of others.105
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I do appreciate Elaine Scarry’s argument regarding the undoing of language in extreme pain
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In other words, body, mind, and world are involved in language. Looked at from a
different angle, language then cannot be conceived of as a property of an independent
consciousness, given the ways in which our bodily capacities and our social context are
involved. If we then reflect on Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that “I think through and with
and by means of language,”106 and we think of language a described above (as
inseparably related to body, mind, and world), then language is not simply the outside to
a prior existing interior thought. Rather, thought and language are simultaneously
constituted by our bodily capacities and embeddedness in a world—my capacity to think
is inherently related to my bodily biochemical capacities, to my bodily intentionality (to
extend into the world bodily and consciously), and to my social context (within which I
learn langue and parole, see footnote 103 of this chapter).
Put differently, because I am a body, because I see, smell, touch, feel, hear things
in reference to my body-self, language “makes sense to me” in reference to my situation
in the world, and language has sedimented as a result of corporeal reference and habitual
meanings, and my bodily and social habituations allow for creative expression, allow for
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new meanings to emerge.107 Yet I also “do” language as a living, speaking, perceiving
body, which also limits “my language;” I am limited in/by my bodily capacities, my
conscious engagement with the world in language, and the socio-cultural world in which
I exist.
Let me elaborate further on how language is bodily and social, and how the
different dimensions of language are interrelated. For example, my mother’s native
tongue, Thai, is a tonal language, so that the same string of syllables can make up
different signs/words by way of intonating it differently. Thai has five different tonalities:
high, middle, low, rising, and falling. The syllable maa for example can signify dog if
spoken in rising tonal register, but signifies come when spoken in the high or middle
register (there are also regional differences—tonal dialects—in Thai,). Tonality is a
bodily capacity to arrange vocal cords and breath to reach the desired sound, yet it is also
a bodily habit which needs to be acquired.
While it is not impossible to learn a tonal language as second language, for those
growing up in language systems in which tonality expresses emotion or takes on
grammatical functions (such as shouting when angry, or raising one’s voice to signify a
question), it is a different bodily habit to learn to listen for tonality, learning to identify it,
and even reproduce it. Misspeaking maa to a Thai person can turn into an insult when
rather than inviting someone to come closer, I referred to her as dog.
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Similar examples of bodily linguistic habits and acquired linguistic knowledge
can be observed in regard to German diphthongs. The sounds of ä, ö, and ü are embedded
in my native German language system, and I grew up learning to produce these sounds
bodily perceptually, identify them as I hear them, and use them as I speak. Yet these
bodily capacities and/or habits do not necessarily emerge together. Trying to teach
American students German diphthongs, I could teach them how to form ü with their lips
and tongue, so they could for example speak the word fünf (five). Yet when asking them
if they could hear the difference between fünf and funf, many of them were unable to do
so even after much practice.
Another example could be found in Thai language again. The sounds
distinguished in English or German as ‘r’ and ‘l,’ produced through certain movements of
the tongue either in the back or the front of the mouth, are sounds not distinguished in
Thai, so that the word for foreigner can alternatively be pronounced as falang or farang.
While both soundings are distinguishable to the Thai ear, the meaning signified is not,
and both pronunciations may be heard.108
To engage in Thai language systems though is more than just learning how to
produce and recognize tonalities. Socio-cultural processes of personal and communal
engagements and meanings are also bound up in language, language again understood as
corporeal and social. Foreigners often perceptually emerge not solely based on their
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visual appearance, but for their lack of “passing” linguistically. For example, Thai
language does not tend to imbue speaking with emotional qualities, speaking is then not
necessarily a cultural tool to express emotions or make emphasis (though not impossible,
but it is not the main way to do so). A question, for example, is indicated by an added
word, rather than the raising of the voice at the end of a sentence (in English words may
be added as in Where did you go? or one may simply raise the voice as in You went
there?). This may make sense when considering that Thai culture puts great value in
public presentation, presenting and “saving face” through a certain way of performing
language, such as measurement in vocalization, but also in the many meanings embedded
in a smile.109 The cultural values of how one presents oneself publicly to others then also
sediments in the manner of speech, so that to speak Thai is to be bound to a cultural
language system in which measured tonality, voice, and bodily expressions are highly
valued.
Again then, language operates similarly to perception: I discussed the paradoxical
operation of perceiving along pre-established alignments which stabilizes perceived
meaning through sedimented habits, while still always being open to new or different
perceived meanings. Language follows a similar paradoxical dynamic, in that in my
speaking, I am dependent upon my bodily capacities of word formation, I am dependent
on past uses of language in order to convey anything meaningful (in thought, speech,
writing, etc.), yet I can say something new or different by fitting and using my linguistic
109
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expression into my context. This new speech and associated meaning now takes on a
“social life” and may be a part of linguistic sedimentation.110 The “social power” of this
new meaning depends on if and how this meaning sediments through habituation.111
To pick up on concepts used above, I can say that I enter into a world in which
language is already sedimented. I am born into a pre-existing linguistic arena within
which I learn to think and express my thoughts through words, within which I learn to
use my bodily capacities for, e.g., voice and gestures to “say something,” to make use of
my bodily capacities within the conventional signifying system. And while words and
rules of grammar and syntax might exist before I bodily-consciously use language, my
actual saying something is not a fixed reference. Language is ambiguous and open to
bodily change (change in how we pronounce words or intonate them) and new meanings,
even new rules and structures.
For example, the English word dog and the associated pronunciation already
signifies a furry animal of a certain shape which can adapt to living with humans and
emits certain barky sounds. Yet there is no necessary univocity or consistency when I use
the word dog—the meaning emerges in the interrelation between the sedimented
language and my taking up language in a speech act. Put differently, there is no direct and
consistent connection between the word dog and the bodily being it signifies. But neither
110
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do I create this meaningful connection anew every time I utter the word. Rather, there is a
paradoxical relation between existing linguistic meanings and the not-yet-emergent
meaning expressible in the speech act. This paradoxical process (present meaning can
only emerge because of previously emerged meanings and because of the possibility of
new meanings) takes place in the interrelation between speakers, signs (the word as
spelled and pronounced), prior language use (socio-cultural sediment) and current speech
(my bodily utterance in the moment referring to something). This paradoxical relation is
what makes creative individual and communal expression possible.
This paradoxical relation also helps us understand the significance of context in
the use of language: If my saying dog actually refers to a furry barking animal, or to a
sausage put between a bread bun, or is a derogatory reference to another human person,
or is creating a new contextual meaning nevertheless perceivable to others, is only
determinable in the situational and socio-cultural context while at the same time
depending on the dynamics of socio-cultural sediment (the occurrences of linguistic
habits forming). For example, cultural linguistic habits of using dog as a slur formed
because of habitual sedimentation through repetition, i.e., the slur became a slur through
repetitive derogatory speech acts (again, involving the bodily capacity for speech, but
also specific intonations that may be habitually aligned with speaking insults, the
cognitive capacity to think about ways in which to creatively use words when we wish to
insult a person, and the social habit of providing me with linguistic habits so that certain
words are recognized as insult, rather than a random act of misplaced reference).
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But if dog emerges with derogatory meaning depends not just on past repetitive
habits, but also on the situational context, including my actual bodily performance of this
speech act encompassing other sensory dimensions (such as sound, gestures, etc.). As all
meaning is ambiguous and indeterminate, so are linguistic signs and meaning open to
change: For example, dog as derogatory reference to a human person is open to change so
that dawg (phonetically similar, though visual-textually different) emerges as sign to refer
to a close friend in speech acts between two African-American men in an urban US
cultural context.
Without bodily and cognitive capacities, and without using these inherited frames
of linguistic references, I cannot “accomplish” language, though language is not a fixed
system with static reference to meanings. 112 The meaning of linguistic expressions
emerge over time, are changeable in new eras and social contexts. The emergence of
meaning is a dynamic process, where linguistic signs (a word and the associated sound
and textual representation) that have sedimented (the word “dog” habitually and most
commonly referring to the furry barking animal) can be taken up and metamorphose
anew through a spontaneous speech act: I might call a person a dog and it is understood
as insult, not as misrecognition or mis-speaking; or I might still mis-speak due to bodily
perceptual alignments which lead to failure to perform recognized linguistic gestures
(even if I may accomplish speaking dawg bodily, in my specific embodied existence, I
probably cannot call an African American friend dawg and expect the other to feel
addressed in a friendly manner).
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Now, recalling my insistence that the condition of my existence is my bodily
perceptual orientation in the world, I cannot exempt language and posit it as separate
from the intertwining of body/mind/world. I speak as body, physically; I speak from my
corporeality, in reference to my bodily being; I speak to an embodied world, in reference
and communication with world within which meaningful discourse emerges, and within
which I am but one of the players in an active and creative process of meaning. In
speaking, I speak through my bodily gestures and perceptual capacities—I do not think a
thought and then command my body to carry out the thought through language. I think
through and with and by means of language as body.
As I have explored through the example of Thai language, language is proper to
the body in that my bodily perceptual orientation in the world inscribes the meanings
emerging in/through language as bodily perceptual intentionality. Language is not strictly
only the words I utter within a grammatical system, but language is bodies in movement,
and bodies extending physically and socio-culturally towards others in the world. In other
words, I “do” and embody language through being a thinking/gesturing/speaking body
(even as I silently type, I do this as body and through my bodily capacities). And the
manner in which I emerge via language is embedded in my bodily capacities and habits,
my bodily perceptual orientations in and towards the world, and interacts with sociocultural sedimented habit (such as specific linguistic habits or culturally informed bodily
gestures) in bodily form, in a specific context.
To extend linguistically then, to speak, write, think, etc., is a form of bodily
intentionality, to extend into the world through bodily-linguistic movements towards
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cultural expression (though language, like perception, is always more than this function
of expression). This movement takes bodily being beyond biological
limitations/capacities, and body and culture become implicated with each other and
incorporate each other.113 Put differently, I can extend into this world and relate to and
about my dog—thinking and speaking about it, touching it—because I have a bodily
relation and reference to this furry animal. But I am also already moving bodily beyond
my biological capacities; I am already extending myself towards and through cultural
means. Namely, I use the signifier dog and relate to this animal as my pet; I engage in
culturally determined social, economical, moral, individual, etc., habits of pet care. 114
Significant here is that without others, there would be no need and no sediment
habit to extend myself (with). Using language is already a relational bodily movement,
moving intentionally towards an other; extending linguistic gestures the meaning of
which emerges in the relation between me and other. But to communicate, to transmit
meaning in gestures that are reciprocal, bodily intentionality must already take place in a
reciprocal perceptual grid or current, where my bodily intentionality and the other’s
intertwine in order to be meaningfully grasped. In other words, language, gestures, bodily
movements, perceptual intentions, already need to be part of a sediment habit, repeatable

113

Silverman, 125.

114

How these are culturally determined bodily expressive intensions becomes more clear when
reflecting on other cultures, in which “dog” might emerge within meaning systems where this kind of furry
animal is related to as food source. For an investigation of perceptual alignments of animals, see Melanie
Joy, Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows: An Introduction to Carnism (San Francisco, CA: Red
Wheel/Weiser, 2010).

170

and performable (though not fixed or static), in order to be appropriable in relation
between bodies.115
Language is inscribed in any of the problems we explored previously—be it
perception as fundamental to our being in the world, be it gendered perceptual
intentionality, be it racialized perceptual alignments—and can help us explore the
relational dynamics at work. But language itself is also bound to the knowledge frame in
which we undergo these explorations.116 I will discuss and elaborate on this latter
assertion more fully in the following chapter. In the space remaining in this chapter, let
me discuss language and the relational dynamics at work in the issue of “normalcy,” in
order to further understand how bodily perceptual orientation is how we exist in this
world.
Language and Bodily Perceptual Orientation of/to “Normal”
Just like I can only know about my experiences by experiencing, I can only know
about my perceptions in perceiving, and I only know about language by thinking,
speaking, writing, reading, etc. The significances of our experience, perception, and
language as bodily movements are manifest in our movements.117 The ground from
which meaning and significances emerge is the mutual constituting of space between
body-body/body-world through bodily movement (bodily perceptual intentions). As
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discussed above, this relation is inherently an open relation (meanings such as those
emerging in language are not fixed, they are ambiguous and indeterminate), one that
exposes me to an interrelated bodily reality. Therefore our cognitive achievements, even
complex and sophisticated ones (such as concept formation and linguistic abstractions,
like language and concepts referring to normalcy) are fundamentally grounded in
embodied life.118 In fact, conceptual movements are essentially rooted in embodied life
and embodied structures. Exploring language can point us “back” to the sedimentation of
habits, the pre-patterned historio-cultural perceptual behaviors, which establish a certain
perceptual perspective from which our bodies emerge.119
I explored bodily perceptual orientations in terms of gender, sexuality, and race
above and gave personal examples of perceiving myself as a girl, as a lesbian, or shifting
my self-perceptions from a nationalized to a racialized body. I also notice my own
habitual perceptions regarding what counts as a normal body and normal mind; I notice
how I habitually perceive body and mind as distinct but connected entities: sitting with
my grandmother in her still-early stages of Alzheimer’s as she appears to be ignorant to
the smell of burning milk on the stove, wondering if she is losing her mind (“how can a
‘normal’ person not respond to this acrid smell?”); or helping my father change her
diapers, when “she is losing control” over “normal” bodily functions. These kinds of
118
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perceptual orientations to “different from normal” may also connect meanings in a way
so that a specific deviation from “normal” can make a difference in how other bodily or
intellectual abilities are perceived. For example, I might catch myself judging a
wheelchair user in my classroom as intellectually inferior, or feeling surprised to learn of
an outstanding athletic skill of a person with a mental impairment.120
How do these perceptual associations and connected social hierarchies come into
play and how can we understand further the social relations at work in bodily perceptual
orientations and experiences of “normal”? How exactly is the living matter of our bodies
connected to the social aspects of our embodiment? Where are the differences, and what
are the dynamics of this dialectic that might lead to perception along hierarchical
perceptual lines defined through “normalcy”? And what might language as corporeally
embedded show us about this dialectic?
Habitual Sediments of Normalcy
Cognitive linguists Lakoff and Johnson analyze language and cognitive structures
to argue that linguistic metaphors are always essentially rooted in embodied life and
embodied structures and in turn structure the world we live in and our experiences of
it.121 But when primarily focusing on metaphors, even when agreeing with the embodied
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nature of metaphors and the embodied effects of linguistic practices, one might still posit
that language actually does refer to biological realities given, that it is merely the social
association or meaning inferred in signifying language that might possibly take a
derogatory turn. Therefore, we ought to simply cease using language with devaluing
meaning or re-value language with positive meanings.
For example, I could have ceased to refer to my grandmother as a “vegetable”
when she seemed cognitively incapable, and instead continued referring to her in
personal terms in order to change my emotional and behavioral attitude towards her. Or
while “cripple” as a referent to a person with physically disfigurement points to
biological occurrences of a crooked or uncommonly bent body part, we can recognize
that the associated meanings of cripple as damaged, worthless, lacking person are a social
construction which might have effect on a person’s perception of social worth. So we can
address this by either using language imbued with positive meaning or initiating a
repetitive linguistic habit connecting cripple with a positive value (as has been done, for
example, by reclaiming “crip” in a socio-political act of disability pride).
However, considering linguistic differences, differences in sedimented habits in
sign language of American Deaf communities reveal the indeterminacy of linguistic
meaning and the discontinuities, but interrelations, between the biological and social.
Carol Padden and Tom Humphries, in their investigation of the linguistic meaning of
“deaf” and related signs illustrate the following: The signed phrase A-LITTLE-HARDMind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1987), 29-45. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its
Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 31-36. See also George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980; reprint, 2003).
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OF-HEARING, a phrase in audist cultures linked to meaning referring to someone who is
slightly hearing impaired, was used in Deaf communities to refer to persons who are
slightly hearing (but mostly deaf).122 The signed phrase VERY-HARD-OF-HEARING, a
phrase in audist cultures linked to meaning referring to someone who cannot hear well at
all, was used in Deaf communities to refer to persons who can hear well (and are only a
little hearing impaired).
How is it that biological givens and linguistic signs are seemingly discontinuously
aligned? Audist explanations offered trace this back to lack in proper English skills, a
case of mixing up “normal” meaning associations. But, as Padden and Humphries
demonstrate, this linguistic difference emerges out of social habits connected with
specific communities: in Deaf communities, HEARING is the opposite of what Deaf
people are. In the larger world of meaning emerging in Deaf communities and
sedimented linguistic habits, different bodily alignments emerge: DEAF, not HEARING
emerges as dominant bodily habit and socio-cultural value (deaf is normal) in hierarchical
perceptual alignments, with HARD-OF-HEARING representing deviation of some kind.
Thus, A-LITTLE-HARD-OF-HEARING emerges meaning slightly deviating from
normal-deaf, whereas VERY-HARD-OF-HEARING indicates greater deviation from
normal. Therefore, because for Deaf people the greatest deviation is HEARING, ALITTLE-HARD-OF-HEARING emerges as mostly deaf, and VERY-HARD-OFHEARING emerges as mostly hearing. 123
122
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Regarding the social habitual schemas, the tacit knowledges concerning social
habits expressed at the level of thought and language and their implication in bodily
experiences, disability scholar Rosemary Garland Thompson helps us by remarking:
Thus, the ways that bodies interact with the socially engineered environment and
conform to social expectations determine the varying degrees of disability or ablebodied-ness, of extra-ordinariness or ordinariness. Consequently, the meanings
attributed to extraordinary bodies reside not in inherent physical flaws, but in
social relationships in which one group is legitimated by possessing valued
physical characteristics and maintains its ascendancy and its self-identity by
systematically imposing the role of cultural or corporeal inferiority on others. 124
Here we can detect that linguistic gestures are not simply a measure of thought
expressing itself in language, and meaning achieved on the level of thought and an
interiorized mental activity. Social ideologies pervading social imagination indeed are
expressed in and do their work through social gestures, language being one of the
dimensions of social enactment and habitual repetition. Below I will further explore how
language is one of the ways in which normalcy emerges through bodies and social world
interacting, and how language can demonstrate this dialectic (because embedded in it), so
that bodily perception can be understood as immediate and mediated.
To explore the role of social ideology at work and the implications of language,
let me return to our previous discussion of how a difference in our bodily movements is
also a difference of being in the world. This implies that differences in bodily
capacities—which influence our bodily perceptual movements—are differences in being
in the world. It is important here to slow down and investigate the linking between bodily
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difference and cultural and corporeal values made in references and representations of
normalcy as able-bodied-ness, to be normal is to be not disabled.125
What is at stake in implicit or overt inattention to the corporeal dimensions of
language and discourse is that, in terms of bodily differences, the perceptual and
conceptual connections may be closed at one end by presupposing a naturalized
discursive concept of bodily difference, i.e., bodily difference materializing through
production and regulation of hegemonic symbolic orders. Embodied difference then
might be taken to be a real bodily experience only insofar as it is a materialization of
discursive concepts, as it is bodies coming to matter and taking shape within discursive
productions of values. And while materiality is not reducible to the discursive, such
inattention might make it difficult to engage in any discussion of materiality of bodies
beyond cultural constructions within which these bodily differences materialize as such.
It also might bring us close to a naturalization of the discursiveness of bodily difference
as originary perceptual experience, privileging cultural concepts in the same breath with
which we insist on the embeddedness of material embodiment and discourse. To put it
differently, inattention to bodily experiences as material differences might make it
difficult to understand the bodily experiences of for example a paraplegic beyond social
125

Discourses on “disability” engage (to use or to deconstruct) the distinctions of the World
Health Organization between impairment, disability, and handicap: impairment is defined as an
abnormality in function, disability as not being able to perform an activity considered normal for a human
being, and handicap as the inability to perform a “normal” social role. While these distinctions are useful
when discussing physical or mental difference over against socio-culturally imposed barriers or
inaccessibility, these terms still inherently draw on a medical classification system which makes
assumptions about normalcy and maintains the focus on the perceived/experienced impairment and
solutions to it. This keeps disability within the confines of individualized experiences and bodily difference
and its desired normalization, rather than highlighting social and cultural disabling mechanisms. Colin
Barnes, "A Brief History of Discrimination and Disabled People," in The Disability Studies Reader, ed.
Lennard J. Davis (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 29.

177

constructions of disablement, which might imply (through inattention) the discursively
constructed meaning of “paraplegic” as originary to this kind of bodily experience.
However, thinking with Merleau-Ponty here and remembering his description of
the body schema points to a dynamic of embodiment which—while not free from cultural
inscriptions—is nevertheless an experience and engendering of meanings that is a deeply
bodily experience, where difference is engendered, but not necessarily discursively
dominated. Remember that my body schema is my bodily blueprint that structures
perceptions and my sense of self and/in relation to my environment. If it configures my
movements and postures which also affect my bodily sense of unity, then no matter what
body I find myself in, one dimension of bodily experience (which is not separate, or
beneath, but concurrent/a co-current with other bodily experiences) is that of myself as a
bodily unit.
For example, a person born without limbs holds a complete body schema (her legs
have not been severed through perhaps amputation), and her body schema and bodily
intentionality (such as her proximal movements) are established according to her tacit
understanding of herself as bodily unit. Also, what are usually considered as objects
different from bodies might also come to be part of our body schema and bodily
extension, for example, a pianist with visual impairment comes to incorporate the piano
into his body schema so that the piano is part of the bodily unit that is him, similar to the
ways in which a cane can become not an object or tool of a person who is blind, but a
tactile bodily organ, part of the unifying/-ied body schema.126 Bodily perceptual
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intentionality, my movement in the world, is synthesized in the various motions my body
and bodily parts are capable of, and my body schema is that of a whole, unified body.
Being deaf/Deaf might again help to illustrate this point. While common ableist
modern perception of this difference in bodily perceptual capacity is that of deaf as lack
of hearing, the Deaf instead see themselves as a distinct cultural group that uses a
different language. The culturally Deaf (those considering themselves as part of a
linguistic and cultural minority), understand themselves to function as an adequate, selfenclosed, self-defining culture and community, yet a cultural minority which functions in
an “audist” society, a society that is biased towards the auditory mode of communication.
This is not simply a linguistic redefinition but a bodily perceptual experience and
orientation. The bodily experience of a deaf person is not necessarily one that is
immediately or solely a materialization of an audist/ableist conceptual inscription. Rather,
the person born deaf extends bodily as a whole unit within and through the bodily
capacities of her individual sensory perceptual intentionality, rather than as an incomplete
unit, extending with perceptual deficiencies. From this perspective, the absence of
hearing is no more a deficiency, abnormality, or disability than the absence of English
speaking skills is.127
Of course, as both disability and feminist scholars have pointed out,
fragmentations of body image are not only possible, but a bodily experience shared
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amongst those subjected to becoming the embodiment of difference.128 But the body
schema, this pre-reflective perceptual understanding of my bodily capacities and motility,
is an experience in which bodily difference emerges as such. I realize my bodily selftranscendence as/in my body, and my body schema informs how I perform my “I can” in
the world.
Now, if I were born without legs, I am not just “compensating” for what others
with four limbs might perceive as a lack. My pre-reflexive bodily experience, my tacit
knowledge of my ability to extend bodily in a given environment, is not of lacking a
certain capacity and then adjusting to this lack. But my body image as impaired, disabled,
or abnormal is a concurrent dynamic influencing my bodily experience, not separate
and/or following from my body schema entering a social world, but another current in
which I am bodily immersed. My bodily intentionality, my bodily movement towards
cultural expression, then takes my bodily being beyond my biological capacities of
movement with two limbs, incorporates sediment habits of language (“I have a mobility
impairment,” “I am disabled,” “I cannot walk on legs,” “I do not move like a normal
person”) as I speak of my bodily condition.
All the while my self-experience of myself as fully functioning and capable
person in my specific incarnation runs against the currents of sedimented linguistic habits
of “normal,” taking up words and gestures as expressions in their ambiguity and
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indeterminacy within cultural schemata, yet I am always “speaking against” concepts of
normalcy as I am embodying and speaking through cultural linguistic signifiers of
normal: “My different body is normal”—extends expression within the language of
normalcy, while seeking to make use of the indeterminate meaning of “normal.” My selfperception is immediate—I concurrently can perceive myself as different and normal,
because the meaning of these words has a corporeal dimension and I am those signifiers
as much as I use them. And meaning is mediated through my body and culture, because I
understand the meaning of these words in reference to my body but within the cultural
habits of understanding them, even as I bodily invoke new meanings.
Body schema and body image are then not reducible to each other nor are they
internally simple. Body schemas, as indicated above, are fluid and can change according
to my embodied material condition: I grow older, might lose physical flexibility,
experience changes in perceptual capacities, etc.; I might learn how to drive, how to drive
vehicles of a different kind or size, might learn an instrument, etc.; and my body schema,
my tacit knowledge of bodily comportment, enables and supports these changes and the
acquiring of bodily habits.
Body images are also fluid and changeable, according to the dynamics of social
relationships aligning value and meaning to specific bodily emergences and how I move
as (changing) body in (changing) contexts. In other words, my bodily perceptual
orientation is a dialectic of complex and heterogonous currents. I extend outward through
a tacit body knowledge and through socially mediated perceptions of what “there is to
know” about my body.
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I know how to move into a classroom as an able-bodied woman; my bodily
difference is manifest in my bodily comportment (I am physically fit, of a certain height
and strength), but my habits also display a certain caution or restrained bodily motility
around male students. I perceive interactions with students along gendered lines, which
influences my affect and other bodily gestures—I move around the classroom with a
range of bodily abilities (I walk around chairs on two legs, write on the whiteboard while
listening to my students), but also control my movements in alignment with perceptions
of gendered bodies (I approach male students differently aware of my gendered body
than I might perceive myself around male friends or female colleagues).
It is not until I experience a back injury which temporarily affects my bodily
motility that the currents of my body schemas and body images might “run through me”
differently, though not necessarily harmoniously. I might learn to adjust bodily postures
to alleviate pain and compensate for impaired movement; I might still hold a body image
of an able-bodied woman who needs to return to able-bodied-ness, but I also might feel
social pressure to perform professional femininity and able-bodied-ness (out of sync with
what I tacitly know my body to be capable of in the moment) in the classroom in order to
maintain social power as a teacher through repetitively established perceptual alignments.
Put differently, while I hold a tacit or pre-reflective awareness of my-body-self without
having access to my body as an object of my awareness (I know where my body is and
know how to move my body, but I cannot be aware of my body as separate from me), I
can still be perceptually aware of my-body-self by engaging in a cultural world. “I” as
my-body-self am that subject who has taken up the mechanisms of culture and has
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achieved awareness of myself as normal or different/deviant—within the bounds of my
culture.
Sediment cultural habits might precede my subjective individual bodily
experience, my habituated patterns of perceptual behavior and consciousness as subject.
But I am also embodied in this world with tacit knowledges of my bodily intentionality, I
hold a body schema which organizes my movements without conscious attention. And
my engaging in language and other bodily expressions as body and as body in a presubjective world can show the compelling character of perceptual demands of normalcy
within which I find myself recognized and through which I reflect: Perceptual concepts
(gender, race, normalcy) might change; my contextual engagement with these concepts
might change; the contextual meaning emerging in the corporeal dynamics between
bodies and world might change; but the fact that I perceive and emerge as subject with
culturally given perceptual concepts does not.
And because I take up perceptual mechanisms of culture, I take up political
relations of perception: My perception of normalcy is intertwined with relations of power
which align me with certain perceptions of normalcy and otherness that are not neutral or
innocent. For example, the persistent mind-body dualism and the cultural hierarchies
preferring “mind over matter” in Euro-Western concepts of human existence more often
than not instill us with doubt that a life without “normal” cognitive function might be a
life worth living. Not only can we not imagine existing without our mental capacities
(after all, we are habituated to embrace our imagination as a mental, not a bodily act), but
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our social value systems idealize the mind and all the control over life we think it affords
us, for example, as the locus of intention for our actions in the world.
The habitual schema I am immersed in of perceiving preferentially mind-overmatter also has a socio-political force inherent to it. Alzheimer’s disease or dementia, for
example, emerge as fear-inducing because the loss of mental control signals a loss of
identity and human agency. An uncontrolled mind is to blame for a body out of control,
so that recent socio-political public conversation regarding violence focuses on control of
bodily restriction of access to weapons and legal provisions for mental health providers,
using language and imagery which frame “normal” people as “reasonable” and “mentally
stable” and therefore in charge and empowered to control “crazy” people who are
perceived as out of control and bodily violent.
We perceive normally-abled persons because we come to recognize certain bodily
and mental capacities as common to human persons, at a time when identification and
control of normal bodies and minds is important to the organization and structuring of
human bodies in cultural and political space. The bodily perceptual experience of
abnormality (deviance from normal) alerts us to the dynamics between body–bodies–
social world from which the other body might not emerge as subject analogous to
“normal.” Because some bodily perceptual movements (gestures, movements, gaze, etc.)
are socio-culturally not recognizable as “normal” in the field of interaction—or at least
not recognized in their specific form (a limp, a slur, the absence of vision) due to
perceptual orientations—the mutual constituting of space between bodies, the ground
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from which bodies are perceived, is a dialectic from which unequal bodies emerge into
perceptual recognition.
Thus, the “abnormality” of bodily function which defines “impairment” is already
the transition towards and entering into representational relation to another concept, that
of normalcy—so that an impaired body materializes as body image framed within sociocultural conceptions of normal/abnormal. Yet while these perceptual alignments have real
embodied effects, and can produce complex, multiple, and fragmented self-perceptions
and body images, bodily difference comes to be matter also in the dimension of body
schemas, a current in which difference is not necessarily experienced as pathology. The
relationship between meanings—specific bodies relating with and through linguistic
signs—once reflected on within the parameters outlined in this chapter, is not one of
necessity, but rather one of discontinuity. There is no natural or necessary linking
between bodily difference and meaning in language (though a linking between the two
always is), which implies that other meanings and links are possible, especially when
remembering the histories and possibilities potentially to be gathered on perceptual
backgrounds.
Just like bodily perceptual orientations are aligned to support some perceptions
over others and are directing our perceptions to focus on some emergences over others
from a supporting pre-reflective current, so do our bodily perceptual alignments support a
construction of normalcy which invests perceptions of difference with meanings that
endow perceptual dialectics with taxonomical, ideological, political, and cultural
significance.
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Conclusion
Our involvement with others, our mutual immersion in the currents of social
bodily interrelation, haunts us, as Merleau-Ponty sometimes describes it:129 My style of
walking, how I hold myself or silverware even when nobody is watching, what my eyes
are drawn to in an image, my reaction to unexpected touch, how I consciously and
unconsciously respond to music; our most intimate bodily lives indicate this dimension of
pre-reflective interrelation, this involvement in a current of incarnate otherness which
precedes my consciousness though it is present “in the flesh” at every moment. My
bodily movement, gestures, and postures do not enable communication between me and
others, but depend on it. Our bodies and bodily lives inherit the memory of a prereflective contact with otherness, a contact which might be irretrievable to conscious
reflection, but which nevertheless haunts our experience in the here-and-now. Put
differently, as this pre-reflective dimension precedes my subjective coming-to-be, it
precedes my individual experience while it always embeds me in a historical context that
both is and is not mine.130 In other words, this pre-reflective dimension provides an
inexplicable familiarity of me as body with things and bodies of others and a same
inexplicable sense of strangeness of “my own” body. 131 This is the bodily perceptual
dimension from which individual and communal achievements emerge historically and
culturally.
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The pre-reflective currents in which I and the world are embedded imply an
exposure, and even more, an inherent openness and ambiguity, in which my being-in-theworld is grounded and on which it depends. In other words, inherent to my existence is a
relation to the other/world, which shapes our capacities and possibilities of relation in the
world. But this relation marks our bodies as open to and pervaded by a reality which is
beyond our grasp insofar as it does not wait for us to set the terms of its appearance (as a
Kantian a priori would have us do), and this appearance therefore brings exposure and
vulnerability (and with it fecundity) to my experience as sentient body: 132 I am always
already in the world as body interrelated with this world, and as such I am already
inheriting certain ways of moving in and relating to the world. This leaves my body open
to and pervaded by currents which are beyond my grasp; in other words, as body I am
immersed in a world already marked by gender, race, and normalcy; the world does not
wait for me to enter it and dictate the terms of these concepts. I am already exposed and
vulnerable to the bodily effects and alignments of these concepts, though in my bodily
experience I also embody creativity and choice in how I employ these concepts as social
and bodily habits.133
The significance of conceptualizing my being as always bodily perceptually
oriented and always embedded with pre-reflective, intercorporeal dimensions, is that it
132

Ibid.
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See for example a sociological discussion of three ethnographies (of bodybuilders, HIV/AIDS
in heterosexual men, and obesity in men), discussing the social aspects of bodies, the fluid and mutable
meanings and experiences depending on processes of symbolic interaction in Lee F. Monaghan, "Corporeal
Indeterminacy: The Value of Embodied, Interpretative Sociology," in Body/Embodiment: Symbolic
Interaction and the Sociology of the Body, ed. Dennis Waskul and Phillip Vannini (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2006). Monaghan carefully highlights how bodies have no intrinsic meaning, rather, meanings
emerge because of this indeterminacy, meanings are forged bodily-creatively, and social meanings are
transmitted and habituated in embodied ways.

187

enables me to think of the meaning emerging from bodily perceptual experience as
always traceable back to bodily experience, but neither experience nor meaning are
properties of an individual self. Rather, being as body is the indispensable condition of
one person’s sharing of experience with another.134
Implied in the observations about bodily intentionality and pre-reflective
dimension of perception was a pushing of the subject’s boundaries beyond the skin “out
into the world:”
Whether we are concerned with my body, the natural world, the past, birth or
death, the question is always how I can be open to phenomena which transcend
me, and which nevertheless exist only to the extend that I take them up and live
them, how the presence to myself (Urpräsenz) which establishes my own limits
and conditions every alien presence is at the same time depresentation
(Engegenwärtigung) and throws me outside of myself.135
What Merleau-Ponty problematizes is that the environment, or the world of the subject,
has often only been of interest as object of perception, and also only insofar as its features
correlated with perceptual structures and capacities. To assert with Merleau-Ponty that
our bodily existence is organically interrelated with that of the world strongly implies that
this interrelation of being is a dependency in becoming. In other words, becoming and
existing as embodied subject is to depend on other living bodies and the world I relate in
and with. This dependency or intertwining of embodied experience and world is not
simply a product or manifestation of being.
The pre-reflective dimension, the current of sedimented habitual schemata,
inhabits me as body and other bodies at the same time. We have seen that the parts of my
134

Samuel Todes, Body and World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 2.
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Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 363. Emphasis in original.
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body and my sensory capacities form an organic unity and my perceptions come together
in things (such as my perception of a lump of dough rolling between my fingers). In the
same way,
as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other’s
are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous
existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both
bodies simultaneously.136
The previously explored body schema, my tacit knowledge of bodily capacities in
a given environment, is possible because of the mutual involvement of interrelated
bodies. Only because I am already immersed in sedimented habits—and therefore in
communion with other bodily movements and other bodies forming social relations that
precede me—can I emerge with individual bodily movements. In other words, it is not
“I” who enters the world and chooses my own style “from scratch.” Rather, because I am
already always bodily involved in a world in which bodies before me and around me are
already relating to each other, already taking up habituated relations, I can emerge as a
bodily being who “knows” how to be in her body. 137
My subjectivity, my individual experiences, transcends me. My experience is that
I do not feel that I am the constituting agent either of the natural or of the cultural
world: into each perception and into each judgment I bring either sensory
functions or cultural settings which are not actually mine. Yet, although I am
outrun on all sides by my own acts, and submerged in generality, the fact remains
that I am the one by whom they are experiences…138
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Ibid., 354.
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Marratto, 145. It is not by accident that Merleau-Ponty invokes “communion,” as he sometimes
refers to this interrelation of bodies as transubstantiation, as mysterious intertwining in the process of
perception: in perception, the perceived is inseparable from the perceiver. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology
of Perception, 320.
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Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 358.
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I and others are “outrun by [our] world, and [we] consequently may well be outrun by
each other.”139 I am not completely ignorant about the other’s existence as subject: Once
I encounter the other as bodily perceptually oriented intentionality (i.e., a subject who
perceptually transcends, as in movement or speech), then the other is not an object of my
perception, or a subject-mind hidden in a body to me, but a perceivable subject-intention.
For example, as my grandmother moves her hand to cover herself with a blanket,
or moves her eyes around the room in search of something, she is not a body-thing with
questionable cognitive abilities, nor a consciousness hidden away in a body cut off from
communication with me. Rather, in her bodily perceptual movements she has an intention
towards and an orientation in the world. And while I have no absolute access to her or her
experience (just as I have no complete access to mine), we are both inserted and
participate in an interrelated bodily world in which our perceptual movements are as
much our own as they are the other’s. She cannot not be an experiencing subject, because
she still inhabits a shared world on which she holds a bodily perceptual grasp. We are
both present in a world, and our bodily perceptual intentionality opens us both to a world;
we are both enmeshed with each other as we are enmeshed with the world.
As I join my mother at our German home in the outdoor kitchen, and she instructs
me in the preparation of a Thai dish, our bodily perceptual orientations to each other and
to our environment are full of alignments, orienting mechanisms, and pre-reflective
currents which allow for indeterminate meaning to emerge as we get ready for a meal of
gaeng nuea. My underlying discomfort or embarrassment of cooking outside is more than
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Ibid., 353.
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just mental knowledge that “something is not right”; it is also emerging out of bodily
habituations of taking gendered home spaces outside the family home, of not having
acquired bodily perceptual capacities of moving with my mother and within this space.
Emerging are also “imported” (habituated during my living in the US) bodily perceptual
orientations, such as a tacit awareness of two racialized brown women pushed to the
margins of a German home, infusing the home space from the outside with ethnic
fragrances. My apprehension, judgment, evaluation, thoughts, memories, emotions, etc.,
in this situation are arising out of and within my bodily perceptual orientations, out of and
within my bodily experiencing and perceiving the situation, and emerging out of and
within social sedimentation of habits that encompass me as body.
It should not strike us as paradoxical or surprising anymore that the English term
“sense” implies the ambiguity or duality of bodily perception and meaning as discussed
in this chapter: Sense can connote “making sense,” inferring sense as meaning found in
order and through understanding. And sense or the senses refers to our perceptual
experiences, our sensing and feeling of ourselves and/in the world through sensory
capacities. The Latin percipere (from which the English perception derives) denotes “to
take a hold of, to feel, to comprehend.” Here too, the ambiguous connotations of the word
perception in common usage describe reception of information through sensory
capacities and as mental insight or activity of sense-making, meaning derived from
sensory information. The dual use and implied aspects of sense and perception point to
sensory perception as the reaching out, the extending into the world we have explored
and to the understanding of the world gained in perceptual processes. Bodily perceptual
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experience is grounded in and dependent on my individual bodily capacities and history,
and framed by socio-cultural orientations and habits.140
Sensing, perceiving, understanding, and knowing are inseparable dimensions of
bodily experience; they are sides of the same coin (though I am stretching the coin
metaphor here beyond the usual two sides). A complex understanding of bodily
perceptual experience needs to recognize this ambiguity, which must not be resolved in
favor of the bodily or mental aspect, lest we reinstate a body/mind dualism. But we must
understand this interrelation and embeddedness of body-consciousness in its complexity,
or we resort to naïve conceptions of perception without accounting for the way in which
bodily perceptual experience is a relationship to the world, a mutual constitution with the
world, a meaning-making process with respect to that world, and a habituated, culturally
specific, style of being in the world.
In the following chapter, I will continue this exploration of bodily perceptual
orientation, but focus more deeply on the complexity in how this being in the world
through touching, smelling, feeling, hearing, seeing, speaking, etc., manifests. Bodily
perceptual orientation is not simply a biological process connected to mental activity, but
because our human existence is also personally and socio-culturally situated, bodily
perceptual orientations do not only differ individually or across different groups in a
society (as we have explored in this chapter), but also across time and cultures.
Therefore, our exploration of bodily perceptual orientation will now turn to sociohistorical and socio-cultural differences in bodily perceptual orientations.
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARING BODILY PERCEPTUAL ORIENTATIONS
If you have ever travelled away from home, you might have experienced your
immersion into a different place, a different culture even, as an “onslaught on the senses.”
We encounter new places in a variety of perceptual dimensions: we perceive the distinct
smell of a city made up of exhaust, street food vendors, the types of garbage rotting in the
street; we sense a place having a certain “touch” or “feel,” the pace of traffic, the bodily
proximity of people passing each other, the feel of architecture, clothing and other
objects; we are aware of new sounds on every corner, different musical harmonies
making up popular local tunes, intonations and gestures in personal communication, car
horns, coins clicking, steps on pavement; we taste different foods and drinks, we notice
how fruit familiar to us tastes different, and dishes tasted at home are experienced with
new flavors. Maybe we even get to stay long enough that certain experiences deemed
“exotic” or “strange” to us become familiar, even cease to be the focus of attention of our
perceptions and experiences. We might even begin to notice subtleties previously
unperceived: the different kinds of spiciness of chili, the different accents or dialects of a
language we still don’t understand; we learn to appreciate a culture’s music and notice
different styles.
It is in traveling, in leaving the habituations of our socio-cultural environment,
that our bodily perceptual orientations may be highlighted via the experience of
difference, the experience of not being “properly” bodily oriented in ways to blend in. In
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the previous chapter, I have explored what bodily perceptual orientation in the world
entails, and I have investigated how bodily experiences and sensory perception shape our
existence via explorations of perceptions of gender, race, and normalcy. In this chapter, I
would like to evoke a certain kind of disorientation through historical and cultural
“travels,” brief examples of different bodily perceptual orientations. Like any short term
vacation or even long(er) term stay, full cultural competency may escape us, and while as
experienced traveler I might learn to understand aspects of other ways of being in the
world, the subject more fully and complexly understood through exposure might be
myself. Because I can no longer take certain sights, scents, sounds, etc., for granted, I can
reflect on the ways in which I presume certain perceptions and perceptual orientations.
We explored above that perception does not conform to preexisting laws tracing
an independently existing world, but rather, the perceived world and the norms of
perception emerge together in mutual immanence.1 This then implies that what might
guide the processes of perception is open to change, and importantly, there is no fixed
structure within which perceptual indeterminacy moves, but perception has an
indeterminate structure, operating within always to-be-decided customs. In other words,
there is no fixed grid of meaning which then guides and limits the perceptual
potentialities, but the perceptual grid itself, the currents supporting perceptual
emergences, is always open to change, changes that come with bodily as well as
historical and cultural transformations.

1

Marratto, 95.
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Below, I will continue the exploration of bodily perceptual orientation, but shift
towards a comparative approach in order to explore more complexly the “how” of
sensory perception. The aim in these examples is to highlight the ways in which our own
bodily perceptual orientations are far from natural or universal.2 Neither are the currents
supporting the perceptual emergences familiar to us universal, nor are the perceptual
capacities and orientations familiar to us natural. This chapter seeks to de-center and
maybe even exoticize our own ways of “making sense,” and help us consider more
closely our own too-often taken for granted bodily perceptual orientations.3 I will
therefore show how bodily perceptual orientations are complex heterogeneous dynamics,
within which perceptual hierarchies, orders, and interplays can be found. This will also
2

Among those, of course, is also the bodily perceptual orientation towards a body/mind split, and
the questions guiding this project in regards to how we may more adequately conceive of our bodily
existence as a unified and interrelated body/mind/culture experience. As we shall see, this problem might
indeed be a Western problem; if I were to find myself embedded in a different socio-cultural context, the
questions pursued in this project might be nonsensical.
3

Doing so, I am very aware of the inherent difficulties and dangers in providing many very
different sites for exemplary investigation, staying with neither site long enough to adequately represent
difference. Furthermore, I am providing glimpses into these sites often from second-hand “others,” making
respectful and thoughtful discussion more difficult and also important. I bear in mind Barbara Mann’s
description account of Eurocentric vanity, which falsely universalizes European themes (in the case of this
project, conception of experience, the senses, sensory divisions and hierarchies) superimposing Christian
European metanarratives on indigenous cultural difference, though more often than not, cultural
metanarratives hardly coincide. “It is just another face of colonialism, the our-size-fits-all mentality at
work, busily retrofitting the monoculture of the ‘West’ over all Other cultures, straining, stretching,
lopping, compressing, and, if expedient, annihilating the original the better to cram it into the
“metanarrative” most comfortable to Euro-observers in a process I have elsewhere dubbed, ‘Euro-forming
the Data.’” Barbara A. Mann, The Gantowisas: Iroquoian Women (New York: Peter Lang Publishing,
2000), 62. Emphasis original. And while I am convinced that I cannot escape Euro-forming myself, I aim to
undergo this comparative travel to expose my own Western bodily perceptual orientation. I am also
cautioned by Iris Marion Young regarding privilege, applied to this project as scholarly and Western
academic privilege, and hope that the representations and images conveyed serve greater self-reflection,
rather than perpetuation of objectification of others. Young remarks that structural privilege and oppression
may give rise to falsifying projections, damaging stereotypes and ideologies which often legitimize
privilege and oppression. “When members of privileged groups imaginatively try to represent to
themselves the perspective of members of the oppressed groups, too often those representations carry
projections and fantasies through which the privileged reinforce a complimentary image of themselves.”
Iris Marion Young, Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy, and Policy (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 48.
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help us understand how perceptual differences, and different perceptual orders are
already present in real historical and cultural worlds worth “visiting.”
Above, we explored that bodily perception is not a matter of gathering
information but a fundamental dimension of meaning making, the domain of cultural
expression and conceptual alignments/orientations, the medium of enactment of social
values. Perceptual experiences, then, are cultural acts, and perceptual differences are not
only bodily differences, but also cultural differences, as culture inscribes how the senses
are formed, utilized, and attributed.4 If meanings are invested and conveyed perceptually,
then different ways of perceiving the world also imply different modes of consciousness
and knowledge formation.5 We already explored this in regards to gender, how perceptual
intentionality shapes a gendered grasp on the world, or how perceptual alignments of
bodies form racial perceptions and alignments of normalcy. Perception shapes that we
“know” a body is a raced body, and how and what we know about being “normal.”
Ethnographic fieldwork inquiring into sensory epistemological frameworks shows
that “the five senses” are not a universal occurrence. Sensory perception varies within
and across cultural groups, and the quantities and organization of the senses can vary as
well.6 This has important implications for understanding how meanings are invested and

4

Constance Classen, Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures (New
York: Routledge, 1993), 5. David Howes, Sensual Relations: Engaging the Senses in Culture and Social
Theory (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003), iv.
5

Classen, Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures, 1. Howes,

245,n3.
6

The number of senses, their differentiation, interrelation and prioritization, are cultural
articulations. It was Aristotle, following Plato’s distinction between the mind and the senses, who
established five as the number of senses commonly theorized in Western culture, and also established a
hierarchy (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, descending in epistemological value). Though the numbering
of the senses is neither a biological nor universal given, but a philosophical strategy to match and support a
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conveyed phenomenologically. Differences in sensory perceptual ordering in a culture
affect a person’s (bodily) experiences. The culturally inscribed number and ordering of
senses and the interplay of sounds, silence, modes of vision and cultural meanings
attached to it, affect one’s positioning in and orientation to the world, and thus make up
the sensory constitution of the emerging experiencing subject.
In this chapter, the works of sensory anthropologists and ethnographers will serve
in my comparative exploration of how bodily perceptual orientations work. Where
psychological and philosophical studies have focused on consciousness and epistemology
(and have displayed a tendency to universalize the senses), the cultural study of the
senses (sensory anthropology or anthropological phenomenology) often begins with
inquiries into (cultural) differences in sensory perception.7 My comparative method aims

relationship between the senses and the five elements identified by Aristotle, Western philosophers
remained loyal to this classification and hierarchy up until Hegel. See Classen, Worlds of Sense: Exploring
the Senses in History and across Cultures, 2. Touch, for example, can be broken down into a multitude of
specialized perceptions (movement, temperature, pain), which are given a sensory category of their own in
different cultures. Moreover, sensory orders are not static, but can change over time with changes in culture
and cultural values (Classen, Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures, 3-5.).
For an overview of Western thinking about sensory perception from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and Marx,
and their connections to epistemological concepts, see Anthony Synnott, "Puzling over the Senses: From
Plato to Marx," in The Variety of Sensory Experience: A Sourcebook in the Anthropology of the Senses, ed.
David Howes (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1991). Also Carolyn Korsmeyer, Making
Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 11-37.
7

Sensory anthropology as a “re-thought” anthropology has some of its origins in cross-cultural
anthropological comparisons of sensory perception, and since the beginning of these inquiries, three
decades or so ago, while drawing on interdisciplinary fields, it also increasingly incorporates a critique and
contestation of the universality of modern western categorization of the senses. The emphasis on the
relationship between the senses, between sensory differences and sensory ideologies, is useful to my
concern with bodily perceptual experience and difference. Especially in regards to expanding the attention
given previously to highlighting subjective perceptual experiences towards tending more explicitly to
communal and social perceptions in various cultural contexts, and cultural differences in perceptual
practices, the inquiries undertaken in this field will be useful. Sarah Pink, "The Future of Sensory
Anthropology/the Anthropology of the Senses," Social Anthropology 18, no. 3 (2010). Pink and the below
cited Howes engage in an academic dispute over the contours and trajectories of sensory
anthropology/anthropology of the senses. The disagreement between the two is of no significance to my
use and appropriation of either scholar’s work.
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to follow two trajectories: The first one has a hermeneutic intent, reading the previously
given phenomenological account of perceiving gendered, raced, and normalized bodies in
conjunction with another from a different historical location or culturally distinct
community. As my travel analogy above indicated, this will help us understand our own
(modern Western) perceptual orientations more complexly by pointing out its nonnormativity in other contexts. 8
The second kind of trajectory has a constructive and supplemental intent,
engaging the issues explored in chapter three to take my investigation of bodily
perceptual orientation and perceptions of gender, race, and disability further. Specifically,
it is supplemental in its more complex exploration of the “how” of bodily perceptual
orientations, as it adds arguments, distinctions and new illustrations.9 I will show how
some organizing assumptions regarding the aspects of perception and the tools for

8

I want to dis-affirm that we may understand both (as in “ours” and “theirs”) fully or better,
simply because my understanding and the descriptions of difference I depend on here are still dependent on
being articulated in English and within a Euro-Western framework. While I might understand some of what
is described, I also want to acknowledge the lack of translatability of certain things that will remain
inaccessible to me.
9

Philosophically, it is also supplemental in the Derridian sense. Derrida provides two definitions
of “supplement:” the surplus addition which enriches the self-sufficient plenitude, and the addition which
fills a void, the adjunct which intervenes in-the-place-of. However, as Derrida argues, common to both
meanings of supplement is assumption of the marginality of its addition, yet the very fact of its necessity
points to the lack of the supposedly complete. It is always the exterior, the outside to which it is
supplemented, yet as such it is the condition of possibility of the interior. At the core of the logic of
supplementarity is the process of exclusion, the process which establishes exterior and interior and thus
establishes the plenitude and the supplement. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans., Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 144-145,167. In short, to
explore these examples as supplements, I also want to posit them as that which also makes possible our
cultural interior by being constituted as the exterior to our self-sufficient knowledge, yet that which is
necessary to our own self-understanding.
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description employed are universalized conventions (such as the numbering of five
senses, four tastes) not necessarily found across histories or cultures. 10
I will return to the concepts of intentionality, habits, and language to explore how
bodily perceptual orientations not only instill differences, but are also constituted
differently. As in the previous chapter, the aim is not to give comprehensive accounts of
constructions of, for example, gender. Rather, I seek to elaborate on difference in sensory
orders, interplay of perceptions, and perceptual hierarchies. Taking a closer look at
culturally varied bodily perceptual experiences of, for example, gender or normalcy will
allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the “how” of bodily perceptual orientation in
the world. I will start off with gender perceptions, returning to bodily intentionality and
perceptual movement, and showcase historical and cultural differences in order to deepen
our understanding of perceptual processes.
Bodily Perceptual Orientations: Historical and Cultural Differences
Euro-Western cultures in pre-modern times aligned bodies along different
perceptual lines, some similar or familiar to contemporary sensory hierarchies, some
seemingly strange to us today. In The Color of Angels, Constance Classen provides an
account of how the self and the world were conceptualized sensory-perceptually in
10

I want to stress again that none of the examples used in this chapter seeks to give a
comprehensive account or deliver full knowledge. Readers interested in further elaboration are encouraged
to engage in their own comparative travel to my sources. But my intent is not to make my readers more
“competent” (as in “knowing more”) about differences regarding bodily perceptual orientation (as in
becoming an expert on the bodily perceptual orientation of others). To hold such an aim would be
counterproductive to the aim of this project, which is to make a case that bodily perceptual orientation
matters, and that if we begin theological analysis with bodily experience, we must be clear about the
dynamics of perception which make up our bodily existence. Therefore, the examples used here are neither
full case studies nor exhaustive demonstrations of perceptual orientations. But I utilize them to highlight
differences in order to explore the limits or “forgotten” horizons of our contemporary Western perceptual
habituation.

199

Western cultures during different periods.11 She notes that the common organization in
Western cultures of perceptual experience into five senses is not a universal
phenomenon.12 This five-fold distinction is evident in Western Christian cultures due to
the influence of Aristotle. While he did not introduce this partition of perception into five
distinct senses, his philosophical authority established this number, division, and ranking.
Aristotle’s De Anima and the psychological theories, problems, and formulas proposed in
it influenced not only discourses in ethics and religion, but also the subsequent thought
on the senses (as well as the connection between the senses and the soul), considering
sight the highest and touch the basest primary sense.13

11

See Constance Classen, The Color of Angels: Cosmology, Gender and the Aesthetic Imagination
(New York: Routledge, 1998).
12

This common division in Western sciences also led to the development of cultural theories of
the senses, e.g., Marshall McLuhan’s oft cited theory of orality or “great divide” theory, which arranges
geographical, historical, and cultural spaces into basic sensory groups (oral-aural, chirographic,
typographic, electronic). McLuhans binary theory is sweeping in its claim and significantly depends on
Western sensory exclusive divisions and displays the above mentioned “Euro-forming of Data.” Marshall
McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1962). For critiques of
the theory, see Smith, 8-18. Also Howes, xix-xx.
13

Louise Vinge, The Five Senses: Studies in a Literary Tradition (Lund, Sweden:
LiberLäromedel, 1975), 15-21. For Aristotle, this division was more of a philosophical strategic product to
match and support a relationship between the senses and the five elements he identified. Classen, Worlds of
Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures, 2. Touch and taste involved direct physical
contact and were connected to animal pleasures for Aristotle. Sight, hearing and smell were ranked higher
as “human” senses. Smith, 28. While this Aristotelian five-fold taxonomy of perception is not evident in
Christian scriptures, medieval Christianity utilizes it as structural metaphor for the cosmos and as ethical
model. It was the senses that led to the fall (the forbidden fruit was pleasing to Eve, and the perceptual
enjoyment of it was the sensory dimension of the original sin); redemption of humanity is then acquired
through control of sensory impulses, the spiritual mastery of bodily perception within a moral code.
Classen, The Color of Angels: Cosmology, Gender and the Aesthetic Imagination, 3. Early Christian
thinking was already highly visualist, and Aquinas gave theological sanction to an already established
philosophical and cultural hegemony of vision. Smith, 29.To explore sensory cosmologies is beyond the
scope of this chapter, for more detailed descriptions see Classen, The Color of Angels: Cosmology, Gender
and the Aesthetic Imagination, 13-60. See also an investigation of the sensorium found in the Hebrew
Bible, sensory vocabulary revealing a septasensory model. Yael Avrahami, The Senses of Scripture:
Sensory Perception in the Hebrew Bible (New York, NY: T&T Clark International, 2012).
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With the emergence of modernity in the West, perception and knowledge became
increasingly tied to an epistemology of visual models and representations which sought to
provide viewers with direct access to reality. 14 This perceptual privilege of vision in
terms of knowledge has not always been prevalent, as sensory orderings are changeable
through time.15 Pre-modern Western cosmologies were imagined through a variety of
sensory symbolism, for example, through touch and smell, and these cosmologies were
imbued with and reflected social ideologies. An emerging visualism worked to obscure
the sensory imagery of previous eras, and visual imagery—transparency, photographic
representation, maps, graphs—became the sensory symbolism underlying modern
Western culture, carrying with it an aura of rationality and objectivity. 16
14

The supremacy of sight may be traced to the afore-footnoted taxonomical hierarchy established
by Aristotle. The negation of perceptual capacities as epistemological tools for learning about the world
traced to Descartes in the 17th century, though the exclusivity of sight in philosophical treatises is best
connected to 18th century Immanuel Kant (though he should also be understood as thoroughly immersed in
the philosophical trends of his time regarding perception). Michel Foucault locates the shift to sight as
superior sense in popular Western culture to the 18th century, when semantic shifts in sensory vocabulary
occur with the philosophical, cultural, and scientific changes in European space (for example, the phrase
“seeing is believing” emerges, though it is a transformed or shortened version of the previously popular
phrase “seeing is believing, touching is the truth”). Avrahami, 5-7. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the
Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (London, UK: Tavistock Publications, 1973).
15

See for example Barbara Maria Stafford’s investigation of the epistemological shift to imagery
beginning in Europe in the 1700s, a shift she observes in all areas of life (she specifically investigates
science and art). Stafford traces how Enlightenment aspirations to perfect experiences (perfect as in
untainted revelation about reality), connected to dualistic constructions of the material and the
metaphysical, led to a compulsion to find clarity about the metaphysical within the material. Stafford
carefully connects visual imagery and its deployment in science and art to the epistemological/pedagogical,
i.e., she traces how visualization of what is typically unperceivable (from invisible bodily functions and
mental/moral experiences to far distant stars) is central to the Enlightenment project, yet significantly,
always required the guidance of discourse, Logos, or logic, lest the visual appearance deceive the
unenlightened/uneducated mind.
16

Classen, The Color of Angels: Cosmology, Gender and the Aesthetic Imagination, 1. However,
not all cultures in which we find vision to be the highest sense understand vision in the same way in which
it emerged in Euro-Western understandings. Among Nepal’s Yolmo Buddhist’s, for example, one might
find more than twenty ways of conceiving of vision, including a form of action and interaction, a means to
communicate, a tool for spiritual practice, etc. Vision is not confined to epistemological and physiological
purposes, but also includes metaphoric, pragmatic, political, moral purposes and many more. See Robert
Desjarlais, Sensory Biographies: Lives and Deaths among Nepal's Yolmo Buddhists (Berkeley, CO:
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This privileging has not only led to studying vision scientifically more than the
other, considered “lower,” senses—which are still very much at work as well—a visualist
regime does not imply that our perceptually emerging meanings are effected through
sight alone (as I will discuss in more detail in the second section of this chapter). It also
informs our scholarly inquiries into perception, or into any subject for that matter: I take
perspectives on an issue, seek to focus my investigations, illuminate a point with
illustrations, or employ a theoretical lens. We investigate an inner world through
introspection, demonstrate the scope of an issue and then provide a synopsis or an
exhibit.17
I will begin by exploring some pre-modern Western perceptual orders and
culturally different sensory hierarchies regarding gender in order to strengthen our

University of California Press, 2003), 54-101. Further, even when describing Western orientations as
visualist, I do not mean to infer a dominant visual order that is singular in structure or universal in scope.
For readers interested in the multiplicity and plurality of visual regimes in modern and postmodern Europe,
specifically France, see Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century
French Thought (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). For example, Jay suggest a plurality
of scopic regimes, e.g., the Cartesian perspectivalism which framed modern epistemology, the detached
scientific Baconian empiricism, and the baroque regime which encompasses opacity, surplus images,
bizarre and peculiar visualizations. Jay’s significant contribution to understanding the visualism of the
West is his pluralization of visualism, in which visual regimes may interact, compete, overlap, and
interrelate.
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Perspective, inspect, introspect, speculate, aspect, circumspect, etc., derive from the Latin
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understanding of bodily perceptual intentionality presented previously. 18 In a visual
culture, in which vision is often analogous to objectivity, truth, and rationality, bodily
perceptual aspects such as touch (like thermal perception) or olfaction might be described
as the most subjective, and thus least reliable, perceptual capacities in terms of gaining
knowledge. It is to these perceptual capacities that I will turn in order to highlight
differences in sensory hierarchies.
Differently Gendered Bodily Intentionality
In the previous chapter, I discussed bodily intentionality via gender and
elaborated how gender emerges as an effect of how bodies are aligned within perceptual
grids that allow bodies to extend in specifically gendered ways. These gendered ways
shape which objects we take up, the manner in which objects are taken up, as well as
what shapes up to be an object of gendered desire. I asserted that bodily perceptual
orientations involve how we as bodies inhabit and occupy the world in bodily perceptual
ways. But these bodily perceptual orientations are not universal, neither historically nor
culturally.
From today’s standpoint, it would be easy to dismiss the examples provided
below as pseudo-science and superstitious beliefs. However, as I pointed out in the
previous chapter, bodily and social habits are patterns of movement, perceptual
movements which constitute one’s world and what the world comes to mean. Habitual
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As already noted, my previous chapter drew heavily on illustrations and descriptions invoking
vision, such as the notion of “background.” As Western cultural epistemological frameworks privilege
vision, I am guessing that as we read the previous chapter, some/most of us might not have been able to
escape a close association between “perceiving” and “seeing” when reading about perceptual processes
(e.g., the alignment of gendered bodies for some of us invokes imagining the visual alignment of
feminine/masculine bodies).
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movements, bodily movements emerging from a socio-historical pre-reflective
dimension, are tacit knowledges which are socially meaningful, and they shape our way
of being in the world. We find ourselves in a visual culture, and more often than not, our
first sense impressions of persons are visual: I perceive a woman, because my initial
perception might include my seeing a person with long hair, swaying hips as she walks,
perhaps wearing a skirt. Only when my perception emerges with ambiguous meanings do
I have to “zero-in” and take a closer look: that person has long hair, but dresses
somewhat masculinely, or does not perform a very feminine posture; is this person a
female tomboy or a long-haired male teenager?
But what if our primary perceptual sense is not about visual appearances, but
about someone’s smell, or even temperature? Historically, we do find different perceptual
hierarchies, so that, for example, thermal perceptions align gender. And these are, in fact,
not simply beliefs and/or nowadays disproved pseudo-scientific theories, but bodily
located and embedded knowledges and habituated orientations in that world; they are part
of the complex body-mind existence in and response to the world. While it might be
difficult to “imagine” this kind of perceptual orientation from a hypervisual cultural
standpoint, it also shows how bodily social habits can change through time within a given
culture, and with them, the tacit knowledges regarding how to be as bodies.
In this section, I will begin with comparative travels to historical contexts in EuroWestern cultures, investigating different perceptual alignments and movements regarding
gender. I will then explore culturally different sites in order to provide examples of
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gender perceptions and perceptual intentionalities which are employed within different
perceptual orders and hierarchies.
Gendered Perceptual Intentionality: Historical Differences in Euro-Western Cultures
Different sensory fields in medieval Europe were gender-typed, but sensory
qualities within a field were also cast with gender distinctions. Sight and hearing were
typically male senses and classified as distance senses, whereas smell, taste and touch
were female senses and senses of proximity. Within those fields, men were typically
associated with what was understood as the nobler quality of the sense (employing the
sense for intellectual and public activities), women with the more ignoble (making use of
the sense for sensual and selfish ends). The gendered social realm—men in the public
sphere and women in the domestic realm—is also perceptually constructed, as for
example, the ideal sensory realm for women was of proximity to her body, and her
“natural’ inclination the use of smell, taste and touch to fulfill domestic duties.19
A variety of sensory symbolism (e.g., tactile or olfactory symbol systems)
reflected social ideologies in pre-modern cosmologies. Paralleling gender sensory
symbolism, Euro-Western class ideologies and distinctions were also expressed through a
range of sensory metaphors. Lower classes associated with the lower senses of taste,
touch and smell were typed as foul-smelling, preoccupied with their bellies (food and
drink consumption) and sexual satisfaction. Variations in social roles and class positions
were reflected in variations of symbolic sensory realms, yet without significantly
disrupting gender hierarchies: a male laborer might be associated with the tactility of his
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work, which is still public, while an upper class lady might have been able to read and
write, though it was considered to be more suitable for her to do domestic handiwork. 20
Gender divisions in medieval Europe were encoded along delineations of
gendered perceptual capacities as well as gendered differentiation within a perceptual
capacity. To perceptually emerge as a gendered female in pre-modern Europe was to
perceptually extend and move in specific perceptual ways, to emerge with a genderspecific perceptual intentionality and to embody a sensory perceptual capacity in a
gender-specific manner.
One prominent perceptual orientation drawn from ancient authorities like
Aristotle and supported by contemporary scholarship and folklore was that of
temperature, the gendered contrast being that of “cold” women and “hot” men. Similar to
the perceptual orientations towards body parts and biology discussed previously in the
example of perceived gendered movement of egg and sperm, medieval perceptions of
body parts or bodily interiors were perceptually oriented to align gendered intentionality,
in this case through temperature. Male bodies perceptually extended through movement
of heat, as perceived by the outward extension of genitals and the evidence of baldness in
males (lack of hair was a sign that the excessive heat in men tended to burn up their hair).
Women’s innate coldness and moistness (due to being “half-baked,” insufficiently
gestated males) inhibited their bodily movement, since coldness was associated with
inactivity. It also framed female bodily movement as inwardly directed; rather than
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burning up food, women stored it, in order to bodily move inward for processes of
pregnancy and nourishment of children.21
Perceptual orientations towards gendered bodies and bodily functions aligned
along temperature divisions also effected social bodily intentionality and motility. For
modern visualist perceptual regimes, Iris Marion Young had located the origin of
inhibited intentionality observed in women in the objectifying gaze; visual perceptual
repetitions turn the female body into a thing and thus create a double spatiality of the
female body rather than a bodily unit, the social power of visual perception affecting
female bodily perceptual motility. In this European medieval situation though, thermal
perception was a social power effecting the gendering of bodies through the orienting
device of the science of temperature. Bodily perceptual intentionality, movement, was
perceived and structured through temperature. “Acting like a woman” was understood
then to refrain from vigorous physical activity (it used up the internally stored heat and
burned up their fat and menstrual blood, preventing pregnancy). Visual perceptions of
gender transgressions—male genitals or external female genitals of a size larger than
“normal,” facial hair, lower voices, broader shoulders, etc.—were perceived according to
and as effect of transgression of perceptual alignments in terms of perceptual
overextension of temperature (generation and outward movement of too much heat).22
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Ibid., 65. Perceptual meaning and assigned values could shift, such as heat symbolizing racial
perceptions with the beginning of the renaissance. The thermal scheme now aligned non-Europeans,
particularly Africans, South Americans, and Indians with heat, representing feminine sensuality and
indolence in contrast to “cold” European masculine rationality, industry, and order. Classen, The Color of
Angels: Cosmology, Gender and the Aesthetic Imagination, 67.
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Another medieval European gendered perceptual alignment is that of smell.
Rooted in pagan lore and classical philosophy which described the uterus as a kind of
animal with the power to move and a sense of smell, women’s bodily intentionality was
perceptually aligned with a scented womb capable of olfaction. In other words, women’s
outward bodily movements were connected with movements of the womb which could
smell (in both meanings of the word) and move about the body. Thus, body technologies
to perceptually align female bodies included scented treatments, such as encouraging a
displaced womb (a case of her sex getting to her head) through administering scents to
lure it back into place.23
But not just female bodies, but gendered positions and perceptual recognitions of
gender were made along scented lines. Women were perceived as particularly productive
of odor, and perceptual constitutions aligned women in general with malodor, most often
associated with the functions of a female womb. The science and lore about the womb
functioned as orienting devices regarding bodily movements aligned with gender, and
repetitive association of perceptual productions (smells) with gendered bodies and bodily
functions then also served as perceptual orienting lines of morality. For example, sexual
activity was considered to particularly increase the odor production of the womb. Virgin
maidens perceptually emerged as fragrant, with pleasant aroma; a malodorous woman
was aligned with lesser virtue: since women of bad character gave off the worst smells,
malodor was perceptual proof of sexual licentiousness.24
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Gendered bodily perceptual orientation and gendered habits are then not
necessarily, universally, or primarily visually aligned. Habitually acquired gendered
movements and bodily intentionality also take place in olfactory dimensions, and, for
example, the gendered female body emerges as such by extending in specifically scented
ways, and is perceptually recognized through alignments of odor. These olfactory
extensions and productions are both an effect of gendered differences (body-specific
fluids involved in sexual arousal, menstruation, childbirth, etc., have particular odors,
though the association, meaning, and value associated is variable) as well as a mechanism
for their reproduction (e.g., medical science employs olfactory technologies such as
scents to move body parts, perfuming as perceptually significant act).
This also aligns the gendered subject in her environment along olfactory lines of
significance: only bodies extending with certain scents or lacking others can achieve or
access certain objects or spaces (especially when odors where considered to affect and
penetrate body and brain directly: social habits sedimented and allowed for public health
regulations regarding public spaces to emerge); others remain out of reach, what is
desirable or not is oriented along lines of scent: male priests extended through the
fragrance of rose garlands and incense (scents associated with and obtainable by the
divine and restricted to male clerics); the dead bodies of saints (male and female)
extended fragrant scents aligning them with holiness; rich families buried their deceased
with spices and herbs to effect the alignment with sanctity over against malodorous moral
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corruption; women can effect redemption through emptying themselves of ill odors (e.g.
fasting to repress menstruation) and being divinely infused with sacred fragrance.25
The significance of olfactory alignments and olfactory sediment habits continued
through Euro-Western cultural perceptual knowledge, as olfaction took on class
significance in the 18th and 19th century with urbanization and industrialization. Ideas
about selfhood were linked to class formation, which was aligned along olfactory
perceptions. Laboring classes were aligned with reeking bad scents, perceptually
emerging as foul and dangerous smelling, the bourgeoisie, with the power to shape social
habit and with it habitual sediment, “disappeared” scent-wise behind these olfactory
alignments (similar to my discussion of “disappearing behind heteronormative lines”) and
emerged perceptually as inodorate, without bad scents—thus able to re-emerge through
individuated smells and habits of perfuming. 26
Alain Corbin analyzes in depth the bodily olfactory orientations of the French
from 1750-1880, illustrating the social and physical alignments of differently “smelled”
persons and groups, sedimented in cultural segregation of public and private domains and
also significant in the emerging of identity and understanding of notions of the self.
Individuated fragrances also allowed for persons of a certain class to perceive their own
body-self differently than before, a change in bodily olfactory movement, new patterns of
perceptual intentionality changing one’s way of being in the world (even inaugurating
new kinds of narcissism and sexual desires/alignments). The “I can” of a perfumed
25
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bourgeoisie male is olfactorily very different from, for example, that of a lower class
housemaid, whose “I cannot” smell a certain way is experienced in conjunction with the
“I can smell like myself” of someone other. 27 The emergence of an individual self in
Europe then can be more complexly understood when taking into consideration the kind
of individualized and individualizing scenting in modern Euro-Western cultures to stand
out against malodorous “others” and to perceptually appear as discrete individual. 28
To inquire into possible subversions of social hierarchies, such as gendered
alignments of status or moral capacities, we must take into account the bodily perceptual
orientations that are work. For example, in a cosmology ordered by smell, the stench of
hell and sweet scents of heaven were perceived as in bodily and worldly realms in the
Hildegard von Bingen context. The abbess of a Benedictine convent is known for her
medical writings, liturgical music compositions, and is most famous for her recorded
mystical visions. Her scholarly productions already strike historians and theologians as
subversive for a woman regarding her socio-cultural world, and often her ability to gain
theological credibility is traced to her embracing the mystical and therefore sensory
realm, rather than what was considered the scholarly rational pursuit of theology proper
reserved for men.29 But significant here is also that it was through her bodily perceptual
emergence that she could extend and move intellectually the way she did: She
perceptually emerged exhaling the odor of sanctity, aligning her emergence with the
27
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divine in ways women commonly could not; and because in her socio-cultural world, to
smell was to know, this perceptual emergence aligned her with authority (a female body
exhaling divine knowledge) to subvert gendered spiritual and theological hierarchies. 30
In the previous chapter, I have discussed bodily perceptual intentionality
regarding gendered movements and inhabitation of space. As patterns of movement, our
habitual intentionalities are a way of being in the world, to walk like a woman or look
like a man. Sensory capacities are not separable or distinct functions but are always
interrelated and implicated in each other.31 Interrelated subversions and crossings of
socially habituated gendered perceptual alignments can be seen, for example, in 19 th
century European perceptual orientations of gender and smoking. Smoking as male
bodily movement, a visual, tactile, oral, and olfactory perceptual extension, was a
bourgeois male social habit, a way of being a man and with men in the world. Extending
male bodies through smoke was a bodily movement grounded by tacit knowledges of
masculine assertiveness and supporting emerging meaning regarding male vitality.
Women who took up smoking were perceived and described to “smoke like a man,” or if
a wife was found smelling of smoke, she was perceived as crossing female wifely
perceptual alignments and accused of marital unfaithfulness (to smell like smoke
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Classen, Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures, 47-48,59.
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indicating a woman must have been penetrated olfactorily and bodily by another man; or
to take up smoking behind the husband’s back would indicate crossing gendered and
sexed lines of habituation). Smoking as a bodily habit involving touching,
inhaling/exhaling, smelling, and visually extending through smoking projectiles was not
only a way to depict and represent sexuality (with advertisements and literary productions
depicting sexual meanings through depictions of smoking), but actually involved
complex and interrelated bodily perceptual movements sedimenting gender and
sexuality.32
We have seen thus far in the examples of historical differences how different
perceptual intentionalities (like temperature and odor) were gendered bodily movements
which brought about meaning emerging with bodies and bodily functions. Gendered
intentionality, like the co-existing “I cannot” with the general “I can” of someone, for
European medieval or nineteenth century women, had thermal, tactile and/or olfactory
dimensions not easily grasped today (though not completely without connections to, and
thus conceptual understanding within, our current perceptual orientations). For example,
female self-perception as effect and mechanism of perceptually produced gender
differences includes a female bodily intentionality in which a body schema is shaped into
a gendered body image which contains an “I cannot bodily extend through my smell, or
my touch through _____ or other than _____” because it crosses lines of bodily
intentionality which orient male subjectivity or threatens the bodily perceptual extension
of bodily possibilities, of an “I can” reserved for male bodies.
32
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Female subjects in pre-modern times emerge as bodies more than just visually
extending into space through recognized physical bodily movements. For example,
embodied olfactory habits are acquired knowledges “in the nose,” tacit understandings of
what odors are given to me, what scents my body is capable of, and tacit knowledges
about my environment and others according to olfactory emergences. The body schema,
the blueprint informing and configuring specific ways of being in the world, involves
ways of knowing herself as a body with certain odors and temperatures which affect her
being in the world, and the meaning of her movements in/as her body and in her
environment. The perceptual grid aligning bodies with gender and morality as well as
social status includes olfactory, tactile, and thermal orienting lines guiding bodily
movements and creating bodily connections.33
To complexly consider bodily perception as orientation, as being oriented towards
possible tasks and ways of achieving objectives, then, requires extending our
understanding of bodily facing something beyond eyeing something. I have discussed
thus far how bodies might be positioned as gendered in space and time in a variety of
perceptual modes, through seeing, smelling or thermal feeling. Perceptual processes,
however, should not be solely understood through considering perceptual capacities
separately (though the differentiation of senses has served as an illustrative point thus
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far). We always perceive within an interplay of perceptual processes: I smell what I see
what I might touch and hear.
We can imagine this connection conceptually. As I have argued in the previous
chapter, my body schema, the tacit sense of my bodily “I can,” comes about through
bodily perceptual movement. My bodily intentionality and body schema always situate
me as a bodily unit. I experience as body-unit because my bodily movements are
coordinated so that my various bodily parts cohere. And since my perceptual capacities
are bodily movements, I perceive as body-unit with cohering and interrelating perceptual
capacities (as well as perceptual capacities interrelating with other bodily functions and
abilities).
Put differently again, my bodily perceptual schema, to which my perceptions
cohere and within which they are coordinated, functions as a perceptual unit. To imagine
this through illustrations, we might express: I see snow and have a tacit sense of its
coldness; I hear the soup on the stove come to a boil and tacitly sense its heat; I hear a
loud, low voice behind me and tacitly feel where it may come from and tacitly “see” a
large man behind me (and it is in disconfirmation, not confirmation, of these tacit
perceptual schemata that something appears surprising to me).
I highlight this aspect of perceptual interrelations because some of the examples I
will provide below will not only include differences in perceptual orientations in regards
to gender; the cross-cultural comparisons presented will also bring to our attention
complex interrelations and sensory coordination in perceptual orders different from our
own. As “sensory travelers,” this may help us raise questions regarding interrelations in
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our own perceptual orientations, which perceptual capacities might support, contribute to,
or even be in creative and ambiguous tension with our world we see.
Gendered Perceptual Intentionality: Cultural Differences
When considering cross-cultural differences in perceptual ordering, it is important
to remember that dominating perceptual concepts and structures are not universal givens.
In other words, in patriarchal Western cultures, gender might often be a subsuming
concept structuring socio-cultural institutions and personal relations. Yet this might not
be the case in other cultural/perceptual systems.
For example, in indigenous Latin American cultures, we are able to find thermal
bodily orientations. The Tzotzil of the Chiapas highlands of Mexico consider heat the
basic force of the universe, ordering space and time.34 We might detect gendered thermal
alignments among the Tzotzil which appear to be similar lines as the medieval European
ones discussed above (men possessing more heat than women), but we need to consider
heat as an overarching perceptual orientation (i.e., subsuming gender and other concepts).
While public spheres are male dominated and land ownership is aligned
patrilinearly, to label such gender divisions as patriarchal might be a misnomer, or to seek
understanding from Western gendered perspectives might be misguided, as it grounds
observations of difference in Western habituated perceptions of social dynamics. For
example, women and female powers are associated with beginnings, endings, and chief
agents in transitional and critical moments in the life cycle and historical cycles. Yet
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these cycles (daily, seasonally, yearly, etc.), while displaying gender valences, are
thermal cosmologies forming the pre-reflective, deeply embedded decision-making
schema, the sedimented socio-cultural habit from which present actions emerge and are
accounted for.35
Thermal lines pervade all areas of life such as food, education, gendered relations,
communal architecture, infrastructure, and political structures. Everything from rocks,
plants, foods, animals, and humans to ceremonies, rituals and symbols possesses a degree
of heat, the basic force of the universe. Newborns of either gender possess little innate
heat and are bathed in warm water, wrapped in blankets and presented with “hot” peppers
until they have acquired enough life/heat of their own to survive. Heat is felt throughout
the Tzotzil body: as the dominant perceptual orientation, it structures bodily orientations
towards specific foods (imbued with different thermal values) and social relations
(exchanges of heat).36
Gendered bodily perceptual intentionality is aligned through thermal orienting
lines: women sitting on the (cold) earth, walking barefoot, men sitting elevated, closer to
the heat-force in the sky, and wearing sandals, to maintain thermal alignments.
Occupying the world in thermal ways like this displays a gendered occupation of space.
But again, it is important to note that the thermal value of objects or meaning of bodily
intentionality is not aligned with gender first and then repeated through thermal
perceptual orientations. Rather, thermal schemas run through the environment, connect
35
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bodies and world, and align bodies and objects in ways that structure and gender bodily
intentionalities. Heat and gender are not reducible to each other; women do not sit on the
floor because they are women, but their bodies are thermally aligned with the earth and
from that alignment they perceptually emerge as cold/woman.
As visualist travelers, oriented to visual hierarchies (e.g. up over down), at first
sight we might perceive meaning emerging according to our pre-reflective perceptual
orientation: We might perceive women as valued less than men as we observe social
habits. However, meanings emerging for the Tzotzil (and possibly perceivable in our
imagination now) align earth, darkness, waning heat, with the feminine as creative force,
with reproductive capacity. The bodily positioning of women emerges perceptually in
alignment with certain seasons and creative and revitalizing periods in a life or
community’s history. 37
Thermal perception, as perceptual intentionality—bodily movement extending us
into the world—is a culturally different perceptual orientation than that of Western
knowledge of heat as a proximal perception aligned with touch. For the Tzotzil, thermal
perception is a sense extended through the whole body (not just parts of it), and the heat
extended in working, the eating of hot and cold foods, the movement of temperature
throughout the day, the positioning of bodies and objects around heat sources in the
home, the movement of heat through the material social body, etc., constitutes the
emerging perceived meanings in the world, gendered bodies being one of them. The
Tzotzil body schema can be imagined like a blueprint on thermal fabric—the tacit
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knowledge of how a Tzotzil moves in the world, the sense of bodily unity, the meaning of
movement and postures in a given environment, is a tacit sense of thermal dispositions
and capacities.
As a Western subject, my tacit understanding of my own situatedness as/in my
body in my environment might be informed by a tacit visual sense. For example, I have a
tacit knowledge of how I may navigate through a building with various kinds of doors
and winding hallways, because I have a tacit visual and interrelated physical-tactile sense
of what this navigation might entail (I know if I will fit through a door and how). This
might even include bodily extensions, so when I carry a backpack, hold an umbrella, or
walk my dog on a leash, I have a tacit sense of how to chart a path to reach my goal, and
how to adjust my bodily posture to, for example, enter through a door.
I may find it difficult to conceive, possibly because of my tacit knowledge
dominated by visual perception, how a Tzotzil might be oriented to the world through
tacit bodily perceptual knowledges. I do not have a dominant tacit thermal sense or any
habituated movements which allow me to know myself and the world through
temperature, how I as body-heat move and extend, am obstructed or challenged; I have
no innate understanding of thermally inhabiting my environment and the thermal
meanings emerging in and with my environment.
Another cultural comparison can be made with the Ongee in Southeast Asia who
also inhabit a world differently perceptually organized from Western hierarchies, namely
through olfactory intentionalities. The Ongee consider the identifying characteristic of
life force to reside in smell. Smell is the fundamental cosmic principle: even time is
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conceived of as cycles of smell, and the calendar is a calendar of scents. References to the
self are made through pointing at the nose, as the identity of every living being is
composed of smells, and disruptions in bodily functions (e.g., illness) are conceived as
imbalances of odor, with death being the loss of personal odor. Personal growth is
marked and symbolized through olfactory development, and social relations are
expressed and limited through customs and rituals concerning odor control/flow. 38
For Ongee perceptual intentionality, odor is not an elusive, intangible sensation,
but rather one that has a weight and must be regulated. Women’s bodily capacity for
menstruation is a natural means of odor-weight regulation, whereas men are more prone
to olfactory imbalances. Monitoring of olfactory bodily intentionality thus has different
techniques aligned with sexed/gendered bodies.39 Again, gendered bodily perceptual
orientation is not a visual extension, though a visualist observer notices gendered patterns
of bodily decoration through Ongee habits of clay body paint and tends to interpret these
bodily perceptual practices as images and visual symbols of social status. But rather, clay
paint body “decoration” is an odor control act: application of clay paint is understood as
regulating temperature in order to bind smell to the body and also altering the perceptual
intentionality, the release of smell, in particular ways. 40
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As we try to untangle gendered bodily intentionality from our modern Western
perceptual perspectives, we find that olfactory bodily orientations differ from our
habituated perceptions of conception, pregnancy, and childbirth: Ongee women conceive
by eating food substances in which a spirit is trapped, and the spirit released from the
food in the act of consumption becomes a fetus. This spirit resides in the bones of a
human being and at night gathers odors scattered by the individual during the day to
enable continued life.41
Bodily perceptual orientations of gendered desire also cannot be understood
through perceptual symbolism that privileges sight (such as a Freudian Oedipus complex
or a Lacanian mirror image would have us do). Attraction and desire, while including
adorning and ornamental practices, are orientations and manipulations of scent within an
olfactory perceptual grid, establishing, aligning, controlling and regulating odors. This is
of course not to indicate that odor is the only bodily perceptual extension regulating
Ongee life. Sensory perceptions intermingle and interact (we will explore perceptual
interdependencies below), though perceptual orientations may be formed with
hierarchies, or better, preferences of one/some perceptual ability informing others.
The preferred couplings among Ongee, for example, are unions between the two
principal groups of their society, turtle hunters (associated with the seaside and its smells)
and pig hunters (associated with the forest and its odors). Turtle hunters are those
perceptually extending with keen eye sight, pig hunters are aligned with superiority of
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hearing. Marriages between these two groups are preferred to establish a union of sight
and hearing, the alignment of these perceptual capacities following olfactory divisions of
land and sea. The marriage ceremony is a ritual of body painting—again aligning bodies
through aligning mutual olfactory desire, penetration and release of scent, if you will. 42
Directionality of bodily perceptional orientations which make some bodies
available for desire and others undesirable are then not primarily aligned within a
heteronormative grid ordering sexual bodies. Rather, sexual identities and erotic desires
are oriented through identities as pig hunters and turtle hunters, the recognition and
identification as sexual subject follows bodily olfactory motilities and is directed along
olfactory lines—habitually learned facing of the hetero-scented group. This is not to
imply that there are no gender divisions or no technologies to ensure heterosexual
couplings (in the sense of heterosexuality as perceived identity and bodily orientation).
Marriage is bodily movement of a man out of his clan’s territory into that of the woman’s
clan, but the meaning emerging is that of “hetero-odorous” couples, if you will.43
What I want to highlight in these examples is that, while we might understand and
agree with scholarly work highlighting the emergence of sexual identities, with modern
visualist accounts in academic inquiries, and with the social construction of gender within
heteronormative hegemonies, cross-cultural comparisons must be careful not to be
undertaken with preconceived hegemonic epistemological/perceptual hierarchies. This
would make it easy to subsume everything to an analysis perceiving gendered and sexual
42
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identities, without noting discrepancies in self-understanding, where, for example, gender
might not be a visually-oriented concept and might follow other socio-cultural bodily
orientations. The differences in bodily perceptual orientations, perceptual hierarchies and
alignments presented here are patterns of bodily and socio-cultural movement in the
world that indicate a different way of being in the world. To emerge as body within
different perceptual habitual schemata is to embody different tacit knowledges about
emerging meaning, socially meaningful communicative habits and repertoires.
Yet these examples, while they might appear alien to us, should also offer us
some understanding into our own bodily perceptual orientations and the perceptual
interplays at work. While I might be habituated to recognize gender visually, I might also
experience that certain aural extensions might “throw me off” or change the perceived
gendered meaning (e.g. speech patterns might change my perception of a masculine man
and the meaning emerging now is that of an effeminate gay man). Or I catch a scent as I
move around the hall corner and expect to see a man, yet it is a woman extending in
perfumed ways usually aligned with men and men’s scent products. Modern Western
perceptual orientations towards gender are aligned in a myriad of perceptual ways and
interrelations, though we tend to “forget” and only “remember” when we perceive things
“out of line” with the given dominant sense in our meaning making.
Perceiving Others’ Bodies Differently
Returning to sedimented habits of perception more explicitly again, I will now
comparatively present differences in perceptual emergence of bodies that are other
against a pre-reflective current into which those aligned with bodily and social habits of
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perceptual movement blend in as same. By doing so, I hope to continue unfolding our
understanding of sensory differences and perceptual interdependencies/interrelations in
bodily perceptual orientations in the world. While a specific perceptual capacity might be
dominant, other bodily perceptual capacities are interrelated and implicated in it, or might
come to be dominant in other realms of experience or meaning. Maintaining the rhythm
of this chapter, I will begin with exploring historical contexts before traveling again to
culturally different sites.
Sensory Interdependencies/Interplays in Historical Perceiving of Raced Bodies
Pre-modern and modern articulations of racial differences were not simply cast
visually, associating the darkness of skin color with the supposed “darkness” of human
nature in the racially different person. Mark Smith’s sensory history of race in the United
States shows how racial identities have been mediated and articulated through sound,
smell, taste and touch, not only before, but especially with the emergence of modern
racial stereotypes. Increase in racially mixed populations began in the colonial period and
made clearly defined racial identities unstable, and one could no longer rely on modern
eyes to verify visual racial identities. The preference for visual detection of race is as
much a socio-cultural construction as race itself, and as visual orienting lines of
white/black lost their potency, the techniques and work of perceptual repetitions of race
needed to transform to maintain the mediation and articulation of racial meaning. 44
Racial constructions and identifications increasingly relied on other senses as
detector of racial identifiers: innate body odor, animalistic sound and noises, tactile
44
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differences and ascribed blindness to moral offenses. The aforementioned Aristotelian
taxonomy and ranking of the senses guided the perceptual encounter of colonial elite
whites with black slaves, aligning black bodies with the lower senses: Black bodies were
perceived as emerging perceptually through the lower senses of smell, sound, and touch;
they were aligned with those senses in regards to their bodily intentionality, i.e., they
smelled different but also had a keener sense of smell.45
Because perceptual hierarchies are also employed in the emerging of class, one of
the complications in racial perception is the approximate material conditions—similar
oppressive and exploitative working conditions—of poor whites. The ensuing crisis
demanded “buffers,”46 which were bodily perceptually installed. Poor whites, too, were
aligned with, for example, malodor and poor taste on perceptual grids, but orienting lines
were dominated by the prevailing need for racial distinctions, thus perceptual values and
meanings were sensory interplays of vision and smell/sound/touch which maintained
racially segregated perceptual orientations. Put differently, while both might emit the
smell of a laboring person, poor whites still smelled, sounded, and sensed differently
from black slaves.
This material-perceptual segregation was partially accomplished through the
alignment of certain bodies with the power to suspend or cross perceptual orientation
lines. White bodies were aligned with the power to cross racial lines and sound or look
like a black body, and to act on the desire for black bodies by suspending prohibitions of
45
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touch (a power more often than not embodied through brutal violence).47 But where
visual alignments of whiteness and blackness were challenged or subverted by black
slaves “passing” as white, aural markers were important interrelated perceptual
extensions; to pass visually as white, one needed to also pass with “white sounds” in
order to be seen as white.48
Pre-reflective currents supporting racial perception shifted, in this case, for
example, from an industrialized agricultural economy and political assemblages of a
union of states encountering an abolitionist threat to national unity to a postbellum nation
under reconstruction and struggling with waves of immigration. These currents provided
the ground for the sedimentation of habits so that bodily movements and alignments of
perception and movement emerged with racial meanings. Sediment history and sediment
bodily socio-cultural habits established perceptual perspectives, which are open to change
and choice as they are feeding into conventionalized forms of conduct, such as racial
perceptions and alignments. The end of slavery, then, did not initiate an end to perceptual
segregation; rather, physical/sensory intimacy of racial bodies was regulated through
fluid perceptual alignments (not consistently following a strict logic), with the power and
authority to draw orienting lines in the perceptual grasp of white bodies.49
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Racial perception, sedimented habit supported by the strong currents of, for
example, political desire for nationhood and economic expansion, is a perceptual
alignment and reference already socially established.50 The instability of perceptual
meaning, then, can also allow for not just individual choice or expression, but changing
sediment habits regarding perceptual movements. When visual alignments of racial
bodies led to increased ambiguous emergences—such as interracial coupling producing a
variety of skin hues—other perceptual capacities and mechanisms may support or replace
the perceptual “deficiency” of vision to maintain racial alignments. In other words, when
vision fails to support meaningful emergence of race, touch, odor, and sound may
become the perceptual habits to conform to sedimented social habits and tacit
knowledges. The meaning emerging perceptually is indeterminate and ambiguous in two
ways: The perceived meaning of hair (texture, style, etc.), sound of speech, or body odor
is indeterminate and may allow for emergence of a classed or raced body; or the
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emerging perception of, for example, a raced body might be tacitly known through a
perceptual extension previously “insensitive” or “not sensing” of race. 51
The currents supporting orienting lines of modern racial segregation, then, up to
the contemporary industrial prison complex segregating racial bodies, are the products of
repetitive and adjustable perceptual alignments and bodily movements, perceptual
orientation of our attention to say, crime and/or violence (the perceived moral inferiority
of a racialized group).52 The orienting lines of race may be violently enforced, though
again, crossing perceptual lines was also a perceptual control and extension of power:
threats and acts of lynching enforced racial orienting lines by prohibiting a black man
crossing perceptually by touching a white woman (or being perceived to have touched
her); the act of lynching itself was a violent suspension of rules regulating sensory
proximity and alignments. Gender differences were also significant in this complex
perceptual alignment, as interracial touch was permissible between men in organized
violent encounters such as boxing; white men could rape black female bodies without
legal consequence, but black male bodies perceived as touching a white woman
embodied a manifold transgression into the perceptual domain of touch inhabited by
white males.53
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The repetitions of racial perceptions played out in various sensory realms, though
the perceptual orientation directing bodies to perceive raced meanings occludes the
thickening sedimentations of white supremacists’ heteronormative patriarchy, a current
which supports efforts to align economic, political, social, cultural, religious, etc., capital
and desire along racial lines “naturally”. Sediment perceptual habits then worked to give
rise to alignments of social interactions, as segregation, legal decisions and social
activities were ordered using perceptual qualifications that were racially aligned:
segregating railroad cars aligning bodies socially through haptic, olfactory, and auditory
orientations.54
The example of smoking can also illustrate again the power of bodily perceptual
orientations and sediment habits regarding difference: Spanish Jews, who had been
expulsed from Spain in 1492, were visible outsiders to the European cities to which they
migrated and had a positive association with smoking by way of the Spanish trade of still
exotic tobacco. Jewish acculturation and unstable visible perceptual identifiers, however,
necessitated new perceptual habits to support racial orienting lines. The alleged
connection between smoking and Jewishness was supported by sedimenting social habits
of racialization, the racial essence of Jewishness perceptually emerging through the
sensory qualities of tobacco consumption. The racialized pathologizing in Anti-Semite
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discourse of modern Europe sedimented in part as social bodily habit after communal
desegregation, so that smoking aligned perception of innate physically and
psychologically different Jewish bodies.55
The sensory aspects of smoking, then, also highlight the interplay of perceptual
capacities, and that an interrelation of sensory impressions and values may be conflictual
or contradictory within perceptual habits, effecting reordering and changing in perceptual
interrelations and meanings. If a person passes as white but doesn’t sound “right” or
smell/look “right,” perceptual habits can change and be reordered so that aural, olfactory
or tactile perceptions guide or dominate bodily perceptual orientations towards certain
bodies’s emerging.
In underestimating the bodily perceptual orientations to, for example, race so
thoroughly sedimented in the contemporary context of US social habits, we risk missing
the force of Paul Gilroy’s argument of the “continuing dangers of race-thinking,” or as I
may put it now, race-knowing, or race-sensing. Gilroy, like Smith, shows that the
powerful appeal of “occult, militaristic, and essentialist theories that are currently so
popular, should be seen as symptoms of a loss of certainty around ‘race.’”56 While we
might assert that in 21st century US society race seems more unstable than ever, bodily
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perceptual orientations to race still operate, for example, in biomedical sciences,
perceiving and seeking to confirm genetics through visual racial alignments, employing a
gaze penetrating raced skin to align raced bodies on microscopic and molecular levels
(though increasingly confirming the opposite, namely the inability to uphold racial
patterns in genetic alignments).57
“There is no raw, untrained perception dwelling in the body. The human
sensorium has had to be educated to the appreciation of racial differences. When it comes
to the visualization of discrete racial groups, a great deal of fine-tuning has been
required.”58 This education, as Mark Smith’s work shows, has a long sediment history of
social habits training bodily perceptual orientations beyond visual imagery, including a
full-body sensorium. To come to terms with the persistence of racial imaginations is to
heed the perceptual construction of race and otherness in multi-perceptual dimensions.
Sensory Interdependencies/Interplays and Cultural Differences
I hope to show in this section how it is necessary to conceive of bodily perceptual
orientations and habituated ways of perceiving as ways of thinking and knowing, as
epistemological schemata. Knowing difference differently, or knowing what is same and
other differently, can help us conceive of ways in which otherness or strangeness may be
aligned in ways strange to visual determinations of, for example, race. This might help to
further critiques of dominant discourses on race, which construct theories of race based
on physical criteria. Critical race theorists, for example, theorize race as social
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construction, dynamic and fluid, and racial grouping as binding together social groups of
people loosely sharing historically contingent, socially significant elements of geography,
morphology and/or ancestry.59 To understand the sediment of social habit as grounding
various dimensions of our perceptual experience and bodily habits might further our
understanding of the bodily and socio-cultural forces supporting and maintaining
structural barriers, ideologies, and individual actions (which, as we have explored, are
always bodily habits and bodily extensions shaped by perceptual orientations).
The exploration of sediment habits and bodily perceptual orientations towards
race in this section as well as in the previous chapter demonstrated a linking of racial
perception to visual recognition. The modern concept of race worked in the visible realm,
a learned ability which needed support from or transformation through other perceptual
realms when visual perception alone was not sufficient in upholding the stabilization of
indeterminate racial categories. I have shown above how non-visual perceptual capacities
are interrelated with it and support recognition of emerging black or Jewish bodies.
However, as might have become clear, it is not by accident that race and visual
perception emerge together. The meaning of race aligned with visual markers of skin
hues emerged when currents of rationalism, Enlightenment philosophies, scientific
objectivism, and colonial expansion sedimented perceptual schema. The bodily
emergence of race and its meaning therefore could not but emerge as a Western visuallydominated perceptual habit. Cartography and other scientific tools of measuring and
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recording were perceptual tools sedimenting vision (and images, photography, textuality)
as intellectual, civilized, and “white” perceptual activities. And while vision might have
been and continue to be the culturally prominent sensory field, it operated interactively
with other perceptual domains, not least to map out and test the “lower” senses of
“primitive” people, their olfactory, tactile, and aural capacities.60
To better understand these dynamics regarding tacit knowledges of racial
otherness and sedimented habits regarding racial perception, it will be useful to make
cross-cultural comparisons. To do this beneficially, I must shift my language here and
explore the perception of socio-cultural “others” in order to gain a more complex
understanding of what perception of others within a differently ordered structure of
bodily perceptual orientations might show us.61 How might otherness be perceived if it is
not something that hits the insider’s eye? 62
To bring up a comparison through olfaction again, a culturally different example
can be found in the Tukano-speaking tribes in the Amazon, which show a complex
60
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perceptual order and hierarchy. Cosmology and social life are structured through
interrelations of color, odor, temperature, and flavor. Odor for example is a combination
of color and temperature and makes up perceptual alignments of people, animals, and
plants, for example, different odors function as a marker of tribal identity and territory.
All members of a tribe are understood to share the same general body odor, the word for
which can be translated into sympathy or tribal feeling. This shared body odor is
considered to be caused by the different food customs and to mark territorial boundaries
through distinct odor trails. The different odors also have specific symbolic associations
which serve to order intertribal relations.63
Olfactory identifications and divisions may also be found among the Dassanetch
of Southwestern Ethiopia. Bodily orientations to odor include that humans, who are
considered naturally inodorate, acquire their particular smell through inhabitation of
particular environments, thus Dassanetch social groups are identified with the odor of the
species of animals a respective group depends on (fish or cattle). Odors of fish and
associated scents then not only emerge as malodorous to pastoralists, but fish and
fishermen emerge as alien, foreign to the community, outside of cycles of creation and
community life.64
These are not simply superstitious attitudes or mythical beliefs, but bodily
perceptual orientations towards sameness and otherness. If race appears as a dynamic and
fluid meaning, attaching to a group of people sharing socially significant elements of
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amongst other things, morphology, ancestry, and geography, then we need to understand
how these markers may be perceived through means other than visual means:
Morphology, ancestry, and geography may be perceived olfactorily or aurally rather than
being visually mapped or textualized, and may depend on cultural habituation rather than
genetic tracing.
For example, soundscapes (sounds arising in a specific environment) in Israel
create networks of belonging and identity, socially shaped sounds which serve for
perceptual movements and meanings of group identification.65 Publically performed
sounds collect certain people around common interests and highlight cultural and
political differentiation: popular radio music on Jewish radio stations invokes not only
nostalgia, but traces origin through Slavic melodies and seeks to unite Jewish identity as
it also perceptually excludes the ancestry of half the Jewish population from African and
Near Eastern countries; sirens signaling emergencies and alien hostilities direct and
require a homogenous and ritualized performance of a unified national population (all are
threatened, all act out protective measures, strengthening performance of state and
citizenship); Muslim prayers offered in mosques and via loudspeakers are aural and
bodily movements uniting the participants and aligning Muslim identity, sounds which to
others might emerge as noise, disturbance, and potential perceptual signal of mobilizing
political action against the state.66
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National belonging and ethnic and racial otherness here perceptually emerge via
sound and connected bodily and social movements. In neighborhoods where Jews,
Muslims, and Christians dwell together, the sounds of daily prayer or church bells on
religious holidays signal the presence of group belonging. Otherness also perceptually
emerges in connection with these sounds; those not preparing for prayer, or those not
bodily observing the Sabbath, perceptually emerge foreign and other.
Below, in the third section of this chapter, I will again turn to the concept of
normalcy. Like the sounds described above, the same sounds in different ears may either
create a sense of group belonging or a sense of otherness/group distinction. In regards to
normalcy, definitions and conceptions of normal may either create a sense or desire for
belonging (to “normal”) or a sense of otherness. Understanding changes and
transformations of “normal” in other contexts will help us understand how our own
perception of ourselves in regards to (or as) normal might require re-conceptualization.
Perceiving Normalcy Differently
In the previous chapter, we explored how language may relate to perception by
investigating language as sediment bodily habit, using “normalcy” as pivot point. Below,
I will provide some historical and cultural examples in order to provide us with a more
complex understanding of how sedimentation of habits and corporeally and socially
embedded language connect to our bodily perceptual orientations in the world. This will
help us understand further how language is not simply a referent to bodily experience
with fixed and determinate meanings, nor a disembodied discursive power shaping
thought and materialization of bodies without itself being embedded in bodily
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experiences. Rather, language, like perception, is embedded in the body/world/culture
complexity; it emerges from it and is implicated in our linguistic experiences in it, its
meanings indeterminate and emerging in body/world/culture contexts that are historically
and culturally contingent.
In the previous chapter, I have explored sedimentations of racial perception and
outlined how a pre-reflective current of colonialism and nationalism might have
supported the emergence of racial bodies and their perceptual alignments. Below, I will
once again first explore historical examples of differences in language and perceptual
orientations towards deafness, particularly through investigating the (changing) prereflective currents supporting (changing) perceptual alignments of deaf bodies. I will then
provide us with cross-cultural examples of wellness/illness related to perceptual
orientations and language.
Historical Perceptions and Habitual Sedimentation of Normalcy
Inquiring into the origins of perceiving disabled bodies, Lennard J. Davis
advances that “normalcy” as a concept constructed the problem of bodily difference
labeled “disability.” As a construction, it is not a universally perceived condition but has
a history, a social process, a gathered background, which led to the perceptual emergence
of disabled bodies in a certain kind of society at a certain time.67
Davis describes the emergence of the idea of the “norm,” and with this perceptual
concept the socio-cultural imperative of “normalcy” in the Euro-Western world. The
word “norm” as sign had signified something “perpendicular” with reference to a
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carpenter’s square in the early 19th century. The word “normal” as referring to a
conforming to a common type only entered the English language in the mid 1900’s. The
rise of objective (and objectifying) sciences and industrialization connected perceptual
orientations of bodies with generalized notions of normal as imperative through repetitive
gestures in various socio-cultural arenas. For example, using medical data compiled in
the new field of statistics, generating an “average” body as exemplar of normal life and
the normal worker.68
Medical, political, and mathematical science, economics and social science, all
repeat habitual gestures which sediment “normal” as a concept and as language in
reference to bodies, implying the imperative and desirability of normalcy over against the
undesirability of difference and deviance: The scientific notion of average or middle
develops into a philosophical justification for the mean position of the bourgeoisie in the
great order of things;69 the notion of an average human supports and justifies Marxian
theories of average workers and average wages and thus average human value; 70 and the
68
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notion of average human capacities supports and justifies the demand, need, and moral
imperative of surveying, controlling, and eliminating individual deviances for the sake of
the normalcy of the community. 71
Cultural scientific tools such as fingerprinting and genetics embed into these
perceptions of corporeal normalcy ideas and concepts such as heredity and identifiable
essential differences: bodily perceptions become cues for a coinciding identity located in
perceivable bodily differences. Perceived bodies are not identical with a presented
identity, and this identity may be unchangeable and indelible. In connection with notions
of deviance as undesirable existence against the norm, bodily perceptual orientations
aligned irrepressible physical or mental qualities with moral qualities identified and
possibly criminalized. Bodily perceptual orientations in the modern industrial West
loosely aligned what we now call disability with criminal activity, mental incompetence,
sexual license, etc., a legacy still influencing perceptual emergence of meaning today. 72
Yet “normal” as perceptual habit remains ambiguous and indeterminate, and so is
the use of “normal” as linguistic habit: When normal comes to be perceived as “ideal,” as
the imperative towards which human progress must align, the problems of extremes as
well as the apophatic definition (defining normal through its negative, through
determining abnormal) of “normalcy” demand supplementation through other notions
71
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and demand the continuation of the work of repetition. This leaves “normal” caught up in
the evolution of nature and culture. To elaborate: If normal (as in “common” or
“average”) is the ideal, then extreme deviation comes to be undesirable. Yet with notions
of progress, human perfectability, and perceptual preferences already connected to
perceptual orientations, processes of ranking supplement the ideology of normalcy to
perceive of the normal as always moving towards one end of the spectrum, not the other.
For example, higher than average intelligence is perceived today as preferable to lower
than average intelligence, therefore normal is perceptually aligned leaning towards
perceiving lower intellectual capacities as deviant abnormal, whereas higher intellectual
capacities come to be perceived as desirable hopefully soon-to-be normal.73 In
conjunction with solving the problem of extremes by substituting ranking for averaging,
notions of progress and human perfectibility sediment ideologies of normalcy and
produce habits of elimination of deviance in favor of a dominating hegemonic perceptual
vision of a normal—“must be”—human body.74 “Normal” in reference to desirable body
types is caught up in how human bodies adjust to changing environments and how
cultural images of normal health or beauty transform over time.
The habit of perceiving normalcy is embedded in linguistic habits. For example, a
bodily perceptual orientation of a deaf person extends bodily in reference to this
individual bodily incarnation and through bodily movements and capacities within the
given bodily perceptual capacities and orientation. Yet when the meaning of “normal
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human body” emerges as a perceptual fully capable body, then the absence of hearing is
perceived and linguistically expressed as lack of hearing, or as sensory abnormality.
Scientific and economic efforts as bodily movements then are geared towards “fixing”
this abnormality or towards “restoring” normal hearing.75
The pre-reflective currents supporting the perception of deaf bodies and the
emergence of meaning can change, and with it the linguistic signs referring to deafness,
and the bodily perceptual orientation to/of deaf bodies. As with gender and race, deafness
involves a perceived physical difference, yet the meaning emerging is subject to change
and transformation, meaning embedded in socio-cultural dynamics as much as corporeal
ones. For example, until the middle of the nineteenth century, moral models of
personhood defined deafness as a physical condition that isolated the person from the
Christian community. Deafness, as affliction and blessing, was a separation from the
“light” of the gospel (which needed to be heard), yet was also perceived as an ignorance
of the “darkness” of the world. Innocence and ignorance of deafness were compared to
virginity and barrenness (the blessing of virginal innocence becomes the curse of
barrenness if not lifted from that state). Sign language became the educational (visual
gestural) device to perceptually align deaf bodies with the values of a Christian
community.76
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Yet currents of nationhood and the building of the national body (see also the
section on race in chapter three) then support the shifting of meanings regarding deafness,
aligning the emergence of bodies with national desires. To be deaf then perceptually
emerged as a physical impairment (not primarily a moral sign or insufficiency) which cut
off the person from English-speaking American culture; the tragedy was no more the loss
of salvation via the hearing of the gospel, but the lack of national identity via the
participation in the hearing of America.77
This change can be traced in the sedimentation of language habits. As we
explored above, language has a corporeal dimension and sediments as corporeal reference
and habitually established meanings. A change in culturally habituated movements (e.g.,
nation building), then, is a change of a culture’s “being” in the world which then effects
the emerging meanings between body and world. Let me elaborate: The first schools for
deaf people in the United States were established during the Second Great Awakening.
Evangelical Protestant reformers established residential schools where deaf children were
brought together to receive a Christian education, teachers conducting education via
signed language in order to allow for knowledge, salvation and moral messages to be
“heard.” One significant effect of these residential schools for deaf persons is that it led to
the emergence of the Deaf, that is, the alignment of individuals with a cultural and
linguistic community. Previously separated individuals now began forming distinct

only come through moral reform of individual members. A certain duality was at work though, as physical
impairment, though located in the individual, would emerge as holding moral meaning for the community,
either as affliction or possession by evil forces, or as blessing and divine message. Creamer, 19.
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communities, sharing a history and identity, embracing a common language and common
experience.78
However, as the unity of the national body became an important bodily
orientation, the separation and perceived isolation of deaf communities from the life of
the nation was increasingly perceived as troublesome, the assimilation into the national
body of greatest importance.79 The change in bodily and social habits regarding education
for deaf people was signaled with linguistic expressions referring to “progress” (the same
language referred to in the education of immigrants discussed above, and in the education
of American Indian children, to which I will turn below). Taking Davis’ conceptual
exploration of “progress” and “normal” into account, to progress as a national body,
citizen bodies must become “normal,” meaning they must be able to disappear behind
perceptual orienting lines of bodily abilities which aligned national citizenship. Progress
as a nation was then connected to the assimilation, the perceptual disappearance of
deafness into the national body and its sediment bodily and social habits, so that habits
changed to lip-reading and audible speech. We can see how differences regarding
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perceiving normalcy may be observed in historical contexts not too far removed from our
current time, and even undergo transformations within a lifetime.80
One might disagree with me and counter that nationalism and nation as political
phenomenon might have little to do with bodily differences and experiences such as
deafness. Yet, the issue of a common language—a common, or preferred shared
body/mind/world connection—is deeply embedded in the perceptual emergence of a
national people. Benedict Anderson, for example, points to the enforcement of a common
language through devices such as the printing press and through mechanisms of
capitalism (dissemination of printed language through the market); he argues that only a
common language was/is able to harness and enforce images of national character,
national entities, and national progress. 81
Emerging from this pre-reflective current of nationalism, then, are meanings of
deafness signaling an inability to assimilate into the national body. Bodily perceptual
orientations regarding hearing as normal were aligned through educational devices and
oralist ideologies (advocating for purely oral education for deaf people). While sign
80
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language as linguistic expression in deaf communities could not be undone, solely
manual education (through sign language and writing) was replaced by the early 20 th
century with nearly 80 percent of children taught entirely without sign language, being
taught through lip reading and speaking.82
Deafness as a marker of a community which does not require oral/aural
communication challenges the coherence of a national body which moves and extends
socially and culturally through a common language, a common bodily habit. Because
language itself is a set of congealed bodily and social practices shaping our way of being
in the world (as I have argued above), non-participation in the (national) language system
emerges as incoherent with social habits and movements. The meaning emerging is that
of misalignment with citizenship and dysfunctionality of bodily sociality. The threat of
D/deafness is that it may be unperceivable/invisible: unless a deaf person extends through
engagement in language, she does not emerge visually as deaf, engaging in “foreign”
language, inheriting a “different” culture, isolated from the “normal” life of the nation. 83
For example, Douglas Baynton shows how deaf persons were described as a collective
people, inferior, who were unable to exercise their citizenship unless they were made
“people of our language” (in reference to English and in support of suppressing sign
language). Deaf people were persons “without a country” needing to become members of
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a community with leaders and rulers, embodying the threat of foreignness, the offense of
using another language.84
Language as bodily movement and social habit, in this example swept up in the
pre-reflective current of nationalism, aligned deafness by the end of the 19 th century as a
physical condition with social meanings of deviance, a way of being in the world which
emerged out of place and in need of correction through social habituation, immersion into
the sediment cultural habits of spoken English language. The force of pre-reflective
currents supporting the emergence of specific meanings regarding bodily habits (such as
perceptually extending through sign language) is evident, for example, in late 19 th
century proposals of Deaf communities to found a separate state.85
What I want to draw our attention to, once more, is the significance of language
as corporeal and social. Tacit bodily knowledges and sediment social habits are
implicated in thought and language, but meaning (regarding the bodily aspects of the
social, and social aspects of the bodily) remains indeterminate and open to change.
Language, because of its corporeal and social dimensions, may support orientations to
and alignments of, for example, the national body and the movements and expressions of
this national body. Pre-reflective currents of nationalism supported bodily perceptual
orientations towards bodily capacities along lines of citizenship, and national common
language changed alignments of deafness from immorality to abnormality (changing
84
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from lack of hearing in reference to access to the gospel to inability to pass as English
hearing and speaking citizen). Deaf bodies failed to emerge as properly Christian, but the
emergent meaning changed to deaf bodies failing to represent normal nationality. Bodily
extensions of Deaf people, supported by currents of nationality, then extended through
tacit body knowledges regarding their cultural and historical belonging and
communicative bodily expressions (Deafness as culture and sedimented habit) and
through socially mediated perception of nationality shaping meaning and perceptual
habits (deafness as otherness in need of corrective alignment).86
Different Perceptions of Wellness/Illness Connected to “Normalcy”
When exploring the concept of normalcy in the previous chapter, I illustrated the
ways in which perceptual and linguistic habits regarding “normal” may sediment, for
example, through medical practices and descriptions. Michel Foucault’s investigation of
the medical gaze, the perceptual power of the modern medical eye, shows how seeing,
and a particular mode of seeing, comes to be a perceptual mechanism of culture,
reinforcing perceptual habits of body/mind dualisms.87 To find comparative clues as to
how different bodily perceptual orientations might emerge from differently habituated
ways of perceiving features considered common—though not necessarily obligatory, or
“normal,” as we will discover—I turn to explorations of cultural difference via what is
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often termed “traditional” (as in, not modern, not scientific or Western, likely inferior in
effectiveness) medicine and healing practices.
In his study regarding phenomenological aspects of Korean medicine, Kim
Taewoo highlights the non-universality of modern Western medicine, though the
sedimentation of the medical gaze in scientific bodily and linguistic habits also
sedimented ontological perceptions of human existence (particularly the body as object of
medical alteration).88 Modern medicine is a medicine of modernity, meaning that it
emerges as social practice habituated to seeing body and illness emerging in a certain
way, objectifying the ill body and distancing the medical expert. The medical practices
Kim observes in Korean contexts encompass a centrality of bodily knowing (rather than
observation applied to knowledge), a knowing achieved through bodily intentionalities,
through experiencing the other’s body in/through the body of the medical practitioner.
Experiences infer comprehension as body which can not necessarily be transmitted
verbally.89
For example, while color perception is an important part of diagnosis in Korean
medicine, skin hues in facial regions alerting to connected organs and their state of
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functioning (e.g., Yellow indicating an issue with the spleen and digestive issues), the
bodily experience of the Five Colors is more than a visual grasping, more than a finetuning of visual perception to detect changes in color. Rather, it is a bodily experience of
being in proximity to, for example, Blue, a bodily recognition of more than just seeing
color, but other visual significances, auditory sensations, and tactile perceptions. While
color as visual perception might indicate a medical objectivist gaze, Kim describes vision
here as a proximity sense, closely interrelated and significantly connected to other bodily
perceptual capacities. In the same trajectory, Blue or Yellow as conditions, then, are not
scientifically described or textualized in order to define a diagnosis. Color as a diagnostic
tool in various traditional Korean medicines is a bodily experience to acquire as habit,
and these habits, as patterns of movement, perceptually orient the practitioner’s body to
make use of tacit knowledges in bodily experiencing others. Linguistic references might
be used, but do not make up the dominant cultural habit of describing and defining
wellness/illness.90
The Anlo-Ewe people in West Africa can provide us with another comparative
example of perceiving well-being, one that might help us further understand the complex
bodily experience and corporeal/social dimensions of language. 91 Kathryn Geurts’
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anthropological study among the Anlo-Ewe revealed that Western linguistic and
conceptual classification of sensory perception was clearly an etic taxonomy when
observing perception in an Anlo-Ewe context.92 Touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight
revealed themselves clearly as linguistic and conceptual categories developed largely
within a Western European scientific tradition. While the Anlo-Ewe people use bodily
capacities (looking, listening, touching, tasting) to experience and know the world, these
perceptual modes did not sediment in linguistic expressions transferrable to traditional
Western categories. Linguistic signs translated into German or English as “sensing” do
not refer to Western categories of bodily experiences (e.g. sensing as touching), but rather
refer to “thing recognized,” “things that help us to know what is happening (on) to us,” or
“how you feel in your body.” Undifferentiated linguistic signs do not infer
undifferentiated bodily experiences; Anlo-Ewe “sensing” encompasses various bodily
experiences with which one can “feel in the body,” experiences including specific
physical sensations (e.g. tingling skin), or sensations considered non-physical, such as
heartache, inspiration, and intuition.93
Bodily movements, such as walking, are synesthetic and kinesthetic movements,
emerging as bodily-emotional extensions indicating morality. “Lugulugu,” for example, a
swaying bodily movement, may be a signifier for a person’s character or the manner of
University of California Press, 2002), 21. Geurts is also careful to highlight that this common language or
reference to a people group by no means represents uniform or homogenous social and cultural perceptions.
92

Etic and emic are terms used in anthropological studies: Etic refers to the use of categories,
distinctions, and concepts derived from the outsider’s point of view, emic refers to the use of categories,
rules, and concepts meaningful to people within a particular cultural tradition. Clifford Geertz, Local
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983), 56-57.
93

Geurts, 38-41. Geurts’ study is also an interesting investigation of cultures which do not
conceive of body/mind splits in ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological dimensions.

250

movement a road directs. To move lugulugu-ly is to experience the sensations of
lugulugu-ness, to embody lugulugu ways, think lugulugu-ly, and become a lugulugu
person, which is then again bodily experienced by others who perceive the lugulugu
walk. Lugulugu is not experienced and thus categorizable in separate spheres of
language, cognition, sensation, perception, culture, but in a synesthetic mode of knowing.
The bodily perceptual orientation of Anlo-Ewe people is that of moving and perceiving
and knowing as deeply intertwined bodily-moral-knowing persons.94
To repeat again, these cross-cultural examples are not instances of primitive (as in
less developed or inferior) habits, superstitious attitudes or mythical beliefs, but complex
bodily perceptual orientations towards embodied existence. Another example which is
useful in exploring the concept of normalcy via illness/wellness and highlighting the
interplay between various perceptual extensions is found in the Massim (indigenous to
Papua New Guinea), a complexly structured oral and olfactoral culture. Bodily
intentionality is embedded in Massim self-understanding. A person comes to be through
exteriorization; identity as such is not who one “is on the inside”, but how—and therefore
who—one extends to the outside, how one expands from the surface of the body. 95
In this bodily intentionality through which identity emerges, not sight or speech,
but smell and sound/hearing are ranked the most important transcendent movements.
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Odors penetrate bodies and consciousness, and adornment, clothing, and other
technologies of bodily intentionality in Massim culture always incorporate an important
odorizing element, and it is the fragrant elements of a ritual or other bodily practice
which are understood to hold the most potency. As perceptual extension and
epistemological venue, smell and sight are understood by the Massim as interrelated, but
it is odor, the olfactory expansion of a person’s presence, which determines one’s
appearance; to have a beautiful smell leads to appearing visually handsome. 96
Other bodily perceptual orientations involved in the intentionality of a person and
her perceptual movements involve primarily sound (though not language/speech). The
objects used as medium for bodily extension (e.g. shells) are valued for the acoustic and
kinetic effects they produce (as opposed to visual value). As previously mentioned, it is
through expansion that the Massim self perceptually emerges, thus it is in the giving
away of valued objects that a Massim person matures and is aligned perceptually with
social recognition and status. Objects given away bodily extend a person acoustically,
and the value attached to the audio qualities is indicative and constitutive of the value of
the person who gave them away. 97 The object’s value perceptually emerges via its
mobility (sound travels as the object travels), and this relates to how persons become
intelligible in Massim culture: Bodily perceptual orientation as condition for the Massim
96
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subject manifests in auditory and olfactory extensions in space and time, sounds and odor
are superior perceptual movements (as they can travel across distance and/or when vision
is obstructed).98
To develop normally, or to mature well, is to progress from visual realms to aural
realms, to establish oneself as a “name,” rather than a visual image, or face. The extent of
mobility of a person’s sounds determines a person’s “existence.” In other words, to be
visually perceived is “not to be”; only as a “name,” as a person who is heard, one
emerges in a community, in the ears of the beholders. To further elaborate: What Western
eyes may perceive as visual body decorations (such as feather ornamentation or skin
treatments with coconut oil) are aural devices which augment the power of a person’s
speech and sound. The actual speaking (greetings, incantations, spells) is embedded in a
language system in which bodily capacities for speech involve bodily habits of sounding
speech. Onomatopoeic expressions (e.g., “tudududu” for “roll of thunder”), when
sounded out, bring about material and perceptual transformations (e.g., an object is
transformed into a sound). But where Western interpretations of this phrase explained
tudududu as metaphorical use of language, an aural perspective can help us understand
that it is not in metaphorical meaning, but in acoustic amplification, in aural performance,
that language is employed.99
Wellness and illness then need to be understood within these bodily perceptual
orientations in the world. Bodily perceptual extensions through sounds and smell are not
98
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only ways to emerge “larger than life”—to intensify a person’s presence and increase
social value—they also align perceptions of a person’s social competence and alignment
with community values. Inability to hear, bodily or metaphorically, is to be unable to be
socialized and align with the oral extensions of family; it is to go mad or insane. 100
Because for Massim, bodily perception is conceived of as production of effects in
others (rather than the reception of incoming stimuli from others), to not hear others is to
not be in line with the expansion of family and community. Insanity is linguistically
signified with a word also translatable as “deaf,” though hearing does not equate
knowing. Again, because social values are aligned with bodily perceptual extensions, the
intellect, the seat of the “mind” is located in the throat, the bodily organ from which one
speaks. For something to be known, even by oneself, it must be voiced and heard; to
think and understand involves speaking and hearing oneself talk. To be incapable of
social knowledges then is to be incapable of hearing and/or speaking; but not as Western
prejudice regarding a person deaf or mute would have it, inferring an incapability to think
from inabilities to voice thought or hear others speak their thoughts. Rather, thinking is
sound-thinking, the intake of noise-force (knowledge) and the ability to extend it outward
again (because to “keep something inside” is just as anti-social and “insane” as being
unable to connect with others’ oral or olfactory extensions). 101
My last example, more expressly again concerning illness/wellness, comes from
Thomas J. Csordas’ study of healing and embodiment, which describes differences in

100

Ibid., 114.

101

Ibid., 116-117.

254

reasoning regarding illness between Anglo-American cultural perceptions and Navajo
alignments of illness. Where Anglo-American concerns regarding cancer are determined
by Western scientific medical perceptions oriented towards diagnosis and treatment as
removal of specific symptoms and/or causes, Navajo conceptions of illness perceive not
linear cause-effect classifications of disease, but rather illnesses as experiences emerging
in space and time. Navajo language as expressed bodily perceptual habit displays this
cultural perceptual difference: there are no specific names attached to specific and
differentiated diagnoses, rather, any type of cancer might be commonly referred to as
“sore that does not heal, ” and cancer is not differentiated in Western scientific
taxonomical typologies. 102
Wellness/illness thus must be conceived differently from the medical gaze of
modern Western habituations towards separating bodily functions and capacities. Also to
be taken into consideration must be experiences of one’s existence in the world beyond
individualistic selves, separated from others and the world. Wellness is connected to
harmony, balance, and interrelation of all creation; all that is in the world is sentient and
interrelated. Further, indigenous cosmologies like the Navajo are spatially oriented, time
being a cyclical event centered in place. To perceive the world and human existence with
it cyclically and interrelatedly provides a pre-reflective dimension different from Western
conceptions of origin, chronology, and linear connections.103 Thus, the experience and
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emerging meaning of cancer is intimately connected to experiences of (im)balance in a
community’s world. The experience of cancer is not, as it is in Western habituation, an
individual bodily experience which may receive individual medical attention and
treatment. Rather, it is an experience embedded in spatial and communal dimensions, and
may be received as such (i.e., restoration of balance and harmony may take on a variety
of personal, communal, ritual, etc., forms).
Significantly, again, is to maintain that illness is not conceived of as
individualized physical experience, but rather a holistic experience, an interrelated event:
a bodily sore or wound that does not heal is an experience of open sores and imbalances
in life that is communal. For example, lightning might have been mentioned as a “cause”
of cancer by Navajo persons participating in cancer research. Yet the question itself is
misguided in this indigenous context, as illness must be understood within Navajo bodily
perceptual orientations in the world. Lightning in Western cultural conceptions may be a
natural force, not connected to personal human experiences. However, Navajo worldview
does not make a human/world distinction, but experience all in interrelated ways.
Lightning, as neither disconnected nor disaffected natural force, but as part of the life
force sustaining all, relates to people in bodily ways. To ask for a perceived cause of
cancer and to analyze “lightening” in provided answers, is to linearly analyze what is not
causally experienced.104

Resistance: Political Theology and American Indian Liberation (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2004),
10-13.
104

Csordas, 194-218. I would like to note that Csordas’s own perceptual orientation is evident at
times and significantly influences his description of his study. His linguistic choices such as referring to
“mythical causes,” framing lightening as a natural force rather than part of interrelated life, and his lack of
attention to spatial significances in ascribing bodily experiences at times betray his own bodily perceptual
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Csordas reports indigenous experiences of lightening as cause of cancer based on
his research guided by causal questions. Yet difference in lived experiences are difficult,
sometimes even impossible, to capture with research strategies embedded in bodily
perceptual orientations with little to no similarities. Within my Western intellectual
habituation, my best attempt to describe and conceive of lightening different from my
cultural habit is to think of lightening as a bodily encounter and experience, conceive of it
as a tactile bodily enveloping and inhalation, a visual contact, and an olfactory experience
of the harmonious electrical energy which is connected to the energy that runs through a
person’s embodied life. To be struck by lightning or be too close to a tree that has been
struck by lightning before (remember the spatial orientation over temporal alignment) is
to bodily encounter and experience lightening in ways not conceivable with a Western
medical or scientific objectifying gaze. Experiencing lightening, as part of the communal
life and energy that sustains all, is a dimension of experiencing in the world that does not
conceive of experiencing natural events as inherently bad (as a cause-effect questioning
regarding cancer might lead us to think) or good. Rather, lightening is experienced along
bodily orientations in the world which grasp human life as s interrelated with other
sentient life (which is not exclusive to humans). 105

orientations bearing on those he describes: though he seeks to emphasize embodiment and
phenomenological dimensions of human existence, he still presents Navajo descriptions of cancer and its
causes as mythical, traditional, and therefore less than the tacit, deeply sedimented ways of bodily being
that they are.
105

Another example of what I am trying to convey here is found among the indigenous Ihanzu in
Tanzania. Todd Sanders’ study of rainmaking, gender, and sense making . Rain rites might appear to an
outsider as a cause-effect practice, with the rites carried out to effect a desired outcome. Rather, rain is
intimately connected to all areas of life, socio-cultural and practical, and, while rainmaking “brings” rain,
rainmaking is not restricted to what makes rain, but it is inherently what “makes sense,” what makes
knowledge and experience, what makes life. Sanders also makes complex observations regarding gender as
a social experience not first and foremost connected to human bodies, but rather, Ihanzu experience the
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The importance of understanding differences in the corporeal and social
dimensions of language, such as those provided in the examples here, is to understand
that these different bodily social habits (experiencing the color of a patient, complex
communally oriented experiences of bodily illness, the descriptions of insanity in
oral/aural/olfactory cultures) are habits which are not simply intellectual conceptions, but
deep-seated ways of being in the world. I move, feel, see, think, etc., through and with
and by means of language; I move bodily into the world through linguistic gestures; my
extension through language is my motile engagement through which I and the world
appear; my “living” of/through language is a cultural act of bringing forth meaning and
movement. Language as a bodily habit and bodily extension through embodied cultural
habit is incorporated within my body schema, within my tacit knowledge of myself and
the world.
To learn a new language is not simply to learn new signifiers, it is to learn a new
way of bodily being in the world. George “Tink” Tinker’s investigation of colonizing
missionary activities such as American Indian “boarding schools” highlights the
importance of not underestimating this interrelation of bodily experience and the role of
perception and language. Tinker describes how educational policies forcefully removed
American Indian children from their communal homes and gathered them in institutions
of re-education, where they were severely punished when caught speaking their native
language. The enforcement of the colonizer’s language as common social and political
language (remember the exploration of common language in the previous section) then
world as gendered (and therefore their own bodies, not the other way around). Todd Sanders, Beyond
Bodies: Rainmaking and Sense Making in Tanzania (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
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enforced alignment with the dominant socio-cultural bodily habits and communal values.
This alignment brought about loss of bodily perceptual orientations, which again, were
more than merely changes in speaking, but enforced and policed changes of deep-seated
ways of being in the world, including bodily social habits such as family structures,
values, dietary habits, communal organization, tacit knowledges regarding the world and
one’s place in it, etc. We need to regard this not just as “only” enforced political control,
but rather must more aptly label this violently enforced bodily perceptual re-orientation
as genocide.106
Language, then, is a bodily and social experience, one that expresses and shapes
our bodily perceptual orientation in the world. To learn a different language is to learn of
different bodily social habits, of different ways of perceiving and extending into the
world. To be forced to give up a native language, or operate dominantly in a colonizing
language, is to be forced to change one’s being in the world, to be dominated by another
group’s tacit knowledges which may not resonate with my own. To demand a common
language, then, is not only to demand a shared mode of communication: it is to enforce
specific meanings, and because meaning emerges perceptually between body and world
and is shaped by habit, it demands and enforces specific patterns of bodily movement
aligned with the hegemonic perceptual grid; it demands unified, “normal” ways of being
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George E. (Tink) Tinker, "Missionary Conquest: The Gospel and Native American Cultural
Genocide," (1993): 49-50. Tinker, American Indian Liberation : A Theology of Sovereignty, 25-28. I
believe the same judgment may be applied (after thorough exploration and contextualization) to other
colonial/colonizing dominations, such as the conquest and bodily removal and re-orientation of African
bodies, the British conquest and usurpation of lands and peoples in India, or the Spanish conquest of South
America, even the global reach of capitalism today.
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and perceiving in the world to keep the currents supporting social structures flowing
strong.107
Connecting to the larger scope of the project, we can see how language is not a
separate instance that needs to be connected to bodily experience. Rather, language is a
bodily experience that perceptually orients us in and to the world. To construct theologies
grounded in experience needs to be able to grasp the interrelated bodily sensory
dimensions of language so that we can complexly conceive of how language does not
simply express meaning and values, but encompasses bodily perceptually experiencing
meaning and values.
Conclusion
Exploring various “hows” of bodily perceptual orientation, I took us on swift
comparative expeditions to a range of different exemplars found in historically or
culturally different contexts. This provided us with diverse ways to complexly conceive
of what it means to insist that “I am as body,” that I am in this world as body touching,
feeling, seeing, thinking, remembering, desiring, speaking; I am always as body and in
bodily reference to my world. I sought to demonstrate the importance of conceiving of

107

See also Steven Newcomb, "Pagans in the Promised Land: Decoding the Doctrine of Christian
Discovery," (2008). Newcomb analyzes the imagination of the US Supreme court regarding federal Indian
law, relating Christian narratives and their metaphors to the colonizing of indigenous peoples and lands. He
demonstrates how Christian narratives, words, and images have an inherently political meaning
(established through metaphors and their bodily dimensions) which provided colonization of Indian lands
moral and legal legitimacy. Newcomb asserts that the employed metaphors and narratives present a
cognitive schema which still operates today not only in the US, but also other places of colonization, where
language and human cognition (conceptualization and categorization), are the perfect instrument of empire
because of their bodily embeddedness. The consequences thereof, such as starvation, denigration and loss
of cultural identity and traditions, loss of land—in short, genocide—always come with a certainty of moral
justification found in schemas (bodily-linguistic) such as domestic dependent nation, tribe, etc. Newcomb:
16-18,30-32, 68-71.
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bodily perceptual orientation not just complexly, but as deeply embedded, pre-reflexive
tacit but also visceral knowledge and situatedness in the world.
Gaining this kind of complex understanding, and taking perceptual differences
seriously, raises the stakes when doing theology, not only when not beginning with
bodily experience as grounds for analysis of a particular human condition, but
even/especially when doing so. The importance of being aware of my own complex
habituations, my own acquired ways of feeling, thinking, and moving in this world
cannot be understated. Underestimating the bodily, visceral, deep-seated perceptual
orientations which give rise to our experiences, and therefore reach into all our human
endeavors, may support tendencies to, for example, dismiss/excuse not just the violent
force of hate speech, but also supporting ideologies or thought systems as “just thoughts”
that may just as easily be changed as the use of words.
Also at stake in underestimating bodily perceptual orientations in the world is the
risk to underestimate difference. When I do not take care to account for how my own
individually and socio-culturally acquired bodily perceptual “common sense” is a bodily
experience shaped by concrete bodily, social, historical, and cultural forces, my own tacit
knowledges may appear pre-cultural or a-historical to me. Contextual perceptual
knowledge is then too-easily presupposed to be universal, natural, and therefore
applicable to bodily experiences of others.
In my introductory remarks, I commented on relevant Christian theology
demanding engagement in cultural analysis. Because of my own Western cultural
location, and Western culture’s interlocking structures with Christian theological
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imaginations, my own cultural imagination is informed by Christian theological
orientations. The theoretical analysis thus far has provided me with a way to understand
how what has come to be a matter of the mind and individual personal faith confession
since the Protestant Reformation may be a deeply embedded bodily perceptual
orientation. In other words, Christian theology is always more than “just” a matter of
belief or a discipline devoted to connecting spiritual practices with ever more rational or
thoughtful doctrinal formulations. Christian theologies and their continuing legacies need
to be understood as embedded in our bodily perceptual orientations. They may be part of
the sediment pre-reflective current, supporting perceptual emergences of nationalized or
normalized bodies. They may be orienting devices, maintaining alignments of gender or
race. Or Christian theologies may be orienting lines which support directionalities of
perception, maintaining perceptual intentionalities, movements, and emergences so that
we cannot but perceive, say, “one nation under God.”
It is to theology, then, that I turn in the following chapter. More specifically, I will
turn to charting a way in which we can employ the concept of bodily perceptual
orientation in theological projects. Attending to the ways in which our existence in bodily
experiences situates and orients us in the world is the key feature of what I will present as
“body theology.”
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CHAPTER FIVE: BODY THEOLOGY
I began this project by stating that to think of our existence in the world as bodily
perceptual orientation is to think beyond common tropes of nature/culture and
essentialism/constructivism utilized used in feminist and poststructuralist discussions to
talk about embodiment. In such explorations, the body is often located at the intersection
of nature/culture. In my investigation of our existence in the world as bodily perceptual
orientation, I showed that our bodily experiences are located in interrelated dimensions of
body-world-culture. Our bodily perceptual experiences, our language, and other bodily
movements shape this space and are shaped in this space. Our existence as lived body is
neither solely natural or essentially biological nor exclusively cultural or discursively
constructed. It is even more than both natural/biological and cultural/discursive. If we
begin with bodily experience, our existence is body-ly, nature-ly, and culture-ly,
intertwined and interrelated: we learn and create meaning only in bodily experiencing. In
bodily perceptual experience, we create, transmit, and express our bodily selves, cultural
values, and the world we inhabit.
Body theologies, as presented to us thus far, at times turn out to be inadequate in
their conceptual and methodological approaches. Body/mind dualisms may be upheld by
positing sensory perception in unreflective or naïve ways and/or by fixing bodily
experiences statically to meaning when moving too quickly to establish theological
metaphors. My contribution to body theology, rather than presenting a fully
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conceptualized theological work, is to present principles which may help us to inquire
into bodily experience more complexly. I am putting forward a framework within which
to understand bodily experience in order to conceptually and methodologically strengthen
those theological projects which seek to be grounded in embodiment. In this chapter, I
will present what theological analysis can do when thinking through bodily perceptual
orientation.
Body theology, the way I frame it within this project, is a way of doing critical
analysis that begins by inquiring into the many ways in which we are oriented in,
towards, and by the world and others.1 To effectively understand how we come to be in
this world, we need to understand what constitutes our being in this world, including how
certain ways of valorizing the mind and devaluing bodies gain such bodily and sociocultural force that some lives get violently pushed to the margins, such that some bodies
are dismissed as holding no (more) value.
In the previous chapters, I showed how our bodily perceptual experiences are
how we exist in this world, how our feeling, smelling, touching, seeing, thinking,
speaking, remembering, etc., are bodily perceptual experiences which orient us in the
world and are oriented by the world. There are mechanisms at play—bodily movements,
socio-cultural habituations—which may work in ways so that our bodily perceptual
orientations position us within bounds of gendered, raced, normalized, nationalized,
classed lines. These alignments are so powerful that we cannot escape their influence,
reproduction, and naturalization.

1

I will present principles for this kind of analysis below.
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To begin to counter the effects of sexism, racism, nationalism, ableism, classism,
etc., is to begin understanding how these ideologies are not simply words or beliefs, and
not even just perpetration of visual stereotypes (though these might be prevalent in
Western cultural orientations). They take on a bio-power, to use Foucault’s term.2 And
this requires conceiving of how the gendering, racing, and normatizing of bodies is made
through the full range of the human sensorium, as Paul Gilroy named it.3 Or to follow
Mark Smith, perceptual orientations are central to the way in which dividing lines in the
world are created.4 The lines of division which come to be fundamental, even natural, in
our experiences come to be experienced in a bodily perceptual way and through instances
of complication, nuance, and subtlety: What we call man/woman, black/white/brown,
normal/disabled, citizen/alien are hierarchies which are aligned through our bodily
perceptual experiences (through our seeing, tasting, feeling, smelling, thinking,
remembering, hearing, etc.). Social concepts are not solely surface impressions (in both
senses, as in impressions about surfaces and impressions on/of surfaces), but are cultural
categories of deep bodily impact and deep social significances. While social hierarchies
and cultural orders may be belied by everyday contingencies, compromises, and
complications in the context of our experiences, bodily perception is central to the mutual
emergence of body/world/meaning.

2

“Biopower” is Foucault’s descriptor for power over bodies, for the set of mechanisms through
which bodies and groups of bodies become controlled by and aligned with and through socio-political
strategies. See Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. In later works, as Foucault elaborates
on this, this terms becomes more technically framed.
3

Gilroy, 42.

4

Smith, How Race Is Made: Slavery, Segregation, and the Senses, 9.
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To abandon these alignments and thereby to counter violent –isms, inquiries into
bodily perceptual orientations will allow us to grasp more precisely and complexly the
origins and sources of the creation and reproduction of divisive imagery. This inquiry
will allow us to begin with framing how bodies and experiences are made and which
mechanisms turn our bodily experiences and perceived meanings to socio-cultural images
so damaging and powerful that they can wage war on human life. This is true even or
especially when we pride ourselves in being unprejudiced, non-discriminating, and
reasoned thinkers and actors regarding social matters. By beginning our analysis so, we
can begin to experience, to imagine, to taste, and appreciate bodily crossings and
subversions of dividing lines which induce harm in our bodily experiences. By beginning
to understand how the shaping of our world comes about in and through our bodily
perception, we may not “just” experience our visceral reaction to others, but can begin
perceiving and experiencing differently, perhaps.
In this final chapter, I will return again to some of the questions I posed in my
opening chapter and sketch a framework for body theology as a set of principles which
advances explorations into the what and how of bodily perceptual orientation. I will begin
by presenting principles of body theology as framework for analysis. Two select
theologies which seek to be constructive, are concerned with bodily experience, and
make reference to the pitfalls of body/mind dualisms and/or sensory perception will then
serve as my test cases for utilizing body theology within the wider field of constructive
theology. After showing via these test cases how body theology can expand and
strengthen some critical claims and avoid potential manifestations and/or reiterations of
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Cartesian dualisms for any theologian concerned with the related issues, I will conclude
this chapter by returning to some of my personal questions/interests and taking a body
theology approach to begin framing answers to them.
Principles of Body Theology
Bodily perceptual orientations emerge from and are dependent on particularities,
contingencies, and contextualities of embodiment. Our specific incarnation in space and
time, our cultural context and individual bodily capacities, our being immersed in social
givens and our personal development, significantly matter in the way we experience in
the world. To insist on these contingencies and fluid ambiguous specifics of embodied
life and then to move toward articulating a step-by-step methodology for body theology
would be antithetical to the concerns and concepts presented here. Distilling body
theology into a systematic method would imply that there is a method which might be
free from culturally informed presuppositions and could be universally applicable. But
this project has begun by cautioning of such presumptions, and to present a universalized
method would be to pay no heed to my own convictions.
However, I believe that this caution does not deny my presenting a certain
positioning commitment, and a presenting of principles of analysis for a body theology
approach. To weigh in on the significance of sensory perception is to take a specific stand
when it comes to analyzing bodily experience; it is to appreciate discursive analysis, but
also to pursue a kind of material investigation which might be fleeting and more difficult
to grasp. Guiding principles then can inform theological projects that seek to be grounded
in experience without fixing experience in textual concepts. To formulate principles
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rather than a method allows me to remain flexible (and hopefully humble) enough to
travel cross-contextually.
The overarching commitment in body theology is the framework within which I
have presented bodily experience in the previous chapters: The basic condition of my
existence in the world and toward the world is my bodily perceptual orientation. My
bodily experiencing is a perceptual experiencing; how I see, touch, feel, intuit, evaluate,
remember, etc., is how I come to be and move in the world. Bodily perceptual
experiences are also cultural acts, and perceptual differences are not only bodily
differences but cultural differences, as culture inscribes how the senses are formed,
utilized, and attributed.
Considering my exploration of bodily perceptual orientation in this project, there
are some notions that I consider most significant and constructive as principles for body
theology:5
Bodily experiences make sense. To do body theology is to turn to bodily
experience not firstly to make sense of it, but to turn to it understanding that bodily
experiences make sense, make meaning, in the world. To do body theology is to
acknowledge that we bodily deal with meaning in the world, and that we also actively
create and make meaning as we bodily move with and within our embodied contexts. To
turn to bodily experience as a resource is to acknowledge that our bodily experiences
always already make sense, in both meanings of the word; namely, there is already a

5

Though I would also like to add that I do not consider this list as complete or exclusive, but I
hold these principles loosely enough to be adapted or added to as contexts and experiences may inform
specific body theologies.
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logic to our bodily experiences, and our bodily experiences create and manifest meaning
for us.
Body theology explores bodily experience considering perceptual dimensions.
When using bodily experience as resource for theology, we must consider perceptual
dimensions. This means that the strength of the theological grounding in experience rests
with the attention to sensory perception. Perception is embedded in various dimensions—
pre-reflectively in social/cultural habits, in language, in individual bodily movements, in
perceptual alignments, orientations, and perceptual devices—and is open to change, to
ambiguous and fluid meanings, and to tensions and contradictions. Perception may shape
how I know the world, but the world may also shape how I know to perceive.
Body theology does ambiguity and paradoxes. To turn to bodily experiences and
perceptual dimensions is to acknowledge ambiguity and paradoxes in our experiences. If
we are serious about overcoming body/mind dualisms, then we cannot maintain dualisms
in body theology, not even traditionally cherished theological dualisms such as good/evil,
oppression/redemption, sacred/profane, etc. Since bodily experiences and perception are
ambiguous and paradoxical (i.e., meaning is not statically fixed to certain experiences or
perceptions, and perception is paradoxically both bodily and social, both passive and
creative, both inherent and acquired, etc.), then body theology must remain open to
ambiguity and paradoxes, to disorientations, changing currents, new movements. Because
body theology conceives of bodily experience as ambiguous and open to change, it
cannot derive theological concepts or formulations that are absolute or dualistic. This
must not be a theological problem or weakness, but may be the strength of body theology
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in that it can attend to the gaps, cracks, fissures, and occlusions in our (theological)
perceptual orientations.
Body theology is epistemologically unsettled. As a body theologian seeking to
acknowledge and maintain the above-mentioned ambiguity, I must refrain from seeking
certainty. I might gain skill and knowledge—for example, skill regarding analysis of
bodily perceptual dimensions, knowledge regarding the processes of bodily perceptual
experiences and interrelated dynamics—but this does not necessarily coincide with
complete understanding. As the previous chapter illustrates, I might gain a more complex
understanding of bodily perceptual processes involved in different experiences, but I
cannot claim to fully understand a different perceptual orientation, a different way of
being in the world. To claim such full understanding and fix it within my own knowledge
system would be counterproductive to the commitment of body theology which frames
our own epistemological perspectives as bodily and socially determined. While I might
deepen my understanding, or gain more complex understanding of a specific experience,
my understanding is always contingent and momentary, and needs to be flexible enough
to engage ambiguities and newly-encountered difference. This also allows body theology
a motile constructivity, attending to new meanings emerging via new bodily encounters,
different perspectives leading to new interpretations, whilst remaining grounded in lived
bodily experience.
Body Theology Approaches
Different theologians might have different goals in mind when employing body
theology, be it systematic exploration of theological concepts or practical theological

270

investigations into specific situational contexts. Deciding that I want to begin with bodily
experience, I begin with the experience/situation I perceive to be relevant or which
caught my theological attention. As body theologian, considering the above principles, I
am now charged to explore this experience for various bodily perceptual dimensions,
understanding that my explorations are limited by my own capacities and orientations. I
can examine my own understanding by maintaining a critically open posture and
checking my own self-knowledge (am I aware of my own bodily perceptual orientations
that I bring to the experience and to the analysis of this experience?) while seeking to
explain how certain bodily perceptual orientations might come into play in our
experiences.
In this section, I will turn to two theologians, Carter Heyward and Marcella
Althaus-Reid, scholars who served as exemplars in my critique of phenomenological
notions in feminist theologies. Both theologians explicitly reflect on bodily experience
and seek to construct liberative theologies, make reference to the pitfalls of body/mind
dualisms, and highlight, in one way or another, knowledge via perception.
Bringing body theology principles to Carter Heyward’s theological project, I will
discuss ways in which body theology can go beyond naïve appeals to sensory perception
as epistemological venue. I will strengthen Heyward’s appeal to “be in touch with our
bodies” by framing it in a complex understanding of bodily perceptual processes.
Marcella Althaus-Reid’s work will serve as an example of what I have termed body
metaphor theology. Exploring and suspending/delaying Althaus-Reid’s theological
method, I will show how body theology can strengthen theological aims, namely by
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dwelling on and exploring experience more thoroughly, thus avoiding to move too
quickly from experience to metaphor.
Touching the Strength of Carter Heyward
Much of Carter Heyward’s theological “coming out” work was published almost
35 years ago, though it has lost none of its critical creative challenge to the way theology
should be done.6 The Christian theologian and Episcopal priest may be best known for
not only discussing openly her being a lesbian but also drawing on this dimension of her
life as an integral source to her theologizing. 7 I very briefly brought up a component of
her theological framework in the second chapter, where I highlighted that her appeal to
be in touch with our bodily senses inadvertently reinstates a body/mind dualism she seeks
to overcome. This conception of perception and framing of the sensual as access to
knowledge leads into a critical dead end, though one we might sense our way out of.
This project established body theology as an inquiry into meaning emerging in
our bodily experiences. As such, body theology can join Heyward’s conceptual and
6

Carter Isabel Heyward, The Redemption of God: A Theology of Mutual Relations (Lanham, MD:
Pilgrim Press, 1982); Carter Isabel Heyward, Our Passion for Justice: Images of Power, Sexuality, and
Liberation (New York, NY: Pilgrim Press, 1984); Carter Isabel Heyward, Speaking of Christ: A Lesbian
Feminist Voice (New York, NY: Pilgrim Press, 1989); Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The Erotics as
Power and the Love of God.
7

Heyward’s theological approach was/is compelling and groundbreaking not only in the way she
insists that theology must be grounded in the here and now of embodied realities in order to pursue
critically and imaginatively the truths of our own lives-in-relation, but also in the way her theological work
seeks to be intersectional in regards to race, class, religion, gender, nationality, and sexual desires. She
speaks clearly of the interrelated dynamics which bring about oppressive ideologies—that sexism and
homophobia must be understood in relation to capitalism, nationalism, and racism, for example. Her
epistemological method is to re-value feeling as source of “objective” knowledge, knowledge of real life
experiences and embodied realities. The epistemological folly of Enlightenment rationality is that
particularity coupled with power leads to presenting as universal, normative, and true what is grounded in
specific social locations. Thus we need to be clear about the limits of our knowledge, which is constructed
in a social context, not simply out of intellectual honesty (and perhaps, humility), but also because the
particularities which limit us are also the ground and source of our truth-claims. Heyward, Touching Our
Strength: The Erotics as Power and the Love of God, 3-13.
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methodological commitments: She defines theology as “the capacity to discern God’s
presence here and now and to reflect on what this means”8 and as “critical, creative
reflection on the patterns, shape, and movement of the Sacred in our life together.” 9 Body
theology echoes her emphasis on human embodiment as inseparable body-mind existence
intertwined through mutual relations with others and the world.
Heyward’s conception and use of relationality and mutuality are where I locate a
challenge and contribution I bring to Heyward via body theology. Heyward’s answer to
the pervasiveness of evil in human life is to frame “God” as human power in mutual
relation. The harmful legacies of separating material from spiritual, body from mind, are
found today in the concept of individual personhood as autonomous and independent.
This denial of interrelatedness is at the heart of structural forces such as compulsory
heterosexuality or white male patriarchy. The answer, Heyward argues, is in
rediscovering and fostering our mutual relationality, to understand being a person as
social relationship. Sin and evil are lack of mutuality; liberation and the sacred are found
in mutual relations. Mutuality, to Heyward, transforms alienated power into right
relations, sharing power in a relationship that each involved may become more fully who
she is. Mutuality is a relational movement which shapes us. 10
8

Heyward, Our Passion for Justice: Images of Power, Sexuality, and Liberation, 7.

9

Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The Erotics as Power and the Love of God, 22.

10

Ibid., 56,91,191. Importantly, Heyward’s theological convictions are deeply grounded in her life
experiences and social justice activism. She has been an activist for racial justice, beginning as a teenager,
and was part of the first group of women to be ordained in the Episcopal Church in 1974. This first
ordination event was also an “extraordinary” event, invalidated in an emergency meeting of the House of
Bishops. Two years later, women’s ordination into priesthood of the Episcopal Church was approved. After
retiring from teaching at Episcopal Divinity School in Cambridge, MA, Heyward now lives in an
intentional community and has founded a therapeutic horseback riding center in North Carolina, geared
towards children and adults with emotional, mental and physical limitations and disabilities.
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Mutuality, according to Heyward, is right relation, and this is the cornerstone of
her theological project. Mutual relations are just and loving relations. She is careful not to
conflate mutuality with sameness or oneness, and insists on the ambiguity and inherent
tensions which come with relation across and within difference.11 All relations are social
and embedded with power, interests, and desires. Yet we are born alienated and into
alienation as consequence of unjust power relations; economic oppression, racism,
sexism, etc., are patterns of alienation.12 Heyward then charges that we live as embodied
creatures in the world, and mutual relation is a “radical connectedness” not just of
humanity but all of reality. 13 Thus, our bodies are affected by the social structures within
which we inescapably live, and this is why we know about the world and ourselves
through our bodies, yet as bodies participating in complex, tension-filled, ambiguous
relations with other bodies.14
Experiences of mutuality, which are bodily, sensual, erotic experiences, are the
grounds for incarnate knowledge of right relations, knowledge that is a vision of what is

11

To be loving is not to engender a feeling, but to be open to action, a willingness to participate
with others in the healing of a broken world and broken lives. Heyward, Our Passion for Justice: Images of
Power, Sexuality, and Liberation, 82,187. “God” is power in right relation as well as resource and power of
relation, thus for Heyward, human activity is divine activity whenever and wherever it is just and loving.
Heyward, The Redemption of God: A Theology of Mutual Relations, 222. Heyward, Touching Our
Strength: The Erotics as Power and the Love of God, 22. Mutuality though goes beyond human relation, as
the structures of alienation encompass the alienation of humans from other earthcreatures as well as rocks,
plants, water, air, etc. Heyward, Our Passion for Justice: Images of Power, Sexuality, and Liberation, xiiixv. Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The Erotics as Power and the Love of God, 92-93.
12

Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The Erotics as Power and the Love of God, 105. Carter
Isabel Heyward, Staying Power: Reflections on Gender, Justice, and Compassion (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim
Press, 1995), 80.
13

Carter Isabel Heyward, Saving Jesus from Those Who Are Right: Rethinking What It Means to
Be Christian (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 62.
14

Tatman, 199.
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possible beyond oppression and suffering.15 She appeals (in an empiricist vein) to sensory
perception as fundamental to conception of ideas, because all knowledge is rooted in the
sensory capacities of the body. 16 Because structures of alienation have disconnected us
from our power to feel, and thus, to know, returning to embodied relationality via sensory
and sensual means and “trust[ing] our senses, our capacities to touch, taste, smell, hear,
see, and thereby know” is learning via the senses “what is good and what is bad, what is
real and what is false […]. [S]ensuality is a foundation for our authority.” 17 Yet Heyward
is also careful not to posit this kind of “body knowledge” as an individually gained
knowledge. Because bodies are always bound up in ambiguous, complex relations with
other bodies and the world, situated bodily knowledge is necessarily communal.18
I cautioned above against a romanticizing or universalizing of “relationality” as
intrinsic to human existence.19 Relationality is not inherently innocent, thus women’s
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Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The Erotics as Power and the Love of God, 187. It is also
important to note that Heyward understands the “erotic” as “the yearning to be involved.” She leans here on
Audre Lorde’s definition of the erotic.
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Heyward, Our Passion for Justice: Images of Power, Sexuality, and Liberation, 172. Heyward
is citing feminist ethicist Beverly Wildung Harrison, "The Power of Anger in the Work of Love," in
Weaving the Visions: New Patterns in Feminist Spirituality, ed. Judith Plaskow and Carol P. Christ (San
Francisco: HarperCollins, 1989).
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Heyward’s own experiences and consciously self-reflexive reflections on them are central to her
own theological reflections. Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The Erotics as Power and the Love of God,
93. Heyward recounts some of her own bodily sensory experiences, e.g., experiencing the call to priesthood
and its confirmations, in Carter Isabel Heyward, A Priest Forever: One Woman's Controversial Ordination
in the Episcopal Church (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 1999). Her engagement of her own feelings and
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VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 71-82.
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275

experience of relationships can be marked by oppression as well as complicity, be it in
deference to cultural customs or survival struggles. 20 Similarly, mutuality, commonly
used as signifier for having the same relationship toward each other, or being directed
and received by each toward the other, or as reciprocal relationship, is not inherently
innocent or justice making. I do not take issue with Heyward constructing and using
mutuality to describe her theological aim (I also appreciate that her interest is not in
abstract notions of mutuality per se, but in “God” as the justice-creating power in mutual
relationships).21 But given my exploration of bodily perceptual orientation in the world as
condition for our existence, I believe there are some noteworthy critical challenges to
bring to her work.
With body theology, I approach Heyward’s theology presupposing our prereflective involvement in the world and with each other, our emergent existence with
bodily and socio-culturally specific bodily perceptual orientations. Perception is not a
tool, but in line with the principles of body theology, perception is how we experience.

if valorizing traditional stereotypes of women being more relational can really be liberating. Jones,
Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: Cartographies of Grace, 47.
20
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groups and to groups, via economical, political, and other larger systemic relations. Right relations include
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of injustice coming to bear in people’s lives. For example, she explores interlocking and interrelated
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ageism in Heyward, Our Passion for Justice: Images of Power, Sexuality, and Liberation.
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Theologically, bringing to bear her concern with relationality and mutuality on the concept of
God, she defines God as “our power in mutual relation.” God is then a quality of existence, rather than a
metaphysical presence outside of and separate from of the world. Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The
Erotics as Power and the Love of God, 3.
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The way we experience (feel, think, speak, imagine, talk, touch) in the world emerges
from a social habitual base, from the way we emerge as existing in the world, already
experiencing (feeling, thinking, speaking, imagining, talking, touching) a certain way,
along pre-established lines of orientation which align our perceptions and bodily habits.
In other words, sensory perception is not an unutilized or undervalued set of
(epistemological or ontological) structures which may help us enter mutual relations, but
perception is already grounding, already structuring our existence.22
Our bodily experience is grounded in a mutual constitution of our existence and
emergence in the world. We are already bound up in a mutual, pre-reflective relationship
with others and the world; our bodily perceptions, movements, and expressions are
immersed and grounded in the bodily social sediment which we are born into. To then
diagnose sin and/or evil in the world as alienation from each other and from our bodily
feelings is to disregard that this very alienation Heyward is writing about comes about
through our mutual embeddedness in the world and with each other.
Heeding another body theology principle, namely acknowledging that our bodily
experiences contain ambiguity and paradoxes, requires a conceptualization of
relationality which holds mutuality and alienation not in a dualistic either/or fashion.
Rather, mutuality and alienation are embedded with each other, intertwined in
experiences of both/and: relations can encompass mutuality and alienation; mutuality and
alienation both come about in relation.

22

Therefore, when referring to perception as a tool to be utilized, Heyward naturalizes what is
perceived (as I have demonstrated in chapter two).
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Bringing body theology to bear on Heyward’s work, I can assert that the patterns
of alienation (racism, sexism, nationalism, etc.) we are born into are patterns of bodily
perceptual alignments. I experience alienation under oppressive structures not only
because I have been alienated from my bodily feeling, but because my socio-cultural
context aligns me with others in a mutual constitution through orientation devices of
individual, autonomous, mind-over-matter ideologies. My emergence in the world, the
emergence of the world, and the emergence of others with me in the world is already
constituted by being directed and received by each toward each other. We are already
immersed in a pre-reflective reciprocal relationship: that of being perceptually oriented
toward each other and by each other.
Heyward asserts that we are alienated by structures of oppression which prevent a
familiarity and trust in—and necessity to return to—our sensory/sensual capacities. Yet
body theology reveals that/how it is precisely our bodily sensory, sensual capacities
which may produce those alienations from each other. Structures of oppression, systemic
injustices, are cultural sensory perceptual expressions, bodily movements and
orientations which come to be habituated and maintain alignments of alienation. So rather
than the answer to oppressive –isms, mutuality and relationality take part in the
significant process of how we come to bodily experience alienation. We are already
perceptually directed toward and received by each other in specific ways, for example in
gendered and racialized habituations, and this aligns us with (and maintains through us)
experiences of alienation from each other.
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This body theology perspective significantly bears on Heyward’s theo-ethical
aim. She charges that to be in touch with our feelings, to claim our bodily perceptions as
access to truth, makes the world intelligible to us and can alert us to danger, injustice, or
violation of bodily and emotional integrity. Bodily senses, for example, allow me to feel
safe or threatened as I walk “alone at night through a neighborhood that is strange to me,”
so that my immediate sensory apprehension alerts me to possible danger in difference. 23
Yet these perceptual apprehensions, our bodily feelings in certain situations, are already
shaped in a pre-reflective current. The meaning of ‘danger’ or ‘threat’ emerges from a
mutual constitution of myself and my environment along bodily perceptual orientation
lines (of say, whiteness, class, heteronormativity), meanings which are not fixed or
settled “body knowledges,” but contingent and fluid significances emerging in motile
engagements within bodily relations.
Heyward writes of erotic justice as creating boundaries with each other, learning
with each other how to cross them, strengthen them, or loosen them,24 yet when we take
our existence as bodily perceptual orientation in the world into account, we can see how
that is already happening pre-reflectively, bodily, socially. To aim for just relations
through bodily expressions, feelings, sensual movements, requires us to be able to
account for how our bodily feelings come about. Reframing mutuality as that in which
we are already embedded (not alienated from) does not negate an ethical trajectory.
Rather, it can highlight the ambiguity, indeterminacy, and tensions inherent in relations
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Heyward highlights. It allows us to account for the bodily feelings, the sensual
apprehensions of the world, which demonstrate social relations embedded with power
and desires, and even “truth” about what a situation, a context, or a relation “means.”
Without accounting for our bodily perceptual orientations, for the ways in which
my feelings, my desires to touch, my imaginations expressed in speech come about, we
are tempted to equate our feeling/perception of ‘danger’ or ‘evil’ with the embodied
presence of it. I certainly agree with Heyward that the bodily sense of feeling threatened
in the presence of an abusive, violent person is a perception of evil and sin. Sharing
feminist commitments, I am sure we have common perceptual orientations which allow
us to perceive the orientation lines of patriarchal sexism and heteronormativity and the
effects they have on aligning bodily movements. Yet the examples I provided in chapter
three and four showed that ‘danger’ or ‘evil’ as perceptually emerging meaning is also
too easily attached to difference in a way that reinforces oppressive structures. To be in
touch with one’s bodily feelings may just as easily lead to my apprehension of truth about
a black body encountered on the street signaling ‘evil.’ Furthermore, tapping into our
feelings/sensory perceptions does not necessarily lead to a world perceived in line with a
feminist consciousness. Put differently, I may be bodily aligned in ways so that
experiences of oppression or abuse are part of my habituation and bodily movement in
the world. My bodily perceptual orientations then situate me in a way that trusting or
valuing my sensory perceptions does not necessarily lead me to liberative truths about my
experience. I might not even perceptually experience in ways which might bring about
meaning regarding relationality in the ways Heyward envisions it, i.e., my bodily
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experiences of violence are what makes sense in my life and what creates meaning in a
situation.
We do not need to dismiss attention to our bodily experiences, but we need to be
able to complexly grasp why certain apprehensions or knowledges about others and the
world come to be natural truth, even when they reinforce stereotypes and oppressive
behaviors. It is because we are indivisible body-mind-selves that, for example,
heteronormativity has such a hold on our embodied lives, not because we lost touch with
our bodies. To aim for justice, for just and right relations, for mutuality which does not
lead to emergence of oppression, is to be in touch with how our bodily experiences are
us, for better or worse.
Theology as enterprise in Heyward is always, critically and fundamentally, a
“communal or collective struggle to comprehend ourselves in a world in which relation is
broken violently.” 25 Therefore, it grows out of lived experiences and the needs felt in
different, particularly embodied communities.26 To do body theology in a Heywardian
frame can allow us to do relational, communally-grounded theology that begins with the
pre-reflective dimensions emerging in our bodily movements together. Tapping into our
experience is then more than being in touch with our feelings (even as we might strive to
overcome ambiguous or conflicting feelings towards each other or others through
embodied social justice actions). Grounding Heyward’s theology in experience can be
crucially expanded by understanding how our bodily perception is what supports certain
25

Heyward, The Redemption of God: A Theology of Mutual Relations, 68.
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acknowledge and account for (and describe her accountability to) the communities in which she resides and
engages.
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kinds of community feelings over others (including those supporting alienation and
separation); it is to understand how all bodily experience, all bodily sensing, is bound up
in pre-reflective relationality.
Rather than something we have simply lost touch with, sensory perception is how
we got be in our current embodied situation in the first place. Bodily experiences can be a
valuable tool in thinking about ethical implications, because it is in our bodily
experiences that the currents which “float the boat” of our lives can be traced. Tracing
bodily perceptual orientations to the best of our abilities can be a tool in demonstrating
the intersections Heyward is careful to highlight. As I have shown, it can allow for
complex investigations into how, for example, nationalism is aligned through racial
alignments, or how class alignments are supported by currents of gendered perceptual
orientation.
Broadening my attention on Heyward from her concepts of relationality and
mutuality to her larger theological project, there are ways in which body theology can
significantly strengthen and support the task of a relational theologian. Heyward’s
theology is worked out within a systematic approach, formulating coherent theological
concepts regarding God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the church community. Since God is
defined by her as power in mutual relation, and the shape of God is justice, all human
activity can be divine activity (the Spirit of God moving on earth). God, rather than being
a personal figure, but the ground of being, is seen in human behavior such as
compassionate action. All human acts of mutual relating are “godding,” allowing God the
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sacred sensual power which infuses our bodies to reach out to others. The theologian’s
task is to discern God’s presence in the here and now and reflect on the meaning of it.
The Heywardian theologian cannot rely on the senses to tell truth in the way in
which Heyward suggests, but can still appeal to sensory perception as significantly
embedded in our bodily experiences. Bodily experiences then may still be the realm in
which “godding”/genuine justice-love relations across difference are possible, even
crucial and necessary. However, sensory perception is not access to this realm, but is
embedded in it. Rather than appealing to the senses to guide us toward mutuality,
appealing to sensory perception needs to be done in a complex and nuanced way.
Because sometimes, justice-love relations require that we deviate from the ways our
sensory perceptions are aligned. It requires we change directions in our perceptual facing
and bodily move into relations our senses might tell us to turn away from or close
ourselves off from. Rather than relying on feelings to guide us, we might need to acquire
new bodily movements so that our feelings can “catch up” with the truth about just
relations which can emerge when we face that which “feels” different. This can only
strengthen Heyward’s claim that right relations can be hard and difficult, and her belief
that we ought to aim to foster human acts of love and making justice in everyday
situations. While her appeal to the senses might get in the way of supporting just relations
in a nuanced way, a body theology approach can help Heyward’s aim for visceral, bodily,
sensual “godding” toward just relations; perhaps in new, different, even queer
orientations toward each other.
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Aligning with Indecency and Marcella Althaus-Reid
Marcella Althaus-Reid approaches the doing of theology in radical ways by
“contextually queering” Christian theology, particularly liberation theologies, through
recontextualizing, “a permanent exercise of serious doubting in theology.” 27 She charges
Christianity with being complicit in the colonization and domination of Latin America,
not the least through imposing a heterosexual rule of decency which underpins oppressive
economic, social, and sexual systems of exploitation.28 She highlights how theological
discourses have domesticated bodies, excluding challenges from different perspectives,
particularly those perspectives which seek to hold together the intersections of sexual
identity with racial and political constructions. 29 I already discussed, albeit briefly, how
Althaus-Reid’s approach to utilizing experience is close to an intellectualist position,
which leads to theologizing as interpretive endeavor, as Althaus-Reid quickly moves
from description of experience to mining it as metaphor for a theological construction. 30
“Indecency” and “queering” become significant concepts at work in AlthausReid’s theological project. Emphasizing the immanence of God in all bodily experiences,
she particularly focuses on uncovering that which has been denied as site of divine
revelation by the disciplining discourse of heterosexual, patriarchal colonialism. Because
her theological concerns began and were significantly shaped in the streets of Buenos
Aires, Argentina, she offers theological analyses through experiences of Latin American
27
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women, from theologians like her to the lemon vendors on the street.31 These
experiences, she claims, have been “decented” to exclude the sexual experiences of the
poor, thus presenting a decent image of the poor as the focal point of liberation
theologies, effectively fetishizing and oppressing the poor, especially poor women, yet
again.32
Althaus-Reid is committed to beginning with and speaking back particular
experiences, but requires that bodily experiences need to be approached with “sexual
honesty.”33 The queering hermeneutical circle of indecent theology begins with
experience, but does not pre-define or censor what counts as experience. Because the
sexual experiences and desires of the poor and marginalized have been systematically
excluded, Althaus-Reid makes those her explicit starting and focal point.34
When she critically deconstructs complex layers of oppression, her
conceptualization bears resemblances to the way in which I have framed perceptual
31
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the University of Edinburgh.
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orientations and the supportive pre-reflective currents of bodily experience. She describes
the orders of (sexual) decency, of what can enter church settings, theological
constructions, and theological patterns, as the underlying and supportive orders of
oppression.35 She charges that (and here I am applying the conceptual language of body
theology to her work) the decenting of theology aligns perceptual orientations in such
ways that the enterprise of theology emerges as theological engagements with a given
directionality (say, concern for the poor, social justice), along certain orienting lines (the
poor, the oppressed, the exploited). Yet the “sexual ideology performed in a socializing
pattern” perceptually disappears behind certain naturalized Christian notions of
decency.36 Or, put differently through a body theology frame again, pre-reflective
currents of sexual ideologies (sediment habits of heterosexist patriarchal Christianity)
give rise to perceptual emergences of proper liberation theologies and alignments of
proper theological subjects.
When Althaus-Reid then turns to bodily experiences, she seeks to queer theology
by making it “indecent,” i.e., attend to what has been habitually excluded. For example,
our bodily experiences of sexuality do include experiences of exploitation, but also lust;
they might incorporate heterosexual tendencies, but also queerness. When making sense
of human experiences, sexuality in all its various expressions needs to be available as a
resource for theology. Althaus-Reid seeks to present experiences rendered too taboo for
public theologizing as instances of experiencing the divine. The hermeneutical circle of
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indecent theology works well for a body theology approach because she understands her
hermeneutics to be more an event than a method. The hermeneutical event that starts with
experience and the naming of it uses sexuality as a way of thinking to unmask ideological
constraints, and understands reflective analysis to demand action in regards to liberation
from political, sexual, and religious oppressions. 37
What makes Althaus-Reid’s work compelling for my framing of body theology is
that she is not simply charging us to be “in touch with our sexuality” (as in similar calls
referring to our senses). Rather, she challenges us to go further in our attending to the
sexual in our experiences,38 and understand it more extensively as (what I have called)
the pre-reflective current and tacit knowledge informing political and economic
constructions, shaping discourses on divinely ordained ideologies and alienations of
embodied lives/experiences via alignments of decency codes. 39 Furthermore, her refusal
to apply her indecenting method to developing a closed narrative of liberative systematic
theology, i.e., a solid structure for a/one revised Christian story that is liberative in its
indecency, makes her theological approach appealing to the body theology commitment I
put forth; like me, she is less interested in systematically formulated content than in
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theology as critical reflection that is always contextual, localized, and embodied. Her
theology aims to remain flexible and able to travel to various indecent experiences.40
To think sexually when doing theology in Althaus-Reid is to queer theology by
grounding reflections in particular bodies, and more specifically, in their sexual practices.
In the relationships of marginalized bodies, especially their sexual practices, we can find
experiences to queer theological imagery, i.e., which unveil God from and in those places
typically excluded.41 In her frequently invoked and cited example of the lemon vendors
on the street of Argentina, Althaus-Reid directs our attention to the important
economical, political, and theological structures and oppressions she seeks to deconstruct
by invoking the underwear-free women selling goods on the streets.42 When she charges
that the everyday lives of people provide us “with a starting point for a process of doing
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contextual theology without exclusions,” she wants us to include “sexuality struggling in
the midst of misery.” 43
Yet her move from experience to employment of it as metaphor or site of textual
inquiry takes place rather quickly. When Althaus-Reid posits the sexual and political
practices of the marginalized as point of departure for theology, she turns rather quickly
to particular experiences as “living metaphor for God,” employing the “images of lemon
vendors,”44 seeking to “sexually deconstruct Christ” in order to allow for resignifications. She positively appropriates words, such as “God, the Faggot; God, the
Drag Queen; God, the Lesbian;” exploring and unpacking seemingly shocking
juxtapositions of the sexual and the theological in leather salvation, “Bi/Christ,” “Frenchkissing God,” investigating in cultural terms that “God is a Sodomite.” She describes
“God’s voyeuristic vocation,” and “God the Whore” who empties herself in a brothel.45
Althaus-Reid urges us to consider these bodily sites metaphorically and
symbolically as the epistemological site for doing theology. 46 The indecent experiences
of the poor become the experiences that Mariology or Christology are made of. So when
she employs the sexual experiences of the marginalized, she explores, for example, the
Bi/Christ as the hard-to-pin-down sexual body, misunderstood on both sides of dividing
lines and providing openings to borders and categories. This Bi/Christ operates outside of
43
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heteronormative and heteropatriarchal binaries and liberates the poor and the rich, those
on the sexual and economic margins and those in the center.47 Althaus-Reid has been
lauded for the radical, subversive, and liberatory theological potential in her indecent
images of human and divine relationships. Yet she also has been challenged for the
inherent limitations that her utilization of poststructuralist and queer methodologies
brings to her doing of theology, for example, her failure to spell out what a Bi/Christ
really means, or what substantial difference lies in using these bodily groundings. 48
I diagnose this failure as resulting from the phenomenological position she falls
into. As I pointed out in chapter two, Althaus-Reid connects perception to recognition of
meaning, recognition that is situated in particular embodiments. Perception is
alternatively considered as bodily function which can be accessed to gather information;
other times it is a socially-shaped recognition and interpretation of what is sensorially
perceived. While she does not make any explicit appeals to perceptual capacities, her
utilization of experience appears to be informed by a common phenomenological method
in religious studies which understands perception as the capacity for objective
observation and for “truthful” description of sensory information of a lived
experience/phenomenon.49
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Phenomenological approaches in the study of religion view religion as experiences with
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Body theology can begin in this space in which Althaus-Reid is limited by her
phenomenological stance, slowing down the move to metaphorical use of radical indecent
imagery found in bodily experiences. Maintaining the focus of exploration in bodily
experiences themselves aids in articulating significant differences found in marginal
bodily sexual experiences and is also useful in spelling out the meanings which might
emerge from a bisexual body, or from selling wares without underwear.
When Althaus-Reid invites us to visit her city, Buenos Aires, and to take walks in
the barrios, she invites us to take in the sights of humans, animals, houses, trees; to take
in the smells of garbage and flowers, food and humans, coffee and sex; to tune into the
sounds of political songs and theological discussions. She then invites us to think about
what we thought when seeing her streets, because “[i]mpressions in foreign lands are so
deceptive.”50 She then presents this image as metaphor for the fragmentation of
subjectivity, the multiple consciousness effected by violently imposed Christian and
European narratives. The lemon vendors provide Althaus-Reid with the imagery of
bodily experience, and Althaus-Reid insists that “[t]hose lemon vendors can tell you a
few things about postmodernism.”51 Though as Althaus-Reid continues, it appears that it
is the image more than the actual lemon vendors speaking, it is what the lemon vendors

itself into an objective description of the world. But to do so, one must bracket attitudes and
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may invoke in the interpreting theologian rather than their experiences themselves, that
does the telling in Althaus-Reid’s work. Thus, the intellectual agency of decoding and
interpreting this imagery is clearly aligned with Althaus-Reid, while the lemon vendors
fade into the background as material, rather than as agents of theology. 52
Yet how might I follow this invitation to do theology from the sexual experiences
of the marginalized, without falling for what Althaus-Reid called (and criticized)
“theological voyeurism”?53 Body theology intervenes at this junction, inviting me to feel
and sense a bit longer, to pay attention to sensual cues and the sensory limits I am
traveling with. Possibly, having been schooled by postcolonial feminists, I might already
be aware that I am meeting her lemon vendors not in perceptual innocence. And I might
be cued into my own visualist biases, paying attention to how I look and position myself
in relation to the lemon vendors, and what my visual judgments of or in the encounter
are. Thrown into perceptual unknowns, I might experience offense, surprise,
disorientation. Body theology principles challenge me to look for the sense in bodily
experiences (e.g., the lemon vendors bodily movements already make sense and create
meaning, before and without my acts of interpretation). And I am challenged to refrain
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from using body theology as framework of certainty in interpretation, but rather remain
unsettled and attend to meaning emerging in bodily (and interpretative) encounters.
Sexuality and its embodied manifestations have often been posited as antagonist
to theological enterprises. When Althaus-Reid seeks to establish the sexual as integral to
critical theological analysis of economical, political, cultural, colonial structures, she
might be invoking the emerging smell of lemons blending with genital scents. But she
immediately connects smells to sex, invoking a metaphorical connection between
sexuality and economics, locating theological messages at this intersection in the street of
Buenos Aires. Yet this might be a rushed connection to make. Lacking bodily perceptual
immersions in this context myself, bringing body theology principles to Althaus-Reid can
nevertheless provide a way to more fully ground her theology in the experiences she
invokes.
For example, exploring bodily experiences in terms of perceptual dimension, what
meanings could be detected emerging when paying attention to the smells on the street?
Is it the smell of sex or the smell of poverty blending with the lemons? Is it a perceptual
movement which claims space? How does smell align bodily movements, and what
might be pre-reflective currents, and what might be perceptual emergences, or alignments
of bodily orientations, supported by them? What emerging meanings might be perceived
and expressed by the lemon vendors? While the lemon vendors might lack the jargon of
cultural criticism (and even body theology), what do they speak, in other words, what are
their linguistic expressions, their movements of sound, smell, touch, taste, intuition or
knowledge? What are the sensory relations within which religious, sexual, economic, and
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political practices are performed? What is the full sensorium through which these
performances take place, and what emerges from it? What is the significance of sensory
hierarchies and orders, how do the senses (e.g. the smell/ing of lemon vendors) interact
with and engage in the political, the economical, etc.?
Exploring more fully the sense in bodily experience, I am urged to consider the
significances of different sensory perceptions and their interactions. How do particular
women create their own sexual, economic, political, personal spaces through their bodily
movements, how do they bodily-habitually engage in life? What are the aspects of culture
and power that are difficult to unravel by simply gazing at the lemon vendor? What kinds
of agency and resistances are perceptually embodied as a bodily subject selling lemons
without underwear? To learn of this, and be implicated by my own immersions in sensory
dominations, I need to be able to take up theology from the epistemological site that is
Althaus-Reidian bodies filled/filling space with senses, rather than be immediately
thrown into the theological imagery presented. Moving too quickly from observed
experience to metaphor may reinstall a dualism when the intellectual activity of
interpretation and metaphorical representation of experience as theological critique takes
up almost immediate focus.
Ambiguity and paradoxes may emerge in the perceptual dimensions on the streets
of Buenos Aires. Smells may evoke memory, place, and agency, as anyone who has
experienced nostalgia at the smell of whatever you consider comfort food can attest to.
Smells might signify inclusion and/or they can signify distance and cultural difference.
As beauty lies in the eye of the beholder, so does the scent of home lay in the nose of the
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one smelling it. In the case of our hypothetical visit to the imagined lemon vendors in
Buenos Aires, perceived olfactory differences often turn to oppression when class and
cultural differences are turned into “filth” and “stench,” which are associated with
uncleanliness or immorality. So Althaus-Reid is right when she charges that the private
and the public, the sexual and the economic are mixed. But there might be compelling
ways in which this interrelation can be explored and articulated, ways in which I might be
implicated beyond my positioning as theological voyeur.
The refusal to comply with the olfactory sensibilities of the decent theological
tourist (me) or upper class sensory ideologies might be the sensory disruption of
hegemonic spaces. Aromas, sights, and textures are not autonomous from their political
and economic milieu. A bodily contestation of olfactory aesthetics can disrupt colonial
spaces, and the lemon vendors may create a place in which their bodies, their olfactory
emissions, rule; they may create a scented place in which they cope with their embodied
reality and displacements, in which they make their bodies and their places a home.
Attention to bodily perceptual orientations and exploration of sensory dimensions
might not significantly alter the theological output of Althaus-Reid’s work, but it would
support and strengthen her resourcing of experience, especially when she seeks to
maintain the bodily/sexual aspects therein. Body theology in this case would be able to
provide a methodological contribution to indecent theology by lingering with/in bodily
experiences. Body theology not only provides indecent theology with questions to raise
regarding experience, but with ways to draw the material connections, and show the
connections that (are) matter, between the experience drawn from and historical, political,
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economical, etc., dimensions. Because sexual decency is enforced through experience,
through bodily perceptual experience, indecent theology can only gain from in-depth
inquiries into perceptual orientations. Even as outsider, I might be able to inquire into a
bodily situation exactly by implicating myself, by asking questions which might reveal
my own bodily perceptual limits and limited orientations.
Attending to bodily experiences of others or of my own in search of metaphors,
even with the explicit and passionate concerns held by Althaus-Reid, needs to delay the
departure into the symbolic until the layered and multifaceted perceptual experiences and
movements are felt rather than abstracted. To ground theology in lived experiences is
seeking to be fully present to them and attending to the ways in which I might be drawn
into experiences to which I do and do not belong. Put differently, I am bodily
encountering the other, and my own bodily perceptual orientations and alignments
habituate me to experience in certain ways and pay attention to certain components. Yet
there are also ways in which some dimensions or components of this experience I want to
draw from are perceptually hidden, or habitually not perceived, by me. This is the
ambiguity and the paradox of bodily experience which requires that I remain
epistemologically unsettled when exploring experience.
Althaus-Reid’s indecent theology and Heyward’s relational theology have been
my test cases to show how body theology can expand and strengthen some of the
theologies which seek to be grounded in bodily experience in different ways. I will now
turn again to bodies and experiences familiar and personal to me. With the principles of
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body theology framing my inquiries, I will go after the questions which initiated this
project and bodily experiences of and in my family’s home.
Orientation of Family Bodies
I am re-entering my experiences in and with my family after having travelled
through theoretical and theological spaces to explore how our bodies and experiences
situate us in the world. To conclude this project, I will return to familiar experiences and
explore them through body theology. With body theology as a commitment guided by
principles (rather than a specific theological method or system), I will show what body
theology can do analytically and theologically by offering glimpses into body theology at
work in different existing theological models.
By re-visiting shared experiences with my grandmother and mother, and setting
out with body theology and attention to bodily perceptual orientation, I acknowledge our
bodily movements, social habituations, and perceptual repertoires as loci for meaning to
emerge. For example, my mother’s cooking in the garage and her inhabiting the marginal
spaces of our home is a place where everyday experiences give rise to meanings shaped
by bodily/cultural differences running through and across this household.
The starting point for a critical inquiry into the shared experiences at my
childhood home is an appreciation for these cultural differences as bodily encounter, and
an understanding that this inhabited space is one of the dimensions through which we can
see how our bodily experiences “are us.” What (feminist) analysis of the visual aspects
and/or textual meanings embodied in the marginality of my mother’s position in the
home have enabled me to do thus far is to inquire into the inscription of “immigrant,”
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“daughter-in-law,” “foreigner,” and/or “mother” on my mother’s body. But taking bodily
perception seriously, now that I conceive of the senses not as intrinsic, natural-biological
properties of the body, I can inquire into the ways in which our perceptions and
perceptual movements are not “innocent,” but the situated practices of our lives together
with various meanings emerging.
Making Home in New Spaces
It was the middle of World War II. My grandmother fled the invading Russian
army, leaving her home in West Prussia with three toddlers but without her husband
(who was detained and later died in a Siberian camp). Displaced for three years in a
refugee camp in Denmark, Oma was resettled after the war ended. She was brought to a
small rural Mennonite community in southern Germany, where residents were obligated
to take in fellow Mennonite refugees. Dropped off in the middle of the village and lined
up for residents to come and chose “their” Flüchtling, as single mother with three small
children, Oma was the last one “picked.” She was not the kind of help the farmers were
hoping to acquire. For ten years, Oma tried to move out of the arranged accommodations
and looked for a place of her own to rent for her small family, but was denied for various
reasons (children too little, too big, no husband, etc.). When the state offered grants for
families seeking to establish a new farmstead, she jumped on the chance and started a
poultry farm with 20 chickens. After some years, the chicken house turned into a shed
and the farm was no more, but Oma’s family had a home. My uncle and my father
designed and built the house, but it was Oma’s dream and efforts that allowed a home to
emerge.
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Oma was determined to stay in this house, her home, for as long as she lived. In
her will, she gave the house to my father, her favorite son and the last of her children to
get married. This will legally cemented her right to stay in the house until her death.
When Oma slowly came to need various kinds of care, my father Gernot was designated
her power of attorney and her caretaker. His siblings who lived close by offered much
advice, yet very little bodily care.
My mother was the foreign woman who married Oma’s favorite son and moved
into the house Oma fought to provide her children with after living as refugees in one
room for years. My grandmother was the matriarch, and my mother tried her best to
learn how to be a good German wife and daughter-in-law. But severe homesickness and
the need for familiar cuisine led my mother to cooking Thai cuisine at home, an act that
offended my grandmother’s sense of proper nurture and her basic sense of proper smell.
My mother was increasingly seen as the unruly, unthankful, renegade daughter-in-law
who, rather than nursing Oma to “help out her poor husband,” went off to work twelve
hour shifts of physical labor tending to vineyards.
Today, if you pass our home during non-meal times, all you see is a house and a
two-car garage with two adjoining garden huts. Yet during meal time, the garage opens
and reveals a gas stove my father built, a fridge, and an array of tables with dishes and
German and Thai kitchen tools. One of the garden huts is an outdoor dining room, with a
table, more kitchen ware, and memorabilia from trips to Thailand. There we gather
around a table, food brought out from the garage, and hear my mother calling us to “Sit
down and eat, eat, eat, before it gets cold!”
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***
This narrative, a compilation of stories shared with me and
recollections/depictions of my own experiences, is, of course, not “all that there is to it.”
To do body theology with these experiences, framing them through bodily perceptual
orientation, I can get a grasp of bodily experiences and their perceptual dimensions whilst
also maintaining a constructive flexibility. By that I suggest: meaning emerges in
experience, and as we have seen, experience is perceptual; and my telling and thinking
about past experiences is an experience itself, thus always open to new meanings
emerging; constructive body theology then resists fixing a narrative, but rather “moves
with” experience. Considering my family’s bodily perceptual movements as extensions
of their body-selves into the world in real, tangible ways, body theology takes as resource
our experiences at home as motile engagements with the world that orient us towards
ways of achieving objectives and meaning, as projections of meaning, and as patterns that
shape our way of being in the world.
The physical house, our family home, came to be an extension of my
grandmother’s body. The house as home was the settling of her bodily habits and desires
into her environment (the ways in which bodies extend through and construct culture);
the house was incorporated into the way she moved and existed in her world. The
presence of my mother, as non-Mennonite, non-Christian, non-German, and my mother’s
alien ways of moving (through language, cooking, bodily relating, etc.) were intrusions
into my grandmother’s physical space, into her home-body. Tension of sounds and smells
were bodily perceptual tensions and invasions. My mother, aligned with her own socio-
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cultural habits of honoring elders, especially mothers and grandmothers, sought to make
bodily sense of her new space, her new home, by becoming part of this bodily space in
the bodily ways she tacitly knew.
My grandmother’s prohibition against cooking certain Thai dishes for the whole
family was then, in some ways, a way to maintain bodily sense at home, to maintain
certain meanings emerging, certain bodily habits of nurture. But in other ways it was also
a way of dominating family practices and asserting control over my mother’s decision
making. To my mother, it also emerged as bodily perceptual re-orientation of her
experiences, as sensory re-education/re-habituation, as restriction of bodily perceptual
movements which impinged on habituated and tacit knowledges about herself and
meanings familiar to my mother. If my mother chose to align with the family of my
father, she had to align—among other things—with a certain food culture of tastes,
smells, and presentations in order to be able to emerge as fit mother and nurturer. 54
The struggle over who and what dictated bodily movements, and with it, ways of
being in the world that was our home, required that certain bodily and social habits
needed to be changed, and certain sensory desires came to be out of reach. The two
women inhabited a space in ways which in their bodily movements and habituated tacit
54
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knowledges called attention to the multicultural and multiperceptual tensions woven into
their relationship: regarding what is meaningful, what conforms to family values, what
emerges as meaningful and communicative bodily perceptual movements, what emerges
as family body perceptually aligned with “home.”
My mother’s cooking within and despite certain rules and restrictions is not just a
development of differential consciousness,55 but is the recognition and identification of
technologies of power which subscribed her place and subjectivity. 56 In my mother’s
culture, elders are honored and family values are aligned with the mother who is
everything: children are indebted morally and practically to the mother, a bodily
perceptual alignment which informs Thai socio-cultural life, private and public.57 When
talking about her garage kitchen, mom often lets me know that she did move cooking
outside not because she was angry or because she wanted to be separate. Her main
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reason, she continues to tell me, are because she has respect for Oma and wanted peace in
the family:
“You can’t change a situation by fighting or being greedy and wanting everything
for your own. You bring about peace in the family by adjusting, not by forcing
others to change for you. Changing what you do with your body is how you
change the world around you. That’s how you bring about peace. You start with
yourself. You show respect.”58
Yet my mother’s desire for bodily perceptual familiarity—the feeling of being
home and with family through the taste, smell, and touch of food and process of
preparation and presentation—is also connected to a recognition and identification of
oppressive power dynamics extended through my grandmother. Mom would never call it
that, or even refer to it negatively. Her linguistic signifying of this situation still embodies
respect: “She didn’t like it very much;” “She said Gernot would like the Königsberger
Klopse for dinner.” So she spatially and temporarily moved her food habits to the
margins of the kitchen first, keeping a hot plate in a kitchen corner. She often begged my
father to set up a separate kitchen in a different room of the house, but when this request
was not fulfilled, she moved her kitchen to the margins of the home, into the garage.
From the margins, she extends olfactorily and inhabits space and bodies. She survives
demeaning and disempowering structures and nationalistic-racist ideologies by moving
resistantly in the home, saturating herself and her space with marvelous aromas.
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The garage kitchen is a spectacle and a subversion:59 It is a spectacle in that my
family and our familial social relations are mediated by the visual imagery of the way in
which the home and the kitchen(s) are arranged and presented, but visible only during
certain times and to certain observers or partakers. And it is subversion in that this
marginal inhabitation critiques and resists my mother’s position in the family. She
navigates my grandmother’s intrusive and abusive movements (treating her as the maid,
questioning her ways of being a wife and mother) in bodily perceptual ways. She is
unwilling to give up certain bodily habits (such as cooking and eating in ways she
chooses), just because my father, even after she pleaded with him to move out of the
home, or to make her a kitchen of her own, is unwilling/unable to accommodate her
desire for meaningful bodily movements, for a way of being in the world and in her home
that was meaningful to her.
A discursive or visual analysis cannot relate the embodied dimensions involved in
the emergence of multiple and indeterminate meanings here. An analysis through
concepts of power, identity, and struggle for respect and dignity cannot grasp the full
sensorium which makes up bodily experiences in my family: neither the pre-reflective
current and habituated orientations and habits supporting this family, nor the ambiguity
and tensions emerging.
The bodily perceptual orientations of the rural German Mennonite village still
align my mother with otherness, her food practices now emerging even more as alien and
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associated with strange habits. My mother’s olfactory and culinary extensions are not
autonomous from the socio-cultural, familial, and moral mechanisms and currents. She is
wrapped up in perceptual orientations, “This is not how normal people do it, but I don’t
care,” and perceptual alignments, “You go and get your degree, so you can get a good job
and you don’t have to live like I live.” Yet she also expresses that her difference is as
much personal choice as it is tacit knowledge out of/about bodily difference. “I can do
what I want out here. You wouldn’t be able to do any of this; you are not used to these
kinds of things. And I want you to have a better life,” she says as she fluidly moves
around her garage kitchen space and invites me to sit down and watch her. Because there
is no body without consciousness, and no consciousness without body, and because the
way we move, see, smell, eat, speak, cook, feel is our consciousness of our world, my
mother’s bodily experiences and perceptual movements are her differential
consciousness, her differential bodily perceptual orientation resisting consensus with
oppressing socio-cultural schemata.
In bodily perceptual movement—such as cooking and consuming certain foods
prepared a certain way—the space of home and the bodies making up our family are
mutually constituted. Only in the experience of bodily habits (even as they change) can
our bodily movements be meaningfully grasped, and I as body moving into and within
this space am implicated in the meanings and the tacit knowledges emerging
perceptually. Even after my grandmother began requiring more intensive care than my
father could provide and moved into a nursing home, my mother refused to use the inside
kitchen again, or any other room previously occupied by my grandmother. She would
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often refer to not wanting to appear as the greedy daughter-in-law, but even more she
would talk about the smells dominating certain rooms of the house, smells she did not
want to dwell in.
My grandmother still extended in bodily perceptual (olfactory) ways in/through
house. Her way of being in the world, and perceptual manners meaningful to my mother,
still extended and moved and made meaning in the home. Though my grandmother could
not verbally abuse or control my mother anymore, and her body did not dwell in the
house anymore, her bodily perceptual reach still extended into the home in powerful
ways, aligning my mother in ways so that she could only perceptually emerge on the
margins of the home. Today, over three years after my grandmother’s passing, with
rooms now renovated and smells expelled, my mother utilizes her garage kitchen,
cooking Thai dishes outside, baking German cheesecakes inside. “It’s too tight in there
sometimes. I need air.”
Body theology demands that I recognize bodily experiences as making sense: My
mother inhabits certain spaces. She is still inhabiting marginal spaces and only slowly
moving into others. She now cooks in two kitchens and has different habits of eating in
three different rooms. This is not a coincidence, nor indecision. Her bodily movements
and perceptual extensions infer and imply sense, make conceptual order in her world, and
make her world meaningful. And her bodily experiences are her sense-making in the
world, her sensing and feeling herself in the world and as part of her world through
various sensory movements and extensions. Her body theology is a taking hold of her
home through extensions of smell, through adjustment and acquisition of bodily habits
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such as eating in a way that feels meaningful to her. She bodily reaches out and extends
her garage kitchen as the smell of fried garlic and fish sauce wafts across the patio and
into the living spaces of our home. In the space of home, bodily (re)orientations and
movements align the meanings emerging regarding home, body, world and emerging
meaning through perceptual means.
Body theology allows me to gain a more complex understanding of these
experiences. My mother’s emergence was/is perceptually aligned in the community with
her foreign religious habits, her lack of conforming to “Christian” or “German” values.
The above-mentioned strong loyalties towards mothers in Thai culture led my mother to
try and take care of Grandmother, but Grandmom made clear she did not want my mother
to care for her in ways that left her feeling less than a matriarch. So my mother, failing
and then refusing to conform to the role of primary caretaker of my grandmother, crosses
perceptual lines of the community she lives in. Her bodily movements are not perceived
as liberating herself from verbal and emotional abuse experienced by my grandmother, so
she does not perceptually emerge as for example, victim-turned-survivor of emotional
violence, but rather perceptually emerges aligned with national and religious foreignness
and moral otherness.
There are different sediment cultural and social habits, pre-reflective currents
supporting the emerging meanings of my family’s bodily movements: Currents of
nationalism and sediment habits of isolation of a non-mainstream religious community
supported attitudes towards my grandmother and her children that ranged from hostile to
indifferent, despite the theological commitments to hospitality and inclusion valued in
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Mennonite communities and preached in the village church. My mother emerges and
moves into the family space as immigrant through marriage, which threatens the already
hard-won perceptual alignment of the family with the village community.
But the very bodily, emotional, social, and spiritual marginalization of my mother
is supported by the similar pre-reflective currents which aligned my grandmother as
refugee and then re-aligned her with national and religious sameness. Nationalism,
religion, and rural community culture shape the ways in which our family bodies emerge,
which bodily movements gain greater currency in shaping what our bodies “can.” My
grandmother’s desire for home and a space of her own—induced by experiences of war,
homelessness, poverty, and widowhood—brings about bodily perceptual movements
through which she engages her world in a way meaningful to her. But these movements,
these perceptual extensions in the world regarding home and family, supported by prereflective currents or nationalism and religion, also support and establish perceptual
habits and devices which allow for tacit knowledge about my mother, her foreignness,
her unruliness, her strange bodily habits which do not make sense in the home my
grandmother inhabits. “Thai people cook outside,” my mother says. Struggling to emerge
bodily perceptually in ways that make home meaningful to her, my mother takes up and
tries on different bodily movements, attempting to orient herself in this new space. Yet
what might be meaningful to her might not allow her to perceptually emerge in ways in
which home, or other desires, are available to her.
There are ambiguities emerging in the garage kitchen and the bodily movements
within it. The bodily perceptual alignments arranging our family bodies and the ways we
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perceptually face each other and move toward each other give rise to my mother as a
marginal body, a daughter-in-law who moves in many foreign ways and who refuses to
comply with certain social habits. Yet my mother’s bodily perceptual movements also
give rise to habits which orient her in her space, which bring forth and project meanings
for her invoking, for example, home and agency. The knowledges inherent in her
perceptual acts are knowledges gained through specific perceptual orientations and
movements. And from the margins of the family home, she knows how to raise/habituate
her daughters in ways to maximize their perceptual passing as Germans and Mennonites,
and she knows how to bodily move in ways so that even given the pre-reflective social
and familial currents, she can inhabit space and extend in space in a way that makes her
way of being meaningfully “home” to her.
This body theology approach to my family home and our family bodies allows me
to get a more complex grasp on the meanings emerging in and through bodily
experiences. This grasp is contingent on what I can perceive from within my own
orientations to perception and on what I can perceive when crossing or being queered to
my perceptual habits. I continue to experience space and time with my parents, and
through the glimpses of and into difference I can deepen my understanding of my
family’s history or my mother’s culture. The experiences I recalled and revisited here for
this project are, of course, my own bodily perceptions, what I have grasped as meaningful
and significant in, from, and through what I have seen, heard, smelled, touched, felt and
thought with my family. And meanings emerging may shift and change, as I remember,
analyze, and imagine the family situations I have described here. My own perceptions
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must remain open to new experiences (remembering, analyzing, imagining being bodily
perceptual experiences as well), new reflections and interpretations, different orientations
and re-alignments, they must remain as motile as our bodily existence.
My understanding is partial and must remain unsettled. My grasp on the habitual
schemata, the tacit knowledges concerning bodily habits that are meaningful and
communicative in my family space is tentative and continuously open. I continue to
experience with others, thus I must remain open to the experiences, perceptions,
challenges and complexification others might bring to me, and new meaning arising in
our interrelation. This is a positional, yet motile, openness that is not without tension,
gaps, or fissures. For example as my mother listens to the descriptions of her kitchen I
used in this dissertation and we seek to find common, meaningful understanding in
German, we both continue translating—me doing English/German, her doing
Thai/German cultural-linguistic-perceptual movements—as we speak about our
experiences and experience each other.
I might “miss” certain knowledges about what is meaningful, about which bodily
movements may bring about the meanings and desired values to be perceived. I might not
come to know or understand everything my mother knows or understands. Some
meanings cannot emerge perceptually within my “other” perceptual hierarchy, in other
words, there might be meaning extending for and perceived by mother, but not for me,
Meanings lost in translation as my bodily perceptual orientations do not tune me into her
habituated meaning-making processes; words we share in common may not represent
experiences in their sensorial significance. Yet this openness and tentativeness can be a
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strength of body theology, granted we are willing to embrace this epistemological
transitoriness.
Body Theologies at Home
To do body theology is to talk about our bodily perceptual orientations, our bodysense in and of the world, connected to specific contexts, locations, and experiences.
Body theology can be done while pursuing other overarching theological goals, for
example, within a systematic approach or a contextual/sexual theology. Or it can be done
as constructive body theology “on its own,” focusing on the specific ways in which
bodily experiences make sense and create meaning, without connecting it to specific
theistic concepts or commonly associated religious artifacts such as scripture or rituals. In
other words, because body theology is more a set of principles rather than a step-by-step
method for theological application, it can accompany a theology to assist in more
complex resourcing of experience, or it can provide principles from which to construct a
specific body theology grounded in particular experiences.
My family experiences as resource can “do” things theologically. Just like
experience is not fixed to inherent meanings or significances, so is the connection
between experience and theology. Below I will offer glimpses and experiments of what
body theology looks like constructively. I will provide theological takes of how the
aforementioned theological models of Heyward and Althaus-Reid might take shape when
done with body theology, and experiment constructively with a body theology of my own
making.
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Mutuality at Home
By putting body theology to work in Heyward’s theology of mutual relation, I can
attend to my own experiences by exploring my family’s emergence in the world. The
alienation or alignments with marginality emerging in my family relations are multiple
and complex but can be grasped through a body theology approach. The mutual
embeddedness of my family in various pre-reflective currents gives rise to perceptual
emergences, so that my mother’s emergence on the margins of the family home in the
garage kitchen can be connected to interpersonal relations and national, religious,
cultural, racial, gendered, and economical dynamics, pre-reflective and immediate.
To inquire into the perceptual dimensions of our existence allows us to understand
complexly how bodily feelings or apprehension of meaning emerge from the ways in
which we and our environment are aligned and shaped. The specific meanings of home
emerging, the specific desires for home, and the specific ways in which we face, access,
and can move towards this desire are constituted and made bodily and perceptually
available through the ways in which we bodily perceptually exist in our specific context.
To live as a family through the erotic justice Heyward conceptualizes as “God,”
we must aim for just relations through bodily expressions, feelings, and movements by
taking into take into account the complexity of how our family bodies emerged together.
The mutuality in which my family is embedded is in the interrelated family dynamics,
and in the interrelations of culture, history, and community context. Erotic justice then
goes beyond bodily relations that might rearrange space in a way that visually places my
mother at the center of the home again. To move toward right relations is to move toward
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justice with our full sensorium, our touch, smell, hearing, seeing, and thereby our
knowing, not abstract truth about my mother’s agency, full humanity and dignity, but
tasting, and smelling and touching and seeing her way of being in the world.
Yet these movements toward right relations remain ambiguous movements,
because the meaning emerging between our bodies (as we eat in the garage or turn a
dining room into a bedroom for my grandmother to make easier her increased need for
care) may shift, and may continue certain alienating perceptual alignments as they disrupt
others. In other words, bodily moving to disrupt perceptual orientations of and within our
relational space may align my mother more closely with desired meanings and
experiences of mutuality; and currents of nationalism and Christian supremacy align her
possibly more strongly as a foreign and alienated body as she now more freely and more
regularly moves in her own different cultural and religious habits.
Body theology embraces the uncertainty and unknowing emerging in the bodily
existence of my grandmother in her last years. Because she always exists as bodyconsciousness, even when she might not be consciously self-aware, her bodily
movements still display habits and thus she still engages in meaning making, still has a
way of being in the world.60 Since bodily experience is how we exist, and bodily
experience makes sense, Grandmother might show no “intellectual grasp” on her
environment anymore after thirteen years with Alzheimer’s disease, but as body-self she
still holds agency. We still extend perceptually towards and with each other; she still
60

I am grateful to David N. Scott for bringing to my attention the significance of differentiating
between consciousness and self-consciousness. See also Raymond Gibbs’ pointing toward a possibility of
consciousness not necessitating self-consciousness, though his focus in the chapter referenced is on
exploring emotion and consciousness as interrelated through embodiment. Jr. Raymond W. Gibbs,
Embodiment and Cognitive Science (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 239-274.
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holds power over our movements around the house. Her bodily presence still affects how
mine obtains meaning. She is still making sense to me and with me because she
participates in the world we inhabit together.
Body theology principles allow me take a close look at the way bodies are aligned
in space, how bodies follow certain lines of perception and movement, tracing how
mutuality and relationality may be emerging. Now the ambiguities and paradoxes
emerging might align my Grandmother as “just a body”, aligning her with values in
which her life doesn’t make much sense to us anymore. The pre-reflective current, our
mutual embeddedness in life orients us toward her already perceiving her and her
dementia fearfully and doubtfully. Our social habituation idealizes the mind and all the
control over life we think it affords us, so she cannot possibly be fully human if she “lost
her mind.” To live in just relations might entail living with the ambiguities emerging
between our bodies, acknowledging that my bodily movements extend hopelessness,
disdain, and patronizing attitudes. But always also right there, not breaking in from the
outside, but as godding among us, as part of the current we move in together, is also
hope, love, care; laboring dances of mutuality because my being is still bound up with
hers and so her body still makes sense with mine.
Indecency at Home
Putting the above explored bodily experiences in conversation with AlthausReid’s indecent theology, I am urged to attend to the full sensorium of sexual
experiences. How do the bodily experiences I decently described above connect to
sexuality, and then again interrelate to the cultural, national, racial, political, economical;
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in other words, how do we think through sexual experiences within the complex matrices
of social power? I can begin by wondering about the bodily perceptual orientations
regarding sexual and marital decency my grandmother and my mother sought to teach me
growing up. My grandmother could only perceptually emerge as a decent widowed
refugee by being aligned with cultural habits which made only her own children and
relations available for familial desires. Even though she was widowed at a young age, she
never remarried, nor became emotionally or romantically involved with another man.
Decent sexual relations were marital relations, which she not only aligned with
heteronormative nuclear families, but also Mennonite and German alignments. Her
children crossed those perceptual alignments, the first marrying a Protestant, the second a
widowed Catholic, and the third, my father, a Thai Buddhist.
My mother, moving into a space of new and different pre-reflective currents,
needed to emerge as sexually decent. German-Thai marriages are not uncommon in
Germany, though these couples perceptually emerge as questionably decent at best, the
meanings emerging often aligning the (commonly) younger Thai woman as sexual object
of an economically superior and older German man. Perceived decency may be achieved
through heteronormative alignments. My mother and father take care to emerge
differently, to be perceptually aligned as a couple that emerges with a romantic love
story, not a common or habituated social bodily perception of a German-Thai couple.
These pre-reflective currents shaped their emergence as a couple, their bodily movements
seeking re-alignments and seeking the shape of meaningful emergences between them
and the world.
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My parents movements and alignments with(in) decency then also shaped their
perception of me as I crossed lines of decency and emerged as a lesbian body. My
parents’ concerns regarding my bodily movements, be it coming out or be it engaging in
sexual relations, were/are significantly aligned with the perceived meaning emerging as I
bodily move as lesbian. To them, these meanings are significantly shaped through
economical alignments (will our daughter be able to have a career without fear of
discrimination?), because of the way in which their own relationship and sexual
alignments were supported by pre-reflective currents of racism, nationalism, and
Christian supremacy affecting their family and home economically, for example, through
my mother’s career options or job discrimination based on her perceptual emergence as
foreigner and sexually indecent woman.
An immigrant Thai-Christ might be found in the sexual body of a woman who
dreams of freedom from poverty and finds romance in a German husband, yet who
remains alien and queer in the many bodily perceptual orientations she finds herself in.
There might be indecent redemption, found in maintaining peace in home spaces through
physically distancing, yet intermingling and penetrating perceptually in space. There
might be queer atonement, where experienced difference limits our actions, yet we act
nevertheless and may even contribute to our own oppression, and yet we continue to live
and struggle to protect and respect what is different. This kind of redemption and
atonement of the immigrant Thai-Christ might be indecent, because it does not exclude
tragedy. She crosses lines of decency, and her agency is found in subversive and
persistent perceptual movements, ambiguous meanings emerging so that her daughter,
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too, can dream of a romance dis-orienting to social habituations. She does not redeem
into decent liberation, but into ever new crisscrossing, queering, indecent indeterminate
eschatologies.
Constructing Home with Body Theology
I grew up in a home where my mother and grandmother encouraged and
facilitated my maturing in German and Christian culture. Yet in my own body theology,
guided by principles that maintain that bodily experiences make sense, and that body
theology does ambiguity and paradoxes, I want to extend respect and appreciation for my
mother’s cultural, religious, and perceptual difference. Thus my theological inclinations
here seek to be more comparative and non-theistic rather than systematic or contextually
metaphorical. In other words, I am inclined to think critically and constructively about
“home” rather than “God” or “Christ,” since for my mother, Christian symbols are not
necessarily how she makes sense of her experience. I am also convinced that I can
explore what is commonly conceived of with God-symbols with other concepts, as to
speak of “God” might be limited and limiting in this interreligious and intercultural
context, to my own constructive imagination as well as the readers. Below I will inquire
into “home” theologically, turning to the bodily experiences described above as a
resource. Doing so, I will experiment with a body theology of home, attending to the
bodily perceptual ways in which home is aligned and meaningfully emerges.
The ways in which “home” perceptually emerged for Grandmom was
spatial/bodily/perceptual habits regarding her bodily movements, her extensions through
gardening, cooking, caring for her children and grandchildren. I grew up watching and
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enjoying my grandmother’s touch, the ways in which she walked the perimeters of her
property tracing the fence with her hands, held open her arms on Saturday mornings
when I jumped into her bed for an hour of storytelling, how she tucked me in and sang
me lullabies before I went to sleep at night. She dreamed of a home and filled it with the
Prussian meals of her own childhood, with songs sung and socks knitted in ways
meaningful to her.
This home in which my mother struggled to find home for herself was so
embedded and interrelated with my grandmother’s perceptual movements that the
cooking of food or the playing of music became contested perceptual movements. The
tastes and fragrances meaning home to my mother were forbidden in the bodily home my
grandmother extended. From the margins, the scents of my mother’s home penetrate the
boundaries and walls of the house my grandmother built, yet it is not until spaces—the
walls, the furniture, home objects—are realigned with new smells that my mother extends
her home to other spaces within the walls of the house. My mother’s singing to loudly
played Thai folk music while she is ironing laundry, to the annoyance of other family
members, is bodily extension, gendered and cultural perceptual movements claiming and
inhabiting space, making home through specific ways of facing and engaging the world.
These bodily perceptual movements and orientations are aligned through sociocultural pre-reflective currents, currents of German nationalism, Christian supremacy,
racialized gender alignments, Thai-Buddhist family habituations, Prussian sense of order
and decency, heteronormative alignments of economical bodies. So when my family
bodily perceptually theologizes—makes meaning of—home, we are oriented to home as
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belonging, cultural and social competency and passing, freedom and agency within
familial space that is created and aligned through a full bodily sensorium. To be disoriented to home is to become dis-oriented to the way my home looks to me, disorienting myself to the ways I am aligning the image of home through my own bodily
movements and representations. To dis-orient home in a liberative sense is to re-habituate
myself to perceive home in ways I am not habituated to: to appreciate a home that looks
strange for the familial smells, the touches of home my mother now traces when she
leaves her book of prayers on the kitchen table, the sound of home when I ask her what
she prayed and she just smiles and tells me in Thai because there is no other way to say it.
And what I understand is this emerging as home, ambiguously, tentatively, but always
through body-sense.
This body theology of/at home maintains that my family’s bodily experiences
make sense, not despite, but in their ambiguity and unsettledness. My grandmother’s
home, her bodily perceptual agency, even as she no longer inhabits the house and her
cognitive capacities are severely impaired, is a home shaped with her bodily movements.
Her dignity and agency emerge in the space that is home, and even after her passing, the
mutual movements supporting the emergence of home are still shaping bodily
movements in the home after her death. Yet the home emerging, in the ambiguous
meaning created through bodily movements, also restricted my mother’s bodily
movements in significant ways, so that her body-sense of home was violently re-shaped.
Even without fully “capturing” or without fully understanding/translating what my
mother’s experiences are like, I can acknowledge that her bodily experience makes sense,
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that she embodies and extends her agency and resistance in ways that do not require a
feminist consciousness. My mother’s subaltern body-sense extends and moves in the
space that continuously becomes home, the meaning of which shifts as our bodies
continue to move and experience with each other.
This sketching of a body theology of home can keep closely together not just
body/mind, or experience/thought, but also submission/resistance, dignity/abjection,
home/alienation, and other experiences emerging in our bodily movements. My mother’s
bodily movements are never just resignation/suffering or resistance/liberation, but always
both/and. She submits bodily by establishing her kitchen in a garage, but she also
perceptually extends in ways no physical or visual boundaries can restrict.
My bodily experiences of home and my family make sense: There are ambiguous
meanings emerging for me as I revisit my home—the German-Thai daughter with
Mennonite allegiances, married to another woman, turned feminist theologian in the
space of the US academy—I return to a home which now often appears strange to me,
having made a new home and established new bodily perceptual movements in a space
with different perceptual dimensions. My bodily experiences are paradoxical: I return to
my family home as insider and outsider, aligned with my family’s perceptual orientations
and queer to them. My returning—physically, in conversation, in imagination, in
recollecting—is present as well as presented to me, and queers me ambiguously. For
example, I am queer to my mother’s cultural and religious difference, queer through my
new “American” habits, queer as the lesbian in a straight family, but also decent in my
economic and familial habits, my taking up of familial alignments as daughter. My bodily
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experiences maintain an unsettled body theology: I gained a more complex understanding
of what meanings emerge as we gather for lunch in a garage. Yet I am very aware that
this more complex grasp, this deeper understanding, might shift and change—slightly or
drastically—with each motile engagement that lies ahead.
Conclusion
I do not have to write on or about bodies but without doubt will always write
through bodies, my own and those with whom I am mutually emerging and becoming. So
then, what would an adjective “body” do, facing disembodied though divinized
masculinities of the theological Word? Our bodily experiences are what immerse us in
“the stuff” of who we are and what this life is made of, and we move as bodies in various
perceptual dimensions. If bodily experience is difficult to express or narrate, it is because
it is always on the edge of, never reducible to or arrested within, what is speakable. 61 But
theologizing, if taken beyond thought and speech to perceptual movements, is not
impossible.
Theologies which seek to be grounded in experience as a critical source for
reflection, which want to robustly engage particularities of embodiment and construct
complex arguments about the role of bodily particulars such as gender, race, sexual
orientation, ability, or nationality, must attend to the way we exist in the world through
our bodily perceptual orientations. Attending to experience as bodily perceptual
existence, acknowledging the ways in which our experiences make sense, considering
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ambiguities and paradoxes of experience, and remaining open to fluid and contingent
knowledge, is to do theology that has and makes “body-sense.”
Understanding the extent of how our bodily perceptual orientations may also be
intrinsically connected to experiences of violence, be it socio-cultural conquest or
individual victimization, we can now add body theology as critical mass when weighing
in on how to move away/across from stereotypical imagery or sound bites. We may cross
habituated alignments, but always must do so bodily, to change the domination of
“lesser” beings, such as bodies with a sex other than male, races aligned different that
white, environments emerging other than industrial, socio-cultural ways of experiencing
other than linear-rationally.
We and the world emerge together through sense-making bodies. The significance
of our place in the world emerges for us through sensing bodies. Our sensing is more than
just structures of thought or embodied, but biological or mechanical, processes. Our
sensing experiences are our perceptions, feelings, experiences, expressions, motivations,
intentions, behaviors, styles, and rhythms. 62 We are existing in the world in/as/through
sensing bodies; in and through our bodies and bodily senses we come to perceive the
world and are perceived by it. Theology can and must gain body-sense if it seeks to be
grounded in experience.
***
It is 2009, and I sit outside with my mother, enjoying some gaeng gai and German
cheesecake. After talking about developing her own recipe for German cheesecake over
62
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Symbols and Images in the Interpretation of Religion, 7.
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six months of baking, she tells me about the first time I left Germany to go abroad for a
year. “Your dad couldn’t sleep well that first night. He was tossing and turning. I finally
got up and got him your pillow that was still on your bed and put it next to him. It still
smelled like you. He fell asleep then.” She then tells me, “Go inside to your grandmother.
Say goodbye. Who knows how long she will still be around? But maybe, for a long time
still.” I go inside, already dreading the sight of my grandmother. She is lying in her bed.
I think she might be looking at me, but I am not quite sure. I cannot bring myself to touch
her hand, but I try to conjure up memories of her holding mine. I cannot quite remember.
I try to say goodbye, but realize that I have grieved her passing some years ago already.
There is a body in front of me that used to hold me, whose warmth and comfort I sought
when I was just a small child. I am crying a bit, but I think those are tears of guilt and
confusion. I am trying to pray for her to die before too long, before bitterness consumes
my mother more than it already has. I am not sure when this kind of God emerged for me,
a God I can ask to deliver the death of a grandmother. But I get a sense that this kind of
God emerged as meaningful in our experiences as family. I take this strange sense, this
dis-orientation to my family, to my sense of self, to my theological conceptions, with me
as I board the plane to leave home and return home to my spouse and my theological
journey on foreign soil.
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CODA: SENSING FUTURITIES
Body theology as I reframed it here contributes to and enhances the grounding of
theology in experience by inviting complex investigations into the perceptual dimensions
of bodily experience. It anchors theological construction in experience and fosters
complex investigations that account for particularity and difference while also relating
how commonalities and communally cohesive experiences may come about. Regarding
experience, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception contributed concepts, such as
intentionality, to explore the bodily processes orienting our existence in the world. To be
bodily perceptually oriented in the world implies to experience others and the world
habitually in specific ways, and these ways of experiencing (in) the world are
fundamentally bodily as well as culturally specific, in other words, there are individual
and cultural differences to account for in terms of accounting for experience.
But why the turn to theology? The personal, familial, social, political experiences
I recount also occupy sacred, divine, spiritual, religious dimensions. The latter then are
part of the full sensorium of human experience, be it as specific experiences of the divine,
or as explanatory/analyical category for experiencing concepts such as race, ability or
gender.1 But ultimately, to frame this project and its outcomes specifically as theology is

1

See for example, J. Kameron Carter, Race: A Theological Account (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2008). Jennings, The Christian Imagination Willie James Jennings, The Christian
Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). Creamer.
Brian Brock and John Swinton, eds., Disability in the Christian Tradition: A Reader (Grand Rapids, MI:
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not solely a scholarly self-situating, though I do engage this interdisciplinary work
explicitly as a theologian. I am also seeking to establish a dialogical bridge where I
perceive a methodological one way flux, thus I am insisting that theologians should not
just be critical consumers of insights gained from other disciplines, but develop
interdisciplinary projects decidedly theological in creative collaboration. Lastly, and
importantly, theology allows me to inquire into human experiences and questions of
meaning and value more creatively and holistically. Put differently, theological
frameworks allow me to inquire into meanings experienced without having to take an
objective or scientific stance regarding religious/metaphysical phenomena. Theology may
go beyond conceiving of religious phenomena as inherent to our bodily existence in the
world. As theologian, I can go beyond accounting for experiences of the supernatural as
inherently connected to our meaning making. Even with acknowledging and accounting
for potential gaps in understanding due to different perceptual orientations to religious
experience, as a theologian I am able to go beyond descriptions and accounts towards
constructions of and appeals to the supernatural.2
To do body theology is to tell of our bodily experiences in a way so we may see
the world and meanings experienced in it in a different way, be it more complexly, or be

Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012). Amos Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome: Reimagining Disability
in Late Modernity (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2007). Paula M. Cooey, Religious Imagination and
the Body: A Feminist Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Jonneke Bekkenkamp, ed.
Begin with the Body: Corporeality Religion and Gender (Leuven, The Netherlands: Peeters, 1998).
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For example, my interests and concerns in this project are akin to Vásquez’s materialist theory of
religion. We do differ, however, not just in our situating ourselves as theologian or religious studies
scholar, respectively, but significantly in what these disciplines allow us to do constructively. While
Vásquez may be able to account for the supernatural in his reintroduction of embodiment to theories of
religion, I may also be able to appeal to it. Manuel A. Vásquez, More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of
Religion (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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it by taking on new perspectives. To do theology, in this case, to do body theology, is to
think via bodily perceptual orientations of bodies and their intimate connections to
manifestations of life in all its various shades, tastes, and tunes, be it the bitterness of
oppression or the dance of abundance.
Resourcing the full sensorium of experience and engaging body theology,
however, need not be limited to projects that are theological in nature. Because the
principles for body theology I presented urge us to attend to the particular ways of
hearing, seeing, thinking, imagining, smelling, moving, etc., in short, the particular ways
of experiencing bodily in the world, various areas for further application come to my
mind, some immediate and directly connected to this project, some reaching further into
deeper interdisciplinary conversations to be had.
For example, areas only hinted at in this project are connections between
theological anthropological implications and ethical considerations, which may be made
with body theology principles in mind. Coming from my reflections on the last years in
the life of my Grandmother, her mental and physical decline due to age and Alzheimer’s
disease, body theology will allow me to consider agency and ethical questions complexly.
If, as I argue throughout, we need to forego notions of body/mind dualisms and
understand our existence in the world as embodied consciousness, as conscious bodies,
this understanding will have to bear on our consideration of bodily experiences such as
dementia. Subjectivity and agency are theoretical terms to think through, but with
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concrete consequences for embodied life, medical and moral approaches and
intersections of the two.3
Another example of bringing body theology to theological concepts might be to
construct a theological eschatology grounded through body theology, an eschatology
which is based in the bodily experiences of change and endings, endings beyond end of
life concepts but grounded in the endings and transformations experienced throughout
life, reversible and final, sudden and gradual, expected and surprising. Theological
constructions of atonement and redemption, grounded in experience via body theology,
might yield imaginative theological work, considering atonement beyond metaphysical
realities and queering justice through embodied acts.
Those interested in exploring other theoretical connections, such as theories of
space, theories of architecture, or environmental studies, may find in body theology
connections useful to their explorations. How we experience spaces—related to the
social, political, cultural, and religious—is intrinsically connected to our bodily
perceptual orientations, our individual bodily capacities as well as our socially trained
3

For example, Marcia W. Mount Shoop engaged embodiment and ambiguities of lived
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and sensorially transmitted values regarding movement, and symbolic as well as
embodied alignments of bodies in space.4 To insist on inherent body/mind/world/culture
interrelations is also to reorient ourselves to the human/animal/other divide, and
investigate the ways in which anthropocentric conceptions of experience may be
overcome.
This last trajectory is critical when continuing cross-cultural body theology
inquiries. A comparative body theology, as I would like to pursue it at some point, would
be able to embrace constructive comparisons of differently religious theologies, but
significantly base it on experience as they might connect to theological themes. 5 Such
religio-cultural comparisons need to be able to conceive of experience as not exclusively
a human feature, rather, comparative work needs to be able to conceptualize orientations
in which all that is in the world is sentient, and therefore, may experience in some way.
Body theology can contribute to the framework of such comparative work, already
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presuming a body/world interrelation, while also remaining flexible enough to attend to
specific shapes this interrelation is conceived of in other contexts.
In the end, however, I find myself significantly oriented in the world as a
theologian, a feminist, postcolonial, queer, moral, Mennonite, body theologian, and
therefore, a theologian through and on whose body different allegiances, alliances,
transgressions, and desires crisscross, merge, and induce motile tensions and
bodily/intellectual turnings. Theologically and personally, I want to see body theology
contributing to the good life of all living beings, however goodness is sensed. To
investigate into meaning of experiences and orientations of life towards each other may
take theoretical-philosophical avenues, as I have done so in this project. But ultimately
and significantly, the concerns that lead up to this project and which continue to stir in
me as I move on from it, are connected to the sense of responsibility/response-ability to
those other(ed) persons I am connected to, either by family, by choice, and/or by global
implication. To investigate and to struggle, complexly and thoroughly, with the ways in
which “I” came about—as product of cultures, privileges and absence thereof, personal
choices, mentored growth, perceptual orientations, educational formation, etc.—to me is
significant in order to construct body theologies for and on behalf of others who may find
this specific project inaccessible, in word and/or space.
I am thinking of women like my mother, for whom education and sophisticated
German and English language was/is out of reach, for whom books, computers, journals,
and the internet are not part of her daily habits, a woman who worked hard to make all
those things accessible to her daughter, yet who struggles to make her life meaningful
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and worth living without them, and who is proud of my academic successes but rightfully
suspicious of academic projects (this one included). If body theology cannot matter in the
embodied lives of especially those whose experiences have been excluded from decent
theologies, then it would be indeed a futile exercise.
My hope for the future of constructive body theologies is that they can remain
grounded in (and insistent on) the various and diverse kinds of good life desired to be
lived. I wish for body theology to be diverse in its interdisciplinary investigations,
sophisticatedly theoretical and poetically comprehensible, and always humble enough in
its sophistication and poetics to acknowledge that inevitably, body theology will get it
wrong, will fail to liberate, will contribute to alienation, will ignore what is significant to
particular experiences. And body theology will be okay with it, will continue to
investigate and imagine life and meaning as experienced. Because –isms such as racism,
ableism, sexism, nationalism, etc., are in fact embodied, visceral perceptual experiences,
habituated in laws, regulations, behaviors, and beliefs, they may change and shift. Yet
this does not deny us attempts to make the experiences of –isms do theoretical work for
us as analytic categories, granted that we allow for those categories to work for us in the
ambiguity and fluidity that they do their work with in our embodied lives.
“The body is our general medium for having a world.”6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty
“In that sense we must remember that the starting point of our theologies are
bodies, but the rebellious bodies: […] the body ‘as is’ before theology starts to draw
demonic and divine inscriptions in it.” 7 Marcella Althaus-Reid

6

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 146.

330

“That which does not bear directly upon human life and move toward the creation
of justice in society is not worth our bother.”8 Carter Heyward
“Go tell them my story, tell them how I cook here.”9 Unchalee Peckruhn

7

Marcella M. Althaus-Reid, "'Pussy, Queen of Pirates': Acker, Isherwood and the Debate on the
Body in Feminist Theology.," Feminist Theology 12, no. 2 (2004): 158.
8

Heyward, Speaking of Christ: A Lesbian Feminist Voice, 34.

9

Personal conversation. Eichenhof, Germany. July 1, 2010.
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